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131 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Leadaxe
0c0c10b5d3 docs(010): use rename-stable SPECS folder ref in fix comments
sing-box-lx is dropping type/status from SPEC folder names
(NNN-T-S-NAME → NNN-NAME), so the -B-C- tail goes stale. Point at the
new stable folder name SPECS/010-WG_ENDPOINT_GRO_SPLIT_BRAIN.
Comment-only, no behavior change.
2026-06-22 11:28:39 +03:00
Leadaxe
6513629626 docs(010): spec folder O→C in fix comments 2026-06-21 17:52:53 +03:00
Leadaxe
fb8d8d8fca fix(010): never enable UDP_GRO on android (GRO split-brain killed download)
runtime.GOOS=="android" (not "linux"), so StdNetBind enabled UDP_GRO and read
rxOffload=true, but the GRO receive dispatcher in bind_std.go is gated on
GOOS=="linux" → dead on android. A coalesced GRO super-packet was read as one
datagram, corrupting the WG transport stream → download died on no-detour
WG-endpoint (detour path uses ClientBind, no offload, so it worked).

Gate both the UDP_GRO setsockopt (controlfns_linux.go) and the rxOffload
readback (features_linux.go) behind !android. TX/GSO untouched, so non-android
linux performance is unchanged. Confirmed on device (CPH2411/Android-15:
probe gave rxOffload=true + dispatch=single).

See SPECS/010-B-O-WG_ENDPOINT_GRO_SPLIT_BRAIN.
2026-06-21 15:49:57 +03:00
Leadaxe
7b15aacbfe docs: spell out why neither fork alone works (each gives half) before the merge rationale 2026-06-09 18:05:40 +03:00
Leadaxe
a2307b51f7 docs: drop dangling "(A)" label; explain the merge direction inline 2026-06-09 18:04:06 +03:00
Leadaxe
7e50606f80 docs: bilingual README (EN + RU); repo renamed to wireguard-go-awg2-lx 2026-06-09 17:58:39 +03:00
Leadaxe
58f534ff10 docs: add README — sagernet/wireguard-go + AmneziaWG 2.0 (3-way merge)
Explain why this fork exists (sing-box needs sagernet APIs, AmneziaWG obfuscation
lives in amneziawg-go, neither alone works), how the merge is done
(3-way merge + MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize=0, obfuscation isolated to
device/), how sing-box-lx consumes it (submodule + replace), and the recipe to
rebase onto a new sagernet tag.
2026-06-09 17:51:32 +03:00
Leadaxe
27290b6de3 lx: graft AmneziaWG 2.0 obfuscation onto sagernet/wireguard-go
3-way merge of amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go (AWG2, I1-I5 CPS + S4 keepalive) into
sagernet/wireguard-go@506b763185 (the base sing-box uses). Keeps sagernet's
sing-box-compat additions (Send offset contract, InputPacket, conn reserved/
control) and neutralizes the encapsulating headroom (MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize=0)
so obfuscation composes cleanly. Obfuscation lives in device/ (obf*.go, magic-header.go
new files + send/receive/device/uapi grafts); conn/tun/ipc kept pure sagernet.

LIVE-VALIDATED: handshake + keepalive + traffic against a real AmneziaWG 2.0 server.
2026-06-09 16:49:21 +03:00
admin
f4f4c99926 fix: apply S4 transport padding to keepalive packets
Keepalive packets were excluded from S4 padding because the padding
logic was nested inside the dataSent guard. The receiving side
(DeterminePacketTypeAndPadding) expects S4 padding on all transport
packets, so unpadded keepalives fail H4 header validation and are
silently dropped.

This prevents the responder from completing key confirmation —
lastHandshakeNano stays 0 until real data flows through the tunnel.
2026-05-13 11:11:21 +02:00
Yaroslav Gurov
12a012205e readme: actualize type for H1-H4 2026-03-31 17:56:17 +02:00
Yaroslav Gurov
e7ef4339e7 readme: remove <c> tag from tag reference 2026-03-23 12:10:15 +01:00
世界
506b763185
Fix reserved bytes offset in StdNetBind.Send 2026-02-24 15:47:47 +08:00
Yaroslav Gurov
449d7cffd4
Feature/outline glue (#106)
* feat: added outline integration layer

* chore: make the function used in RegisterFallbackParser a standalone one

* fix: check if domain has a dot prior trimming it

* fix: use net.JoinHostPort instead of plain concat
2025-12-19 03:14:48 +01:00
vkamn
e796d477d8
chore: update license (#105)
Signed-off-by: vkamn <vk@amnezia.org>
2025-12-11 18:56:42 +08:00
Yaroslav Gurov
730d6c39d0 chore: add docs for the params from awg2 2025-12-01 13:11:33 +01:00
Yaroslav Gurov
0361c54dca
fix: refactor processing of junk packets (#103)
- fix the bug that transport packet interprets as init/resp/cookie with the same size
- cleanup error responses
- reduce buffer allocations
2025-12-01 20:07:48 +08:00
世界
16510ac472
Fix input packet 2025-09-17 19:03:11 +08:00
世界
c63bc19bc9
Export std net bind 2025-09-15 18:17:24 +08:00
世界
b2a20cdd77
Add device.InputPacket 2025-09-15 18:15:47 +08:00
世界
606102e010
Add pause support 2025-09-15 18:13:07 +08:00
世界
2835be4411
Add custom worker size params
(cherry picked from commit 7c2acadba17cadf8a1df957c49e1333130d460ad)
(cherry picked from commit a7bac1754e7717e1d4009d1ffd2d13330067d631)
(cherry picked from commit 7a2f11c693b49e784318bbf987173095c67b563d)
2025-09-15 18:12:52 +08:00
世界
d79d3c88fd
Reformat code 2025-09-15 18:12:47 +08:00
世界
558e1e0493
Rename module 2025-09-15 18:12:36 +08:00
世界
dfa4a8968f
Add module_rename.py 2025-09-15 18:12:27 +08:00
世界
177dea9806
Remove unused 2025-09-15 18:12:04 +08:00
世界
e4aedc6f6e
Add remove unused script 2025-09-15 18:12:00 +08:00
世界
f8eafb781b
Update .gitignore 2025-09-15 18:12:00 +08:00
Mark Puha
f6542209f4
feat: awg 2.0 (#91)
* feat: ranged H1-H4
* feat: S3, S4 support
* chore: updated awg-tools version

---------

Co-authored-by: Yaroslav Gurov <ygurov@proton.me>
2025-09-01 14:04:52 +02:00
Jordan Whited
1d0488a3d7 conn,device: eval conn.PeerAwareEndpoint per-packet
Peer.SetEndpointFromPacket is not called per-packet. It is
guaranteed to be called at least once per packet batch.

Updates tailscale/corp#30042
Updates tailscale/corp#20732

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-07-16 10:06:48 -07:00
Jordan Whited
4064566eca device: fix keepalive detection in TX path
Updates tailscale/corp#30364

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-07-10 22:05:09 -07:00
Jordan Whited
1f398ae148 conn,device: implement InitiationAwareEndpoint
To be implemented by [magicsock.lazyEndpoint], which is responsible for
triggering JIT peer configuration.

Updates tailscale/corp#20732
Updates tailscale/corp#30042

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-07-07 15:05:04 -07:00
pokamest
1abd24b5b9
Merge pull request #85 from amnezia-vpn/hotfix/docker-script
fix: restore Dockerfile changes
2025-07-07 16:20:58 +03:00
Yaroslav Gurov
3f19f1c657 fix: restore Dockerfile 2025-07-07 15:15:29 +02:00
Mykola Baibuz
c207898480
AmneziaWG v1.5 (#84) 2025-07-07 13:34:51 +01:00
pokamest
fe75b639fa
Merge pull request #78 from jmwample/jmwample/upstream
Sync with Major Upstream changes
2025-07-02 03:01:39 +01:00
Jordan Whited
24483d7a00 conn,device: always perform PeerAwareEndpoint check
It was previously suppressed if roaming was disabled for the peer.
Tailscale always disables roaming as we explicitly configure
conn.Endpoint's for all peers.

This commit also modifies PeerAwareEndpoint usage such that wireguard-go
never uses/sets it as a Peer Endpoint value. In theory we (Tailscale)
always disable roaming, so we should always return early from
SetEndpointFromPacket(), but this acts as an extra footgun guard and
improves clarity around intended usage.

Updates tailscale/corp#27502
Updates tailscale/corp#29422
Updates tailscale/corp#30042

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-07-01 15:37:56 -07:00
jmwample
169ed49a46
fix formatting discrepancy 2025-06-23 14:56:43 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
eeb8aae13e
version: bump snapshot
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:56:43 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
99f2e6d66f
conn: don't enable GRO on Linux < 5.12
Kernels below 5.12 are missing this:

    commit 98184612aca0a9ee42b8eb0262a49900ee9eef0d
    Author: Norman Maurer <norman_maurer@apple.com>
    Date:   Thu Apr 1 08:59:17 2021

        net: udp: Add support for getsockopt(..., ..., UDP_GRO, ..., ...);

        Support for UDP_GRO was added in the past but the implementation for
        getsockopt was missed which did lead to an error when we tried to
        retrieve the setting for UDP_GRO. This patch adds the missing switch
        case for UDP_GRO

        Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.")
        Signed-off-by: Norman Maurer <norman_maurer@apple.com>
        Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
        Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

That means we can't set the option and then read it back later. Given
how buggy UDP_GRO is in general on odd kernels, just disable it on older
kernels all together.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:56:43 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
d5359f52f0
device: add support for removing allowedips individually
This pairs with the recent change in wireguard-tools.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:56:43 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
6768090667
version: bump snapshot
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:56:43 -06:00
Kurnia D Win
2cad62c40b
rwcancel: fix wrong poll event flag on ReadyWrite
It should be POLLIN because closeFd is read-only file.

Signed-off-by: Kurnia D Win <kurnia.d.win@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:27:20 -06:00
Tom Holford
8051f17147
device: use rand.NewSource instead of rand.Seed
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:27:06 -06:00
Tom Holford
ace3e11ef2
global: replaced unused function params with _
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:26:55 -06:00
ruokeqx
8a2b2bf4f4
tun: darwin: fetch flags and mtu from if_msghdr directly
Signed-off-by: ruokeqx <ruokeqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:26:37 -06:00
Tu Dinh Ngoc
75d6c67a67
tun: use add-with-carry in checksumNoFold()
Use parallel summation with native byte order per RFC 1071.
add-with-carry operation is used to add 4 words per operation.  Byteswap
is performed before and after checksumming for compatibility with old
`checksumNoFold()`.  With this we get a 30-80% speedup in `checksum()`
depending on packet sizes.

Add unit tests with comparison to a per-word implementation.

**Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4210R CPU @ 2.40GHz**

| Size | OldTime | NewTime | Speedup  |
|------|---------|---------|----------|
| 64   | 12.64   | 9.183   | 1.376456 |
| 128  | 18.52   | 12.72   | 1.455975 |
| 256  | 31.01   | 18.13   | 1.710425 |
| 512  | 54.46   | 29.03   | 1.87599  |
| 1024 | 102     | 52.2    | 1.954023 |
| 1500 | 146.8   | 81.36   | 1.804326 |
| 2048 | 196.9   | 102.5   | 1.920976 |
| 4096 | 389.8   | 200.8   | 1.941235 |
| 8192 | 767.3   | 413.3   | 1.856521 |
| 9000 | 851.7   | 448.8   | 1.897727 |
| 9001 | 854.8   | 451.9   | 1.891569 |

**AMD EPYC 7352 24-Core Processor**

| Size | OldTime | NewTime | Speedup  |
|------|---------|---------|----------|
| 64   | 9.159   | 6.949   | 1.318031 |
| 128  | 13.59   | 10.59   | 1.283286 |
| 256  | 22.37   | 14.91   | 1.500335 |
| 512  | 41.42   | 24.22   | 1.710157 |
| 1024 | 81.59   | 45.05   | 1.811099 |
| 1500 | 120.4   | 68.35   | 1.761522 |
| 2048 | 162.8   | 90.14   | 1.806079 |
| 4096 | 321.4   | 180.3   | 1.782585 |
| 8192 | 650.4   | 360.8   | 1.802661 |
| 9000 | 706.3   | 398.1   | 1.774177 |
| 9001 | 712.4   | 398.2   | 1.789051 |

Signed-off-by: Tu Dinh Ngoc <dinhngoc.tu@irit.fr>
[Jason: simplified and cleaned up unit tests]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:26:25 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
ac8a885a03
tun/netstack: cleanup network stack at closing time
Colin's commit went a step further and protected tun.incomingPacket with
a lock on shutdown, but let's see if the tun.stack.Close() call actually
solves that on its own.

Suggested-by: kshangx <hikeshang@hotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Colin Adler <colin1adler@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:26:07 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
6a7c878409
tun/netstack: remove usage of pkt.IsNil()
Since 3c75945fd ("netstack: remove PacketBuffer.IsNil()") this has been
invalid. Follow the replacement pattern of that commit.

The old definition inlined to the same code anyway:

 func (pk *PacketBuffer) IsNil() bool {
 	return pk == nil
 }

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:25:57 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
704d57c27a
mod: bump deps
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:25:36 -06:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
c0b6e6a200
global: bump copyright notice
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:20:32 -06:00
Jordan Whited
c803ce1e5b
device: fix missed return of QueueOutboundElementsContainer to its WaitPool
Fixes: 3bb8fec ("conn, device, tun: implement vectorized I/O plumbing")
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:18:41 -06:00
Jordan Whited
deedce495a
device: fix WaitPool sync.Cond usage
The sync.Locker used with a sync.Cond must be acquired when changing
the associated condition, otherwise there is a window within
sync.Cond.Wait() where a wake-up may be missed.

Fixes: 4846070 ("device: use a waiting sync.Pool instead of a channel")
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-06-23 14:18:28 -06:00
Jordan Whited
65cd6eed7d conn,device: provide 8 free bytes at packet head to conn.Bind.Send()
This enables a conn.Bind to bring its own encapsulating transport, e.g.
VXLAN/Geneve.

Updates tailscale/corp#27502

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-05-30 14:02:35 -07:00
Alexander Yastrebov
022546570f device: optimize message encoding
Optimize message encoding by eliminating binary.Write (which internally
uses reflection) in favour of hand-rolled encoding.

This is companion to 9e7529c3d2.

Synthetic benchmark:

    var packetSink []byte
    func BenchmarkMessageInitiationMarshal(b *testing.B) {
        var msg MessageInitiation
        b.Run("binary.Write", func(b *testing.B) {
            b.ReportAllocs()
            for range b.N {
                var buf [MessageInitiationSize]byte
                writer := bytes.NewBuffer(buf[:0])
                _ = binary.Write(writer, binary.LittleEndian, msg)
                packetSink = writer.Bytes()
            }
        })
        b.Run("binary.Encode", func(b *testing.B) {
            b.ReportAllocs()
            for range b.N {
                packet := make([]byte, MessageInitiationSize)
                _, _ = binary.Encode(packet, binary.LittleEndian, msg)
                packetSink = packet
            }
        })
        b.Run("marshal", func(b *testing.B) {
            b.ReportAllocs()
            for range b.N {
                packet := make([]byte, MessageInitiationSize)
                _ = msg.marshal(packet)
                packetSink = packet
            }
        })
    }

Results:
                                             │      -      │
                                             │   sec/op    │
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Write-8    1.337µ ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Encode-8   1.242µ ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/marshal-8         53.05n ± 1%

                                             │     -      │
                                             │    B/op    │
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Write-8    368.0 ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Encode-8   160.0 ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/marshal-8         160.0 ± 0%

                                             │     -      │
                                             │ allocs/op  │
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Write-8    3.000 ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/binary.Encode-8   1.000 ± 0%
    MessageInitiationMarshal/marshal-8         1.000 ± 0%

cherry picked from commit WireGuard/wireguard-go@264889f0bb

Updates tailscale/corp#28879

Signed-off-by: Alexander Yastrebov <yastrebov.alex@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-05-29 10:43:47 -07:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
ae0636254c device: make unmarshall length checks exact
This is already enforced in receive.go, but if these unmarshallers are
to have error return values anyway, make them as explicit as possible.

cherry picked from commit WireGuard/wireguard-go@842888ac5c

Updates tailscale/corp#28879

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-05-29 10:43:47 -07:00
Alexander Yastrebov
19f7e29805 device: reduce RoutineHandshake allocations
Reduce allocations by eliminating byte reader, hand-rolled decoding and
reusing message structs.

Synthetic benchmark:

    var msgSink MessageInitiation
    func BenchmarkMessageInitiationUnmarshal(b *testing.B) {
        packet := make([]byte, MessageInitiationSize)
        reader := bytes.NewReader(packet)
        err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msgSink)
        if err != nil {
            b.Fatal(err)
        }
        b.Run("binary.Read", func(b *testing.B) {
            b.ReportAllocs()
            for range b.N {
                reader := bytes.NewReader(packet)
                _ = binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msgSink)
            }
        })
        b.Run("unmarshal", func(b *testing.B) {
            b.ReportAllocs()
            for range b.N {
                _ = msgSink.unmarshal(packet)
            }
        })
    }

Results:
                                         │      -      │
                                         │   sec/op    │
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/binary.Read-8   1.508µ ± 2%
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/unmarshal-8     12.66n ± 2%

                                         │      -       │
                                         │     B/op     │
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/binary.Read-8   208.0 ± 0%
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/unmarshal-8     0.000 ± 0%

                                         │      -       │
                                         │  allocs/op   │
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/binary.Read-8   2.000 ± 0%
MessageInitiationUnmarshal/unmarshal-8     0.000 ± 0%

cherry picked from commit WireGuard/wireguard-go@9e7529c3d2

Updates tailscale/corp#28879

Signed-off-by: Alexander Yastrebov <yastrebov.alex@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-05-29 10:43:47 -07:00
Martin Basovnik
f74ff38c79 device: fix possible deadlock in close method
There is a possible deadlock in `device.Close()` when you try to close
the device very soon after its start. The problem is that two different
methods acquire the same locks in different order:

1. device.Close()
 - device.ipcMutex.Lock()
 - device.state.Lock()

2. device.changeState(deviceState)
 - device.state.Lock()
 - device.ipcMutex.Lock()

Reproducer:

    func TestDevice_deadlock(t *testing.T) {
    	d := randDevice(t)
    	d.Close()
    }

Problem:

    $ go clean -testcache && go test -race -timeout 3s -run TestDevice_deadlock ./device | grep -A 10 sync.runtime_SemacquireMutex
    sync.runtime_SemacquireMutex(0xc000117d20?, 0x94?, 0x0?)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/runtime/sema.go:77 +0x25
    sync.(*Mutex).lockSlow(0xc000130518)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/sync/mutex.go:171 +0x213
    sync.(*Mutex).Lock(0xc000130518)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/sync/mutex.go:90 +0x55
    golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device.(*Device).Close(0xc000130500)
            /Users/martin.basovnik/git/basovnik/wireguard-go/device/device.go:373 +0xb6
    golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device.TestDevice_deadlock(0x0?)
            /Users/martin.basovnik/git/basovnik/wireguard-go/device/device_test.go:480 +0x2c
    testing.tRunner(0xc00014c000, 0x131d7b0)
    --
    sync.runtime_SemacquireMutex(0xc000130564?, 0x60?, 0xc000130548?)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/runtime/sema.go:77 +0x25
    sync.(*Mutex).lockSlow(0xc000130750)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/sync/mutex.go:171 +0x213
    sync.(*Mutex).Lock(0xc000130750)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/sync/mutex.go:90 +0x55
    sync.(*RWMutex).Lock(0xc000130750)
            /usr/local/opt/go/libexec/src/sync/rwmutex.go:147 +0x45
    golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device.(*Device).upLocked(0xc000130500)
            /Users/martin.basovnik/git/basovnik/wireguard-go/device/device.go:179 +0x72
    golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device.(*Device).changeState(0xc000130500, 0x1)

cherry picked from commit WireGuard/wireguard-go@12269c2761

Updates tailscale/corp#28879

Signed-off-by: Martin Basovnik <martin.basovnik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-05-29 10:43:47 -07:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
2b555120c8 device: do atomic 64-bit add outside of vector loop
Only bother updating the rxBytes counter once we've processed a whole
vector, since additions are atomic.

cherry picked from commit WireGuard/wireguard-go@542e565baa

Updates tailscale/corp#28879

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2025-05-29 10:43:47 -07:00
Jordan Whited
6413b491d4 .github/workflows: establish basic build and test actions jobs
Upstream doesn't use GitHub actions for CI as GitHub is simply a mirror.
Our workflows involve GitHub, so establish some basic CI jobs.

Updates tailscale/corp#28877

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2025-05-28 19:41:03 -07:00
pokamest
27e661d68e
Merge pull request #70 from marko1777/junk-improvements
Junk improvements
2025-04-07 15:31:41 +01:00
Mark Puha
71be0eb3a6 faster and more secure junk creation 2025-03-18 08:34:23 +01:00
Brad Fitzpatrick
91a0587fb2 tun: add plan9 support
Reviewed-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
2025-03-03 16:01:00 -08:00
pokamest
e3f1273f8a
Merge pull request #64 from drkivi/master
Patch for golang crypto and net submodules
2025-02-18 11:50:35 +00:00
drkivi
c97b5b7615
Update go.sum
Signed-off-by: drkivi <115035277+drkivi@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-02-10 21:44:58 +03:30
drkivi
668ddfd455
Update go.mod
Submodules Version Up

Signed-off-by: drkivi <115035277+drkivi@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-02-10 21:44:17 +03:30
drkivi
b8da08c106
Update Dockerfile
golang -> 1.23.6
AWGTOOLS_RELEASE -> 1.0.20241018

Signed-off-by: drkivi <115035277+drkivi@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-02-10 21:43:02 +03:30
Nahum Shalman
0b8b35511f ipc: build on solaris/illumos 2025-01-07 08:53:29 -08:00
Brad Fitzpatrick
4e883d38c8 tun: use x/sys/unix IoctlIfreq/NewIfreq to set MTU on Linux
The manual struct packing was suspect:
https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/11899

And no need for doing it manually if there's API for it already.

Updates tailscale/tailscale#11899

Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
2024-11-12 17:44:20 -08:00
Jordan Whited
799c1978fa tun: add method for disabling TCP GRO on Linux
torvalds/linux@e269d79c7d broke virtio_net
TCP & UDP GRO causing GRO writes to return EINVAL. The bug was then
resolved later in
torvalds/linux@89add40066. The offending
commit was pulled into various LTS releases.

Updates tailscale/tailscale#13041

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-09-05 09:18:24 -07:00
Adrian Dewhurst
71393c576b tun: fix checksum test failures on non-4KiB page sizes
When generating page-aligned random bytes, random data started at the
beginning of the buffer that will be chopped off. When the page size
differs, the start of the returned slice is different than expected for
the expected checksums, causing the tests to fail.
2024-07-31 16:30:15 -04:00
Jordan Whited
6c039a188c tun: export optimized IP checksum funcs
External implementers of tun.Device may support GRO, requiring checksum
offload.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-07-31 13:07:01 -07:00
Jordan Whited
60eeedfd62 tun: export GSOSplit() for external Device implementers
External implementers of tun.Device may support GSO, and may also be
platform-agnostic, e.g. gVisor.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-07-23 18:54:28 -07:00
James Tucker
2f5d148bcf conn,device: enable cryptorouting via PeerAwareEndpoint
Introduce an optional extension point for Endpoint that enables a path
for WireGuard to inform an integration about the peer public key that is
associated with an Endpoint.

The API is expected to return either the same or a new Endpoint in
response to this function. A future version of this patch could
potentially remove the returned Endpoint, but would require larger
integrator changes downstream.

This adds a small per-packet cost that could later be removed with a
larger refactor of the wireguard-go interface and Tailscale magicsock
code, as well as introducing a generic bound for Endpoint in a device &
bind instance.

Updates tailscale/corp#20732
2024-07-05 08:25:31 -07:00
Iurii Egorov
2e3f7d122c Update Go version in Dockerfile 2024-07-01 13:47:44 +03:00
Jordan Whited
cfa45674af device: fix missed return of QueueOutboundElementsContainer to its WaitPool
Fixes: 3bb8fec ("conn, device, tun: implement vectorized I/O plumbing")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-06-27 10:12:25 -07:00
Jordan Whited
1e088837d1 device: fix WaitPool sync.Cond usage
The sync.Locker used with a sync.Cond must be acquired when changing
the associated condition, otherwise there is a window within
sync.Cond.Wait() where a wake-up may be missed.

Fixes: 4846070 ("device: use a waiting sync.Pool instead of a channel")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-06-27 10:12:25 -07:00
Iurii Egorov
2e7780471a
Remove GetOffloadInfo() (#32)
* Remove GetOffloadInfo()
* Remove GetOffloadInfo() from bind_windows as well
* Allow lightweight tags to be used in the version
2024-05-24 16:18:23 +01:00
albexk
87d8c00f86 Up go to 1.22.3, up crypto to 0.21.0 2024-05-21 08:09:58 -07:00
albexk
c00bda9200 Fix output of the version command 2024-05-14 03:51:01 -07:00
albexk
d2b0fc9789 Add resetting of message types when closing the device 2024-05-14 03:51:01 -07:00
albexk
77d39ff3b9 Minor naming changes 2024-05-14 03:51:01 -07:00
albexk
e433d13df6 Add disabling UDP GSO when an error occurs due to inconsistent peer mtu 2024-05-14 03:51:01 -07:00
RomikB
3ddf952973 unsafe rebranding: change pipe name 2024-05-13 11:10:42 -07:00
Jordan Whited
03c5a0ccf7 tun: implement API for disabling UDP GRO on Linux
Certain device drivers (e.g. vxlan, geneve) do not properly handle
coalesced UDP packets later in the stack, resulting in packet loss.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2024-04-29 11:54:44 -07:00
Brad Fitzpatrick
64040e6646 ipc: build on aix
Updates tailscale/tailscale#11361
2024-04-13 10:55:05 -07:00
albexk
3f0a3bcfa0 Fix wg reconnection problem after awg connection 2024-03-16 14:16:13 +00:00
AlexanderGalkov
4dddf62e57 Update Dockerfile
add wg and wg-quick symlinks

Signed-off-by: AlexanderGalkov <143902290+AlexanderGalkov@users.noreply.github.com>
2024-02-20 20:32:38 +07:00
tiaga
827ec6e14b
Merge pull request #21 from amnezia-vpn/fix-dockerfile
Fix Dockerfile
2024-02-13 21:47:55 +07:00
tiaga
92e28a0d14 Fix Dockerfile
Fix AmneziaWG tools installation.
2024-02-13 21:44:41 +07:00
tiaga
52fed4d362
Merge pull request #20 from amnezia-vpn/update_dockerfile
Update Dockerfile
2024-02-13 21:28:17 +07:00
tiaga
9c6b3ff332 Update Dockerfile
- rename `wg` and `wg-quick` to `awg` and `awg-quick` accordingly
- add iptables
- update AmneziaWG tools version
2024-02-13 21:27:34 +07:00
pokamest
7de7a9a754
Merge pull request #19 from amnezia-vpn/fix/go_sum
Fix go.sum
2024-02-12 05:31:57 -08:00
albexk
0c347529b8 Fix go.sum 2024-02-12 16:27:56 +03:00
albexk
6705978fc8 Add debug udp offload info 2024-02-12 04:40:23 -08:00
albexk
032e33f577 Fix Android UDP GRO check 2024-02-12 04:40:23 -08:00
albexk
59101fd202 Bump crypto, net, sys modules to the latest versions 2024-02-12 04:40:23 -08:00
tiaga
8bcfbac230
Merge pull request #17 from amnezia-vpn/fix-pipeline
Fix pipeline
2024-02-07 19:19:11 +07:00
tiaga
f0dfb5eacc Fix pipeline
Fix path to GitHub Actions workflow.
2024-02-07 18:53:55 +07:00
tiaga
9195025d8f
Merge pull request #16 from amnezia-vpn/pipeline
Add pipeline
2024-02-07 18:48:12 +07:00
tiaga
cbd414dfec Add pipeline
Build and push Docker image on a tag push.
2024-02-07 18:44:59 +07:00
tiaga
7155d20913
Merge pull request #14 from amnezia-vpn/docker
Update Dockerfile
2024-02-02 23:40:39 +07:00
tiaga
bfeb3954f6 Update Dockerfile
- update Alpine version
- improve `Dockerfile` to use pre-built AmneziaWG tools
2024-02-02 22:56:00 +07:00
Iurii Egorov
e3c9ec8012 Naming unify 2024-01-20 23:18:10 +03:00
pokamest
ce9d3866a3
Merge pull request #10 from amnezia-vpn/upstream-merge
Merge upstream changes
2024-01-14 13:37:00 -05:00
Iurii Egorov
e5f355e843 Fix incorrect configuration handling for zero-valued Jc 2024-01-14 18:22:02 +03:00
Iurii Egorov
c05b2ee2a3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/master' into upstream-merge 2024-01-09 21:34:30 +03:00
tiaga
180c9284f3
Merge pull request #7 from amnezia-vpn/docker
Add Dockerfile
2023-12-19 18:50:48 +07:00
tiaga
015e11875d Add Dockerfile
Build Docker image with the corresponding wg-tools version.
2023-12-19 18:46:04 +07:00
pokamest
b43118018e
Merge pull request #4 from amnezia-vpn/upstream-merge
Upstream merge
2023-11-30 10:49:31 -08:00
Jordan Whited
cc193a0b32 device: reduce redundant per-packet overhead in RX path
Peer.RoutineSequentialReceiver() deals with packet vectors and does not
need to perform timer and endpoint operations for every packet in a
given vector. Changing these per-packet operations to per-vector
improves throughput by as much as 10% in some environments.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-11-21 10:48:58 -08:00
Jordan Whited
8cc8b8b11b device: change Peer.endpoint locking to reduce contention
Access to Peer.endpoint was previously synchronized by Peer.RWMutex.
This has now moved to Peer.endpoint.Mutex. Peer.SendBuffers() is now the
sole caller of Endpoint.ClearSrc(), which is signaled via a new bool,
Peer.endpoint.clearSrcOnTx. Previous Callers of Endpoint.ClearSrc() now
set this bool, primarily via peer.markEndpointSrcForClearing().
Peer.SetEndpointFromPacket() clears Peer.endpoint.clearSrcOnTx when an
updated conn.Endpoint is stored. This maintains the same event order as
before, i.e. a conn.Endpoint received after peer.endpoint.clearSrcOnTx
is set, but before the next Peer.SendBuffers() call results in the
latest conn.Endpoint source being used for the next packet transmission.

These changes result in throughput improvements for single flow,
parallel (-P n) flow, and bidirectional (--bidir) flow iperf3 TCP/UDP
tests as measured on both Linux and Windows. Latency under load improves
especially for high throughput Linux scenarios. These improvements are
likely realized on all platforms to some degree, as the changes are not
platform-specific.

Co-authored-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-11-21 10:48:58 -08:00
Iurii Egorov
7af55a3e6f Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/master' 2023-11-17 22:42:13 +03:00
Jordan Whited
db7604d1aa tun: don't assume UDP GRO is supported
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-10-31 19:20:06 -07:00
Jordan Whited
24f8d7c9e7
tun: implement UDP GSO/GRO for Linux
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-10-26 12:09:09 -07:00
pokamest
c493b95f66
Update README.md
Signed-off-by: pokamest <pokamest@gmail.com>
2023-10-25 22:41:33 +01:00
Mazay B
b81ca925db peer.device.aSecMux.RLock added 2023-10-14 11:42:30 +01:00
pokamest
b34974c476
Merge pull request #3 from amnezia-vpn/bugfix/uapi_adv_sec_onoff
Manage advanced security via uapi
2023-10-09 06:07:20 -07:00
Mazay B
f30419e0d1 Manage advanced sec via uapi 2023-10-09 13:22:49 +01:00
Mark Puha
8f1a6a10b2
Advanced security (#2)
* Advanced security header layer & config
2023-10-05 21:41:27 +01:00
James Tucker
2f6748dc88
tun: fix crash when ForceMTU is called after close
Close closes the events channel, resulting in a panic from send on
closed channel.

Reported-By: Brad Fitzpatrick <brad@tailscale.com>
Link: https://github.com/tailscale/tailscale/issues/9555
Signed-off-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:58 -07:00
Andrea Barisani
202a3401e7
adjust build tags for tamago 2023-09-29 15:32:57 -07:00
Brad Fitzpatrick
6cd5922a04
all: adjust build tags for plan9
Signed-off-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:57 -07:00
Adrian Dewhurst
88b11b4a0d
tun: AMD64 optimized checksum
This adds AMD64 assembly implementations of IP checksum computation, one
for baseline AMD64 and the other for v3 AMD64 (AVX2 and BMI2).

All performance numbers reported are from a Ryzen 7 4750U but similar
improvements are expected for a wide range of processors.

The generic IP checksum implementation has also been further improved to
be significantly faster using bits.AddUint64 (for a 64KiB buffer the
throughput improves from 15,000MiB/s to 27,600MiB/s; similar gains are
also reported on ARM64 but I do not have specific numbers).

The baseline AMD64 implementation for a 64KiB buffer reports 32,700MiB/s
and the AVX2 implementation is slightly over 107,000MiB/s.

Unfortunately, for very small sizes (e.g. the expected size for an IPv4
header) setting up SIMD computation involves some overhead that makes
computing a checksum for small buffers slower than a non-SIMD
implementation. Even more unfortunately, testing for this at runtimen in
Go and calling a func optimized for small buffers mitigates most of the
improvement due to call overhead. The break even point is around 256
byte buffers; IPv4 headers are no more than 60 bytes including
extensions. IPv6 headers do not have a checksum but are a fixed size of
40 bytes. As a result, the generated assembly code uses an alternate
approach for buffers of less than 256 bytes. Additionally, buffers of
less than 32 bytes need to be handled specially because the strategy for
reading buffers that are not a multiple of 8 bytes fails when the buffer
is too small.

As suggested by additional benchmarking, pseudo header computation has
been rewritten to be faster (benchmark time reduced by 1/2 to 1/4).

Updates tailscale/corp#9755

Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:57 -07:00
Adrian Dewhurst
ec6f23b33e
tun: checksum tests and benchmarks
Signed-off-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:56 -07:00
Jordan Whited
cc7b29b8c6
device: move Queue{In,Out}boundElement Mutex to container type
Queue{In,Out}boundElement locking can contribute to significant
overhead via sync.Mutex.lockSlow() in some environments. These types
are passed throughout the device package as elements in a slice, so
move the per-element Mutex to a container around the slice.

Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:56 -07:00
Jordan Whited
ceb9a09d03
tun: reduce redundant checksumming in tcpGRO()
IPv4 header and pseudo header checksums were being computed on every
merge operation. Additionally, virtioNetHdr was being written at the
same time. This delays those operations until after all coalescing has
occurred.

Reviewed-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:56 -07:00
Jordan Whited
915962ded2
tun: unwind summing loop in checksumNoFold()
$ benchstat old.txt new.txt
goos: linux
goarch: amd64
pkg: golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun
cpu: 12th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-12400
                 │   old.txt    │               new.txt               │
                 │    sec/op    │   sec/op     vs base                │
Checksum/64-12     10.670n ± 2%   4.769n ± 0%  -55.30% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/128-12    19.665n ± 2%   8.032n ± 0%  -59.16% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/256-12     37.68n ± 1%   16.06n ± 0%  -57.37% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/512-12     76.61n ± 3%   32.13n ± 0%  -58.06% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/1024-12   160.55n ± 4%   64.25n ± 0%  -59.98% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/1500-12   231.05n ± 7%   94.12n ± 0%  -59.26% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/2048-12    309.5n ± 3%   128.5n ± 0%  -58.48% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/4096-12    603.8n ± 4%   257.2n ± 0%  -57.41% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/8192-12   1185.0n ± 3%   515.5n ± 0%  -56.50% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/9000-12   1328.5n ± 5%   564.8n ± 0%  -57.49% (p=0.000 n=10)
Checksum/9001-12   1340.5n ± 3%   564.8n ± 0%  -57.87% (p=0.000 n=10)
geomean             185.3n        77.99n       -57.92%

Reviewed-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:56 -07:00
Jordan Whited
d831fef379
device: distribute crypto work as slice of elements
After reducing UDP stack traversal overhead via GSO and GRO,
runtime.chanrecv() began to account for a high percentage (20% in one
environment) of perf samples during a throughput benchmark. The
individual packet channel ops with the crypto goroutines was the primary
contributor to this overhead.

Updating these channels to pass vectors, which the device package
already handles at its ends, reduced this overhead substantially, and
improved throughput.

The iperf3 results below demonstrate the effect of this commit between
two Linux computers with i5-12400 CPUs. There is roughly ~13us of round
trip latency between them.

The first result is with UDP GSO and GRO, and with single element
channels.

Starting Test: protocol: TCP, 1 streams, 131072 byte blocks
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr  Cwnd
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec  232   3.15 MBytes
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Test Complete. Summary Results:
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec  232   sender
[  5]   0.00-10.04  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec        receiver

The second result is with channels updated to pass a slice of
elements.

Starting Test: protocol: TCP, 1 streams, 131072 byte blocks
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr  Cwnd
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  13.2 GBytes  11.3 Gbits/sec  182   3.15 MBytes
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Test Complete. Summary Results:
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  13.2 GBytes  11.3 Gbits/sec  182   sender
[  5]   0.00-10.04  sec  13.2 GBytes  11.3 Gbits/sec        receiver

Reviewed-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:55 -07:00
Jordan Whited
e06231b861
conn, device: use UDP GSO and GRO on Linux
StdNetBind probes for UDP GSO and GRO support at runtime. UDP GSO is
dependent on checksum offload support on the egress netdev. UDP GSO
will be disabled in the event sendmmsg() returns EIO, which is a strong
signal that the egress netdev does not support checksum offload.

The iperf3 results below demonstrate the effect of this commit between
two Linux computers with i5-12400 CPUs. There is roughly ~13us of round
trip latency between them.

The first result is from commit 052af4a without UDP GSO or GRO.

Starting Test: protocol: TCP, 1 streams, 131072 byte blocks
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr  Cwnd
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  9.85 GBytes  8.46 Gbits/sec  1139   3.01 MBytes
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Test Complete. Summary Results:
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  9.85 GBytes  8.46 Gbits/sec  1139  sender
[  5]   0.00-10.04  sec  9.85 GBytes  8.42 Gbits/sec        receiver

The second result is with UDP GSO and GRO.

Starting Test: protocol: TCP, 1 streams, 131072 byte blocks
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr  Cwnd
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec  232   3.15 MBytes
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Test Complete. Summary Results:
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bitrate         Retr
[  5]   0.00-10.00  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec  232   sender
[  5]   0.00-10.04  sec  12.3 GBytes  10.6 Gbits/sec        receiver

Reviewed-by: Adrian Dewhurst <adrian@tailscale.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:32:54 -07:00
James Tucker
e26adb828d
go.mod,tun/netstack: bump gvisor
Signed-off-by: James Tucker <james@tailscale.com>
2023-09-29 15:07:45 -07:00
Jordan Whited
bd7e9d35d1
all: rename module (#7)
Signed-off-by: Jordan Whited <jordan@tailscale.com>
2023-09-27 15:03:39 -07:00
75 changed files with 3151 additions and 3601 deletions

41
.github/workflows/build-if-tag.yml vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
name: build-if-tag
on:
push:
tags:
- 'v[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+'
env:
APP: amneziawg-go
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: build
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: ${{ github.ref_name }}
- name: Login to Docker Hub
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Setup metadata
uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
id: metadata
with:
images: amneziavpn/${{ env.APP }}
tags: type=semver,pattern={{version}}
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- name: Build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
with:
push: true
tags: ${{ steps.metadata.outputs.tags }}

18
Dockerfile Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
FROM golang:1.24.4 as awg
COPY . /awg
WORKDIR /awg
RUN go mod download && \
go mod verify && \
go build -ldflags '-linkmode external -extldflags "-fno-PIC -static"' -v -o /usr/bin
FROM alpine:3.19
ARG AWGTOOLS_RELEASE="1.0.20250901"
RUN apk --no-cache add iproute2 iptables bash && \
cd /usr/bin/ && \
wget https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-tools/releases/download/v${AWGTOOLS_RELEASE}/alpine-3.19-amneziawg-tools.zip && \
unzip -j alpine-3.19-amneziawg-tools.zip && \
chmod +x /usr/bin/awg /usr/bin/awg-quick && \
ln -s /usr/bin/awg /usr/bin/wg && \
ln -s /usr/bin/awg-quick /usr/bin/wg-quick
COPY --from=awg /usr/bin/amneziawg-go /usr/bin/amneziawg-go

View file

@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to

View file

@ -9,23 +9,23 @@ MAKEFLAGS += --no-print-directory
generate-version-and-build:
@export GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES="$(realpath $(CURDIR)/..)" && \
tag="$$(git describe --dirty 2>/dev/null)" && \
tag="$$(git describe --tags --dirty 2>/dev/null)" && \
ver="$$(printf 'package main\n\nconst Version = "%s"\n' "$$tag")" && \
[ "$$(cat version.go 2>/dev/null)" != "$$ver" ] && \
echo "$$ver" > version.go && \
git update-index --assume-unchanged version.go || true
@$(MAKE) wireguard-go
@$(MAKE) amneziawg-go
wireguard-go: $(wildcard *.go) $(wildcard */*.go)
amneziawg-go: $(wildcard *.go) $(wildcard */*.go)
go build -v -o "$@"
install: wireguard-go
@install -v -d "$(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)" && install -v -m 0755 "$<" "$(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/wireguard-go"
install: amneziawg-go
@install -v -d "$(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)" && install -v -m 0755 "$<" "$(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/amneziawg-go"
test:
go test ./...
clean:
rm -f wireguard-go
rm -f amneziawg-go
.PHONY: all clean test install generate-version-and-build

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**English** · [Русский](README.ru.md)
# wireguard-go (lx fork) — sagernet + AmneziaWG 2.0
The WireGuard-Go runtime used by **[sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx)**:
**[sagernet/wireguard-go](https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go)** (the fork sing-box builds on) **+ AmneziaWG 2.0 obfuscation**, merged together.
This is **not** a general-purpose project. It exists for one reason — see below — and lives on the **`lx`** branch.
---
## Why this fork exists
sing-box's WireGuard endpoint needs **sagernet/wireguard-go**'s additions (the `conn.Bind.Send(…, offset)` contract, `device.InputPacket`, reserved/control). AmneziaWG's DPI-evasion obfuscation lives in **[amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go)**, which is a fork of *upstream* wireguard-go and therefore **lacks** those sagernet additions.
So neither fork alone works for sing-box-lx:
| | sing-box-compat API | AmneziaWG obfuscation |
|---|:---:|:---:|
| `sagernet/wireguard-go` | ✅ | ❌ |
| `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go` | ❌ | ✅ |
| **this fork** | ✅ | ✅ |
Each existing fork gives exactly **half** of what's needed:
- **Take `sagernet/wireguard-go`** → sing-box-lx compiles and runs, but the AWG fields (`jc`/`h1`/`i1`…) do nothing → **no obfuscation**; AmneziaWG doesn't actually work.
- **Take `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go`** → the obfuscation is there, but sing-box-lx **won't even compile** (the sagernet functions are missing).
We need **both** ✅ at once, and no ready-made fork has them — so we built one by **merging**: sagernet (for the API) + amnezia (for the obfuscation). That is exactly the **"this fork"** row above.
The approach: **keep the sagernet base and graft the obfuscation onto it** — rather than the reverse (adding sagernet's APIs to amneziawg-go, which would route even plain WireGuard through a foreign device). This way sing-box compiles unchanged, the obfuscation is additive and off by default, and a config without AWG fields behaves exactly like plain WireGuard.
## How the merge works
Both `sagernet/wireguard-go` and `amneziawg-go` descend from the same upstream `git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-go`, so they share git history — which makes a real **3-way merge** possible (not a hand-port).
- **Base:** `sagernet/wireguard-go` (the exact commit sing-box pins — currently `506b7631853c`).
- **Merged in:** `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go` (a tip with AWG2 / I1I5 + the S4-keepalive fix).
- **Key trick:** `MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize` is set to **`0`** in `device/noise-protocol.go`. sing-box-lx does not use sagernet's 8-byte `Bind.Send` headroom, and zeroing it makes the AmneziaWG obfuscation compose cleanly with no weave conflicts in the packet send path.
- **Isolation:** the obfuscation is confined to `device/` — new files `device/obf*.go`, `device/magic-header.go`, plus grafts in `device/{send,receive,device,uapi}.go`. **`conn/`, `tun/`, `ipc/` stay pure sagernet.**
- **Module path is unchanged** (`module github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go`) so the consumer plugs it in with a `replace` directive and needs **no import edits**.
## Consumed by
[sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx) wires this in as a git submodule + a `replace`:
```
# sing-box-lx/.gitmodules
[submodule "submodules/wireguard-go"]
url = https://github.com/Leadaxe/wireguard-go-awg2-lx
branch = lx
# sing-box-lx/go.mod (// lx)
replace github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go => ./submodules/wireguard-go
```
Built with the `with_awg` tag, it has been **live-validated** against a real AmneziaWG 2.0 server (handshake + keepalive + outbound traffic) and cross-compiles on linux/darwin/windows × amd64/arm64.
## Maintaining it (rebase onto a new sagernet tag)
When sing-box bumps `sagernet/wireguard-go`, redo the merge:
```sh
git remote add origin https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go # base
git remote add amnezia https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go # obfuscation source
git fetch --all
git checkout -b lx <new-sagernet-commit>
git merge amnezia/master # real 3-way merge via the shared upstream ancestor
```
Conflict resolution recipe:
1. New `device/obf*.go` + `device/magic-header.go` come in clean.
2. **Mechanical** conflicts (amnezia → sagernet import paths, `queueconstants*`, `sticky*`, `tun.go`) → take **ours** (sagernet).
3. Remove amnezia-added infra duplicates: `conn/gso_*.go`, `outline/*`, `tun/*_test.go`.
4. `device/device.go`**union** (sagernet `pauseManager` + amnezia obf fields).
5. `device/send.go` / `receive.go` → take amnezia's obfuscation, set `MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize = 0`, and keep the 3-arg `bind.Send(…, 0)` calls.
6. `conn/`, `tun/`, `ipc/`, `go.mod` module path → **ours** (sagernet).
Then in sing-box-lx: bump the submodule, `make -f Makefile.lx lx-build`, and re-test against an AWG2 server.
## Links
| | |
|---|---|
| Consumer | [Leadaxe/sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx) |
| Base | [sagernet/wireguard-go](https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go) |
| Obfuscation source | [amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go) · [docs.amnezia.org](https://docs.amnezia.org/documentation/amnezia-wg/) |
| Original | [WireGuard/wireguard-go](https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-go/about/) |
## License
MIT, inherited from WireGuard-Go (see [`LICENSE`](LICENSE)). The AmneziaWG obfuscation is likewise MIT (from amneziawg-go). This is an unofficial fork, not affiliated with WireGuard, SagerNet, or Amnezia.

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[English](README.md) · **Русский**
# wireguard-go (lx-форк) — sagernet + AmneziaWG 2.0
Рантайм WireGuard-Go для **[sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx)**:
**[sagernet/wireguard-go](https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go)** (форк, на котором собирается sing-box) **+ обфускация AmneziaWG 2.0**, слитые вместе.
Это **не** универсальный проект. Он существует ради одной задачи (см. ниже) и живёт на ветке **`lx`**.
---
## Зачем этот форк
WireGuard-endpoint sing-box нуждается в добавках **sagernet/wireguard-go** (контракт `conn.Bind.Send(…, offset)`, `device.InputPacket`, reserved/control). Обфускация против DPI у AmneziaWG живёт в **[amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go)**, который форкнут от *upstream* wireguard-go и потому этих sagernet-добавок **не имеет**.
Значит для sing-box-lx ни один форк по отдельности не подходит:
| | API под sing-box | обфускация AmneziaWG |
|---|:---:|:---:|
| `sagernet/wireguard-go` | ✅ | ❌ |
| `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go` | ❌ | ✅ |
| **этот форк** | ✅ | ✅ |
Каждый существующий форк даёт ровно **половину** нужного:
- **возьмёшь `sagernet/wireguard-go`** → sing-box-lx соберётся и запустится, но AWG-поля (`jc`/`h1`/`i1`…) ничего не сделают → **обфускации нет**; AmneziaWG не работает;
- **возьмёшь `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go`** → обфускация есть, но sing-box-lx **не скомпилируется** (нет sagernet-функций).
Нужны **обе** ✅ сразу, а готового форка с двумя галочками не существует — поэтому мы собрали его **слиянием**: sagernet (за API) + amnezia (за обфускацию). Это ровно строка **«этот форк»** выше.
Подход: **берём sagernet-базу и граффтим обфускацию на неё**а не наоборот (не дотачиваем sagernet-API к amneziawg-go, иначе даже обычный WireGuard шёл бы через чужой device). Так sing-box компилируется без изменений, обфускация аддитивна и выключена по умолчанию, а конфиг без AWG-полей ведёт себя как обычный WireGuard.
## Как устроен merge
И `sagernet/wireguard-go`, и `amneziawg-go` происходят от одного upstream `git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-go`, поэтому делят git-историю — а значит возможен настоящий **3-way merge** (а не ручной перенос).
- **База:** `sagernet/wireguard-go` (тот коммит, что пинит sing-box — сейчас `506b7631853c`).
- **Вливаем:** `amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go` (тип с AWG2 / I1I5 + фикс S4-keepalive).
- **Ключевой трюк:** `MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize` выставлен в **`0`** в `device/noise-protocol.go`. sing-box-lx не использует 8-байтный headroom sagernet для `Bind.Send`, и обнуление позволяет обфускации AmneziaWG встать чисто, без конфликтов в send-пути.
- **Изоляция:** обфускация замкнута в `device/` — новые файлы `device/obf*.go`, `device/magic-header.go` + графты в `device/{send,receive,device,uapi}.go`. **`conn/`, `tun/`, `ipc/` остаются чистым sagernet.**
- **Module-path не меняется** (`module github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go`), поэтому потребитель подключает форк через `replace` без правки импортов.
## Кто потребляет
[sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx) подключает это как git submodule + `replace`:
```
# sing-box-lx/.gitmodules
[submodule "submodules/wireguard-go"]
url = https://github.com/Leadaxe/wireguard-go-awg2-lx
branch = lx
# sing-box-lx/go.mod (// lx)
replace github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go => ./submodules/wireguard-go
```
Собранный с тегом `with_awg`, он **проверен живым** сервером AmneziaWG 2.0 (handshake + keepalive + трафик наружу) и кросс-компилируется на linux/darwin/windows × amd64/arm64.
## Сопровождение (ребейз на новый sagernet-тег)
Когда sing-box бампит `sagernet/wireguard-go`, повторяем merge:
```sh
git remote add origin https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go # база
git remote add amnezia https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go # источник обфускации
git fetch --all
git checkout -b lx <новый-sagernet-коммит>
git merge amnezia/master # настоящий 3-way merge через общего upstream-предка
```
Рецепт разрешения конфликтов:
1. Новые `device/obf*.go` + `device/magic-header.go` приходят чисто.
2. **Механические** конфликты (import-path amnezia → sagernet, `queueconstants*`, `sticky*`, `tun.go`) → берём **наши** (sagernet).
3. Удаляем amnezia-инфра-дубликаты: `conn/gso_*.go`, `outline/*`, `tun/*_test.go`.
4. `device/device.go`**union** (sagernet `pauseManager` + obf-поля amnezia).
5. `device/send.go` / `receive.go` → берём обфускацию amnezia, ставим `MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize = 0`, сохраняем 3-арг `bind.Send(…, 0)`.
6. `conn/`, `tun/`, `ipc/`, module-path в `go.mod`**наши** (sagernet).
Затем в sing-box-lx: бампим submodule, `make -f Makefile.lx lx-build` и пере-тест против AWG2-сервера.
## Ссылки
| | |
|---|---|
| Потребитель | [Leadaxe/sing-box-lx](https://github.com/Leadaxe/sing-box-lx) |
| База | [sagernet/wireguard-go](https://github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go) |
| Источник обфускации | [amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go) · [docs.amnezia.org](https://docs.amnezia.org/documentation/amnezia-wg/) |
| Оригинал | [WireGuard/wireguard-go](https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-go/about/) |
## Лицензия
MIT, унаследована от WireGuard-Go (см. [`LICENSE`](LICENSE)). Обфускация AmneziaWG — тоже MIT (из amneziawg-go). Это неофициальный форк, не аффилирован с WireGuard, SagerNet или Amnezia.

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
@ -23,13 +23,10 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
type EgressProvider interface {
SetEgressPort(port uint16) bool
LookupEgress(destination netip.AddrPort) *net.UDPConn
ReceiveEgress(buffer []byte) (int, netip.AddrPort, error)
}
var _ Bind = (*StdNetBind)(nil)
var (
_ Bind = (*StdNetBind)(nil)
_ Endpoint = (*StdNetEndpoint)(nil)
)
// StdNetBind implements Bind for all platforms. While Windows has its own Bind
// (see bind_windows.go), it may fall back to StdNetBind.
@ -38,7 +35,6 @@ var _ Bind = (*StdNetBind)(nil)
// proposal in https://github.com/golang/go/issues/45886#issuecomment-1218301564.
type StdNetBind struct {
externalControl control.Func
egressProvider EgressProvider
reservedForEndpoint map[netip.AddrPort][3]uint8
mu sync.Mutex // protects all fields except as specified
@ -46,8 +42,6 @@ type StdNetBind struct {
ipv6 *net.UDPConn
ipv4PC *ipv4.PacketConn // will be nil on non-Linux
ipv6PC *ipv6.PacketConn // will be nil on non-Linux
ipv4RC syscall.RawConn // will be nil on non-Darwin
ipv6RC syscall.RawConn // will be nil on non-Darwin
ipv4TxOffload bool
ipv4RxOffload bool
ipv6TxOffload bool
@ -57,8 +51,6 @@ type StdNetBind struct {
udpAddrPool sync.Pool
msgsPool sync.Pool
msgx msgXState
blackhole4 bool
blackhole6 bool
}
@ -78,12 +70,10 @@ func NewStdNetBind(externalControl control.Func) Bind {
msgsPool: sync.Pool{
New: func() any {
// ipv6.Message and ipv4.Message are interchangeable as they are
// both aliases for x/net/internal/socket.Message.
msgs := make([]ipv6.Message, IdealBatchSize)
for i := range msgs {
msgs[i].Buffers = make(net.Buffers, 1)
msgs[i].OOB = make([]byte, 0, stickyControlSize+gsoControlSize)
msgs[i].OOB = make([]byte, controlSize)
}
return &msgs
},
@ -126,7 +116,7 @@ func (e *StdNetEndpoint) DstIP() netip.Addr {
return e.AddrPort.Addr()
}
// See control_default,linux, etc for implementations of SrcIP and SrcIfidx.
// See sticky_default,linux, etc for implementations of SrcIP and SrcIfidx.
func (e *StdNetEndpoint) DstToBytes() []byte {
b, _ := e.AddrPort.MarshalBinary()
@ -176,6 +166,11 @@ func listenNet(externalControl control.Func, network string, port int) (*net.UDP
return conn.(*net.UDPConn), uaddr.Port, nil
}
// errEADDRINUSE is syscall.EADDRINUSE, boxed into an interface once
// in erraddrinuse.go on almost all platforms. For other platforms,
// it's at least non-nil.
var errEADDRINUSE error = errors.New("")
func (s *StdNetBind) Open(uport uint16) ([]ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
@ -186,7 +181,6 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) Open(uport uint16) ([]ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
if s.ipv4 != nil || s.ipv6 != nil {
return nil, 0, ErrBindAlreadyOpen
}
s.msgx.reset()
// Attempt to open ipv4 and ipv6 listeners on the same port.
// If uport is 0, we can retry on failure.
@ -203,7 +197,7 @@ again:
// Listen on the same port as we're using for ipv4.
v6conn, port, err = listenNet(s.externalControl, "udp6", port)
if uport == 0 && errors.Is(err, syscall.EADDRINUSE) && tries < 100 {
if uport == 0 && errors.Is(err, errEADDRINUSE) && tries < 100 {
v4conn.Close()
tries++
goto again
@ -215,85 +209,32 @@ again:
var fns []ReceiveFunc
if v4conn != nil {
s.ipv4TxOffload, s.ipv4RxOffload = supportsUDPOffload(v4conn)
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "android" {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
v4pc = ipv4.NewPacketConn(v4conn)
s.ipv4PC = v4pc
}
if supportsMsgX {
var receiveFn ReceiveFunc
receiveFn, err = s.makeReceiveMsgX(v4conn, false)
if err != nil {
v4conn.Close()
return nil, 0, err
}
s.ipv4RC, err = v4conn.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
v4conn.Close()
return nil, 0, err
}
fns = append(fns, receiveFn)
} else {
fns = append(fns, s.makeReceiveIPv4(v4pc, v4conn, s.ipv4RxOffload))
}
fns = append(fns, s.makeReceiveIPv4(v4pc, v4conn, s.ipv4RxOffload))
s.ipv4 = v4conn
}
if v6conn != nil {
s.ipv6TxOffload, s.ipv6RxOffload = supportsUDPOffload(v6conn)
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "android" {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
v6pc = ipv6.NewPacketConn(v6conn)
s.ipv6PC = v6pc
}
if supportsMsgX {
var receiveFn ReceiveFunc
receiveFn, err = s.makeReceiveMsgX(v6conn, true)
if err != nil {
v6conn.Close()
return nil, 0, err
}
s.ipv6RC, err = v6conn.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
v6conn.Close()
return nil, 0, err
}
fns = append(fns, receiveFn)
} else {
fns = append(fns, s.makeReceiveIPv6(v6pc, v6conn, s.ipv6RxOffload))
}
fns = append(fns, s.makeReceiveIPv6(v6pc, v6conn, s.ipv6RxOffload))
s.ipv6 = v6conn
}
if len(fns) == 0 {
return nil, 0, syscall.EAFNOSUPPORT
}
if s.egressProvider != nil {
s.egressProvider.SetEgressPort(uint16(port))
fns = append(fns, func(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, endpoints []Endpoint) (int, error) {
dataLength, source, err := s.egressProvider.ReceiveEgress(bufs[0])
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
sizes[0] = dataLength
if dataLength > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: SPEC 026 — gate reserved-clear on the egress receive path too, so a small-padding AmneziaWG magic in bytes 1-3 survives when no WARP reserved value is set
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
endpoints[0] = &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: source}
return 1, nil
})
}
return fns, uint16(port), nil
}
func (s *StdNetBind) SetEgressProvider(provider EgressProvider) {
s.egressProvider = provider
}
func (s *StdNetBind) putMessages(msgs *[]ipv6.Message) {
for i := range *msgs {
buffers := (*msgs)[i].Buffers
for j := range buffers {
buffers[j] = nil
}
(*msgs)[i] = ipv6.Message{Buffers: buffers[:1], OOB: (*msgs)[i].OOB[:0]}
(*msgs)[i] = ipv6.Message{Buffers: (*msgs)[i].Buffers, OOB: (*msgs)[i].OOB}
}
s.msgsPool.Put(msgs)
}
@ -328,9 +269,9 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) receiveIP(
}
defer s.putMessages(msgs)
var numMsgs int
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "android" {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
if rxOffload {
readAt := len(*msgs) - (IdealBatchSize / udpSegmentMaxDatagrams)
readAt := len(*msgs) - 2
numMsgs, err = br.ReadBatch((*msgs)[readAt:], 0)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
@ -359,7 +300,7 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) receiveIP(
if sizes[i] == 0 {
continue
}
if msg.N > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if msg.N > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[i][1:4])
}
ep := &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: M.AddrPortFromNet(msg.Addr)} // TODO: remove allocation
@ -384,12 +325,9 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) makeReceiveIPv6(pc *ipv6.PacketConn, conn *net.UDPConn, rxO
// TODO: When all Binds handle IdealBatchSize, remove this dynamic function and
// rename the IdealBatchSize constant to BatchSize.
func (s *StdNetBind) BatchSize() int {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "android" {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
return IdealBatchSize
}
if supportsMsgX {
return msgXBatchSize
}
return 1
}
@ -397,9 +335,6 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) Close() error {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if s.egressProvider != nil {
s.egressProvider.SetEgressPort(0)
}
var err1, err2 error
if s.ipv4 != nil {
err1 = s.ipv4.Close()
@ -437,21 +372,13 @@ func (e ErrUDPGSODisabled) Unwrap() error {
}
func (s *StdNetBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, endpoint Endpoint, offset int) error {
for len(bufs) > IdealBatchSize {
err := s.Send(bufs[:IdealBatchSize], endpoint, offset)
if err != nil {
return err
}
bufs = bufs[IdealBatchSize:]
}
standardEndpoint := endpoint.(*StdNetEndpoint)
s.mu.Lock()
blackhole := s.blackhole4
conn := s.ipv4
offload := s.ipv4TxOffload
br := batchWriter(s.ipv4PC)
is6 := false
if standardEndpoint.DstIP().Is6() {
if endpoint.DstIP().Is6() {
blackhole = s.blackhole6
conn = s.ipv6
br = s.ipv6PC
@ -472,42 +399,30 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, endpoint Endpoint, offset int) error {
ua := s.udpAddrPool.Get().(*net.UDPAddr)
defer s.udpAddrPool.Put(ua)
if is6 {
as16 := standardEndpoint.DstIP().As16()
as16 := endpoint.DstIP().As16()
copy(ua.IP, as16[:])
ua.IP = ua.IP[:16]
} else {
as4 := standardEndpoint.DstIP().As4()
as4 := endpoint.DstIP().As4()
copy(ua.IP, as4[:])
ua.IP = ua.IP[:4]
}
ua.Port = int(standardEndpoint.Port())
ua.Port = int(endpoint.(*StdNetEndpoint).Port())
var (
retried bool
err error
)
for _, buf := range bufs {
if len(buf) > offset+3 {
reserved, loaded := s.reservedForEndpoint[standardEndpoint.AddrPort]
reserved, loaded := s.reservedForEndpoint[endpoint.(*StdNetEndpoint).AddrPort]
if loaded {
copy(buf[offset+1:offset+4], reserved[:])
}
}
}
if s.egressProvider != nil {
memberConn := s.egressProvider.LookupEgress(standardEndpoint.AddrPort)
if memberConn != nil {
for _, buf := range bufs {
_, err = memberConn.WriteToUDPAddrPort(buf[offset:], standardEndpoint.AddrPort)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
}
retry:
if offload {
n := coalesceMessages(ua, standardEndpoint, bufs, offset, *msgs, setGSOSize)
n := coalesceMessages(ua, endpoint.(*StdNetEndpoint), bufs, offset, *msgs, setGSOSize)
err = s.send(conn, br, (*msgs)[:n])
if err != nil && offload && errShouldDisableUDPGSO(err) {
offload = false
@ -525,7 +440,7 @@ retry:
for i := range bufs {
(*msgs)[i].Addr = ua
(*msgs)[i].Buffers[0] = bufs[i][offset:]
setSrcControl(&(*msgs)[i].OOB, standardEndpoint)
setSrcControl(&(*msgs)[i].OOB, endpoint.(*StdNetEndpoint))
}
err = s.send(conn, br, (*msgs)[:len(bufs)])
}
@ -539,27 +454,13 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, reserved
s.reservedForEndpoint[destination] = reserved
}
// lx: hasReserved reports whether any Cloudflare "reserved" value is set. The
// receive path must only zero bytes 1-3 when a reserved value exists (WARP);
// otherwise an AmneziaWG magic header that lands in bytes 1-3 (small s1/s2/s4
// padding) would be corrupted and the packet dropped. The send path already
// gates its stamp on a per-endpoint `loaded` check, so no change is needed there.
func (s *StdNetBind) hasReserved() bool {
for _, reserved := range s.reservedForEndpoint {
if reserved != [3]uint8{} {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *StdNetBind) send(conn *net.UDPConn, pc batchWriter, msgs []ipv6.Message) error {
var (
n int
err error
start int
)
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" || runtime.GOOS == "android" {
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
for {
n, err = pc.WriteBatch(msgs[start:], 0)
if err != nil || n == len(msgs[start:]) {
@ -568,12 +469,6 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) send(conn *net.UDPConn, pc batchWriter, msgs []ipv6.Message
start += n
}
} else {
if supportsMsgX {
handled, sendErr := s.sendMsgX(conn, msgs)
if handled {
return sendErr
}
}
for _, msg := range msgs {
_, _, err = conn.WriteMsgUDP(msg.Buffers[0], msg.OOB, msg.Addr.(*net.UDPAddr))
if err != nil {
@ -601,7 +496,6 @@ func coalesceMessages(addr *net.UDPAddr, ep *StdNetEndpoint, bufs [][]byte, offs
var (
base = -1 // index of msg we are currently coalescing into
gsoSize int // segmentation size of msgs[base]
totalLen int // length of all dgrams coalesced into msgs[base]
dgramCnt int // number of dgrams coalesced into msgs[base]
endBatch bool // tracking flag to start a new batch on next iteration of bufs
)
@ -613,14 +507,14 @@ func coalesceMessages(addr *net.UDPAddr, ep *StdNetEndpoint, bufs [][]byte, offs
buf = buf[offset:]
if i > 0 {
msgLen := len(buf)
if msgLen+totalLen <= maxPayloadLen &&
baseLenBefore := len(msgs[base].Buffers[0])
freeBaseCap := cap(msgs[base].Buffers[0]) - baseLenBefore
if msgLen+baseLenBefore <= maxPayloadLen &&
msgLen <= gsoSize &&
msgLen <= freeBaseCap &&
dgramCnt < udpSegmentMaxDatagrams &&
!endBatch {
// Coalesce as an additional iovec instead of copying: element
// buffers are sized to their packet and have no spare capacity.
msgs[base].Buffers = append(msgs[base].Buffers, buf)
totalLen += msgLen
msgs[base].Buffers[0] = append(msgs[base].Buffers[0], buf...)
if i == len(bufs)-1 {
setGSO(&msgs[base].OOB, uint16(gsoSize))
}
@ -641,9 +535,8 @@ func coalesceMessages(addr *net.UDPAddr, ep *StdNetEndpoint, bufs [][]byte, offs
endBatch = false
base++
gsoSize = len(buf)
totalLen = len(buf)
setSrcControl(&msgs[base].OOB, ep)
msgs[base].Buffers = append(msgs[base].Buffers[:0], buf)
msgs[base].Buffers[0] = buf
msgs[base].Addr = addr
dgramCnt = 1
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) receiveIPv4(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint)
bind.mu.RLock()
defer bind.mu.RUnlock()
n, ep, err := bind.v4.Receive(bufs[0], &bind.isOpen)
if n > 3 && bind.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if n > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
sizes[0] = n
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) receiveIPv6(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint)
bind.mu.RLock()
defer bind.mu.RUnlock()
n, ep, err := bind.v6.Receive(bufs[0], &bind.isOpen)
if n > 3 && bind.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if n > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
sizes[0] = n
@ -576,18 +576,6 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, rese
bind.reservedForEndpoint[*endpoint.(*WinRingEndpoint)] = reserved
}
// lx: hasReserved reports whether any Cloudflare "reserved" value is set. See
// the StdNetBind.hasReserved comment — the unconditional receive clear would
// corrupt an AmneziaWG magic header sitting in bytes 1-3 (small padding).
func (bind *WinRingBind) hasReserved() bool {
for _, reserved := range bind.reservedForEndpoint {
if reserved != [3]uint8{} {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *StdNetBind) BindSocketToInterface4(interfaceIndex uint32, blackhole bool) error {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()

View file

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
//go:build !linux || android
//go:build !(linux && !android)
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func (e *StdNetEndpoint) SrcToString() string {
}
// TODO: macOS, FreeBSD and other BSDs likely do support the sticky sockets
// {get,set}srcControl feature set, but use alternatively named flags and need
// ({get,set}srcControl feature set, but use alternatively named flags and need
// ports and require testing.
// getSrcFromControl parses the control for PKTINFO and if found updates ep with
@ -35,8 +35,17 @@ func getSrcFromControl(control []byte, ep *StdNetEndpoint) {
func setSrcControl(control *[]byte, ep *StdNetEndpoint) {
}
// stickyControlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling sticky
// getGSOSize parses control for UDP_GRO and if found returns its GSO size data.
func getGSOSize(control []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, nil
}
// setGSOSize sets a UDP_SEGMENT in control based on gsoSize.
func setGSOSize(control *[]byte, gsoSize uint16) {
}
// controlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling sticky and UDP
// offloading control data.
const stickyControlSize = 0
const controlSize = 0
const StdNetSupportsStickySockets = false

View file

@ -2,12 +2,13 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"unsafe"
@ -105,8 +106,54 @@ func setSrcControl(control *[]byte, ep *StdNetEndpoint) {
*control = append(*control, ep.src...)
}
// stickyControlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling sticky
const (
sizeOfGSOData = 2
)
// getGSOSize parses control for UDP_GRO and if found returns its GSO size data.
func getGSOSize(control []byte) (int, error) {
var (
hdr unix.Cmsghdr
data []byte
rem = control
err error
)
for len(rem) > unix.SizeofCmsghdr {
hdr, data, rem, err = unix.ParseOneSocketControlMessage(rem)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("error parsing socket control message: %w", err)
}
if hdr.Level == socketOptionLevelUDP && hdr.Type == socketOptionUDPGRO && len(data) >= sizeOfGSOData {
var gso uint16
copy(unsafe.Slice((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&gso)), sizeOfGSOData), data[:sizeOfGSOData])
return int(gso), nil
}
}
return 0, nil
}
// setGSOSize sets a UDP_SEGMENT in control based on gsoSize. It leaves existing
// data in control untouched.
func setGSOSize(control *[]byte, gsoSize uint16) {
existingLen := len(*control)
avail := cap(*control) - existingLen
space := unix.CmsgSpace(sizeOfGSOData)
if avail < space {
return
}
*control = (*control)[:cap(*control)]
gsoControl := (*control)[existingLen:]
hdr := (*unix.Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&(gsoControl)[0]))
hdr.Level = socketOptionLevelUDP
hdr.Type = socketOptionUDPSegment
hdr.SetLen(unix.CmsgLen(sizeOfGSOData))
copy((gsoControl)[unix.SizeofCmsghdr:], unsafe.Slice((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&gsoSize)), sizeOfGSOData))
*control = (*control)[:existingLen+space]
}
// controlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling sticky and UDP
// offloading control data.
var stickyControlSize = unix.CmsgSpace(unix.SizeofInet6Pktinfo)
var controlSize = unix.CmsgSpace(unix.SizeofInet6Pktinfo) + unix.CmsgSpace(sizeOfGSOData)
const StdNetSupportsStickySockets = true

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
@ -13,35 +13,6 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// Taken from go/src/internal/syscall/unix/kernel_version_linux.go
func kernelVersion() (major, minor int) {
var uname unix.Utsname
if err := unix.Uname(&uname); err != nil {
return
}
var (
values [2]int
value, vi int
)
for _, c := range uname.Release {
if '0' <= c && c <= '9' {
value = (value * 10) + int(c-'0')
} else {
// Note that we're assuming N.N.N here.
// If we see anything else, we are likely to mis-parse it.
values[vi] = value
vi++
if vi >= len(values) {
break
}
value = 0
}
}
return values[0], values[1]
}
func init() {
controlFns = append(controlFns,
@ -89,19 +60,17 @@ func init() {
// Attempt to enable UDP_GRO
func(network, address string, c syscall.RawConn) error {
// Kernels below 5.12 are missing 98184612aca0 ("net:
// udp: Add support for getsockopt(..., ..., UDP_GRO,
// ..., ...);"), which means we can't read this back
// later. We could pipe the return value through to
// the rest of the code, but UDP_GRO is kind of buggy
// anyway, so just gate this here.
major, minor := kernelVersion()
if major < 5 || (major == 5 && minor < 12) {
// lx(010): skip UDP_GRO on android. The GRO receive path in bind_std.go
// is gated on runtime.GOOS=="linux", which is false on android — so a
// coalesced super-packet is never split and corrupts the WG stream
// (download dies). Belt-and-suspenders with the rxOffload guard in
// features_linux.go. TX/GSO untouched.
// See SPECS/010-WG_ENDPOINT_GRO_SPLIT_BRAIN.
if runtime.GOOS == "android" {
return nil
}
c.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
_ = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, unix.UDP_GRO, 1)
_ = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, socketOptionUDPGRO, 1)
})
return nil
},

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//go:build !windows && !linux && !wasm
//go:build !windows && !linux && !wasm && !plan9 && !tamago
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*

14
conn/erraddrinuse.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
//go:build !plan9
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
import "syscall"
func init() {
errEADDRINUSE = syscall.EADDRINUSE
}

View file

@ -7,6 +7,6 @@
package conn
func errShouldDisableUDPGSO(_ error) bool {
func errShouldDisableUDPGSO(err error) bool {
return false
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn

View file

@ -3,13 +3,13 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
import "net"
func supportsUDPOffload(_ *net.UDPConn) (txOffload, rxOffload bool) {
func supportsUDPOffload(conn *net.UDPConn) (txOffload, rxOffload bool) {
return
}

View file

@ -1,26 +1,49 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
import (
"net"
"runtime"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const (
// TODO: upstream to x/sys/unix
socketOptionLevelUDP = 17
socketOptionUDPSegment = 103
socketOptionUDPGRO = 104
)
func supportsUDPOffload(conn *net.UDPConn) (txOffload, rxOffload bool) {
rc, err := conn.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return
}
err = rc.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
_, errSyscall := unix.GetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, unix.UDP_SEGMENT)
txOffload = errSyscall == nil
opt, errSyscall := unix.GetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, unix.UDP_GRO)
rxOffload = errSyscall == nil && opt == 1
_, errSyscall := unix.GetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, socketOptionUDPSegment)
if errSyscall != nil {
return
}
txOffload = true
// lx(010): never advertise RX offload on android. runtime.GOOS=="android"
// (not "linux"), so the GRO receive dispatcher in bind_std.go (gated on
// GOOS=="linux") is dead there — a coalesced GRO super-packet would be read
// as one datagram and corrupt the WG transport stream, killing download.
// Confirmed on device (CPH2411/Android-15: rxOffload=true, dispatch=single).
// TX is left untouched. See SPECS/010-WG_ENDPOINT_GRO_SPLIT_BRAIN.
if runtime.GOOS == "android" {
return
}
opt, errSyscall := unix.GetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_UDP, socketOptionUDPGRO)
if errSyscall != nil {
return
}
rxOffload = opt == 1
})
if err != nil {
return false, false

View file

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
// getGSOSize parses control for UDP_GRO and if found returns its GSO size data.
func getGSOSize(control []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, nil
}
// setGSOSize sets a UDP_SEGMENT in control based on gsoSize.
func setGSOSize(control *[]byte, gsoSize uint16) {
}
// gsoControlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling sticky and UDP
// offloading control data.
const gsoControlSize = 0

View file

@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package conn
import (
"fmt"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const (
sizeOfGSOData = 2
)
// getGSOSize parses control for UDP_GRO and if found returns its GSO size data.
func getGSOSize(control []byte) (int, error) {
var (
hdr unix.Cmsghdr
data []byte
rem = control
err error
)
for len(rem) > unix.SizeofCmsghdr {
hdr, data, rem, err = unix.ParseOneSocketControlMessage(rem)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("error parsing socket control message: %w", err)
}
if hdr.Level == unix.SOL_UDP && hdr.Type == unix.UDP_GRO && len(data) >= sizeOfGSOData {
var gso uint16
copy(unsafe.Slice((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&gso)), sizeOfGSOData), data[:sizeOfGSOData])
return int(gso), nil
}
}
return 0, nil
}
// setGSOSize sets a UDP_SEGMENT in control based on gsoSize. It leaves existing
// data in control untouched.
func setGSOSize(control *[]byte, gsoSize uint16) {
existingLen := len(*control)
avail := cap(*control) - existingLen
space := unix.CmsgSpace(sizeOfGSOData)
if avail < space {
return
}
*control = (*control)[:cap(*control)]
gsoControl := (*control)[existingLen:]
hdr := (*unix.Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&(gsoControl)[0]))
hdr.Level = unix.SOL_UDP
hdr.Type = unix.UDP_SEGMENT
hdr.SetLen(unix.CmsgLen(sizeOfGSOData))
copy((gsoControl)[unix.CmsgLen(0):], unsafe.Slice((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&gsoSize)), sizeOfGSOData))
*control = (*control)[:existingLen+space]
}
// gsoControlSize returns the recommended buffer size for pooling UDP
// offloading control data.
var gsoControlSize = unix.CmsgSpace(sizeOfGSOData)

View file

@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
// On iOS both directions misbehave in the Network Extension (recvmsg_x on
// unconnected UDP sockets delivers no data, connected sockets stop passing
// traffic after a rebind), so msgx is macOS only until it can be debugged
// on a device.
//go:build darwin && !ios
package conn
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
M "github.com/sagernet/sing/common/metadata"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const supportsMsgX = true
const msgXBatchSize = IdealBatchSize
// msghdrX mirrors XNU's struct msghdr_x used by sendmsg_x/recvmsg_x.
// Per bsd/sys/socket_private.h, sendmsg_x supports neither addresses nor
// ancillary data (msg_name and msg_control must be zero), so batched sends
// require a connected socket. recvmsg_x does fill in per-message source
// addresses (copyout_maddr in uipc_syscalls.c). utun cannot use the send
// side at all (no ctl_send_list in if_utun.c).
type msghdrX struct {
Msg unix.Msghdr
DataLen uint32
}
type msgXState struct {
singlePeer atomic.Bool
disabled atomic.Bool // permanent fallback to the generic paths
connected4 atomic.Bool
connected6 atomic.Bool
endpoint atomic.Pointer[StdNetEndpoint]
connectLock sync.Mutex
}
// reset clears per-socket state; must be called when the bind (re)opens,
// as the connected state belongs to the previous sockets.
func (m *msgXState) reset() {
m.disabled.Store(false)
m.connected4.Store(false)
m.connected6.Store(false)
m.endpoint.Store(nil)
}
func (m *msgXState) connectedFlag(isV6 bool) *atomic.Bool {
if isV6 {
return &m.connected6
}
return &m.connected4
}
// SetSinglePeerMode enables connected-socket sendmsg_x batching. Only safe
// when the bind serves exactly one peer with a fixed endpoint: the kernel
// will drop datagrams from any other source, so peer roaming stops working.
func (s *StdNetBind) SetSinglePeerMode() {
s.msgx.singlePeer.Store(true)
}
func sockaddrFromAddrPort(addrPort netip.AddrPort, storage4 *unix.RawSockaddrInet4, storage6 *unix.RawSockaddrInet6) (unsafe.Pointer, uint32) {
port := addrPort.Port()<<8 | addrPort.Port()>>8
if addrPort.Addr().Unmap().Is4() {
*storage4 = unix.RawSockaddrInet4{
Len: unix.SizeofSockaddrInet4,
Family: unix.AF_INET,
Port: port,
Addr: addrPort.Addr().Unmap().As4(),
}
return unsafe.Pointer(storage4), unix.SizeofSockaddrInet4
}
*storage6 = unix.RawSockaddrInet6{
Len: unix.SizeofSockaddrInet6,
Family: unix.AF_INET6,
Port: port,
Addr: addrPort.Addr().As16(),
}
return unsafe.Pointer(storage6), unix.SizeofSockaddrInet6
}
// ensureConnected connects the family socket to the single peer on first
// use, and permanently falls back if a second endpoint shows up.
func (s *StdNetBind) ensureConnected(rawConn syscall.RawConn, isV6 bool, destination netip.AddrPort) bool {
if s.msgx.disabled.Load() || !s.msgx.singlePeer.Load() {
return false
}
connected := s.msgx.connectedFlag(isV6)
if connected.Load() {
if s.msgx.endpoint.Load().AddrPort == destination {
return true
}
s.msgx.connectLock.Lock()
defer s.msgx.connectLock.Unlock()
if s.msgx.disabled.Load() {
return false
}
s.msgx.disabled.Store(true)
var disconnectErr error
controlErr := rawConn.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
addr := unix.RawSockaddrAny{}
addr.Addr.Family = unix.AF_UNSPEC
//nolint:staticcheck
_, _, errno := unix.Syscall(unix.SYS_CONNECT, fd, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&addr)), unix.SizeofSockaddrAny)
if errno != 0 && errno != unix.EAFNOSUPPORT {
disconnectErr = errno
}
})
if controlErr == nil && disconnectErr == nil {
connected.Store(false)
}
return false
}
s.msgx.connectLock.Lock()
defer s.msgx.connectLock.Unlock()
if s.msgx.disabled.Load() {
return false
}
if connected.Load() {
return s.msgx.endpoint.Load().AddrPort == destination
}
var (
storage4 unix.RawSockaddrInet4
storage6 unix.RawSockaddrInet6
connectErr unix.Errno
)
name, nameLen := sockaddrFromAddrPort(destination, &storage4, &storage6)
controlErr := rawConn.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
//nolint:staticcheck
_, _, connectErr = unix.Syscall(unix.SYS_CONNECT, fd, uintptr(name), uintptr(nameLen))
})
if controlErr != nil || connectErr != 0 {
s.msgx.disabled.Store(true)
return false
}
s.msgx.endpoint.Store(&StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: destination})
connected.Store(true)
return true
}
type sendMsgXState struct {
hdrs []msghdrX
iovs []unix.Iovec
}
var sendMsgXPool = sync.Pool{New: func() any {
return &sendMsgXState{
hdrs: make([]msghdrX, IdealBatchSize),
iovs: make([]unix.Iovec, IdealBatchSize),
}
}}
// sendMsgX sends msgs via sendmsg_x when the socket is connected to their
// endpoint. handled == false means nothing was sent and the caller must use
// the generic path; msgs are never partially consumed in that case.
func (s *StdNetBind) sendMsgX(conn *net.UDPConn, msgs []ipv6.Message) (bool, error) {
var (
rawConn syscall.RawConn
isV6 bool
)
s.mu.Lock()
if conn == s.ipv6 {
rawConn = s.ipv6RC
isV6 = true
} else {
rawConn = s.ipv4RC
}
s.mu.Unlock()
if rawConn == nil {
return false, nil
}
destination := M.AddrPortFromNet(msgs[0].Addr)
if !s.ensureConnected(rawConn, isV6, destination) {
return false, nil
}
state := sendMsgXPool.Get().(*sendMsgXState)
defer sendMsgXPool.Put(state)
for i := range msgs {
buffer := msgs[i].Buffers[0]
state.iovs[i] = unix.Iovec{Base: &buffer[0]}
state.iovs[i].SetLen(len(buffer))
state.hdrs[i] = msghdrX{}
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Iov = &state.iovs[i]
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Iovlen = 1
}
var sent int
for sent < len(msgs) {
var (
n uintptr
errno unix.Errno
)
writeErr := rawConn.Write(func(fd uintptr) bool {
//nolint:staticcheck
n, _, errno = unix.RawSyscall6(unix.SYS_SENDMSG_X, fd,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&state.hdrs[sent])), uintptr(len(msgs)-sent), unix.MSG_DONTWAIT, 0, 0)
return errno != unix.EAGAIN
})
if writeErr != nil {
return true, writeErr
}
if errno != 0 {
if sent == 0 {
// The syscall is refusing this socket entirely (sandbox,
// disconnected by the system, ...): disable and let the
// caller resend everything on the generic path.
s.msgx.disabled.Store(true)
return false, nil
}
return true, errno
}
sent += int(n)
}
return true, nil
}
type receiveMsgXState struct {
hdrs []msghdrX
iovs []unix.Iovec
names []unix.RawSockaddrInet6
fallback bool
}
func (s *StdNetBind) receiveSingle(conn *net.UDPConn, bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint) (int, error) {
n, _, _, addr, err := conn.ReadMsgUDPAddrPort(bufs[0], nil)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
sizes[0] = n
if n > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
bufs[0][1] = 0
bufs[0][2] = 0
bufs[0][3] = 0
}
eps[0] = &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: addr}
return 1, nil
}
func (s *StdNetBind) makeReceiveMsgX(conn *net.UDPConn, isV6 bool) (ReceiveFunc, error) {
rawConn, err := conn.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
state := &receiveMsgXState{
hdrs: make([]msghdrX, msgXBatchSize),
iovs: make([]unix.Iovec, msgXBatchSize),
names: make([]unix.RawSockaddrInet6, msgXBatchSize),
}
return func(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint) (int, error) {
if state.fallback || s.msgx.disabled.Load() {
return s.receiveSingle(conn, bufs, sizes, eps)
}
connectedEndpoint := s.msgx.endpoint.Load()
if !s.msgx.connectedFlag(isV6).Load() {
connectedEndpoint = nil
}
count := len(bufs)
if count > msgXBatchSize {
count = msgXBatchSize
}
for i := 0; i < count; i++ {
state.iovs[i] = unix.Iovec{Base: &bufs[i][0]}
state.iovs[i].SetLen(len(bufs[i]))
state.hdrs[i] = msghdrX{}
if connectedEndpoint == nil {
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Name = (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&state.names[i]))
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Namelen = unix.SizeofSockaddrInet6
}
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Iov = &state.iovs[i]
state.hdrs[i].Msg.Iovlen = 1
}
var (
n uintptr
errno unix.Errno
)
readErr := rawConn.Read(func(fd uintptr) bool {
//nolint:staticcheck
n, _, errno = unix.RawSyscall6(unix.SYS_RECVMSG_X, fd,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&state.hdrs[0])), uintptr(count), unix.MSG_DONTWAIT, 0, 0)
return errno != unix.EAGAIN
})
if readErr != nil {
return 0, readErr
}
if errno != 0 {
// recvmsg_x is refusing this socket (sandbox, protocol, ...):
// serve this and all future calls with a plain single read so
// the receive routine keeps running.
state.fallback = true
return s.receiveSingle(conn, bufs, sizes, eps)
}
numMsgs := int(n)
for i := 0; i < numMsgs; i++ {
sizes[i] = int(state.hdrs[i].DataLen)
if sizes[i] > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
bufs[i][1] = 0
bufs[i][2] = 0
bufs[i][3] = 0
}
if connectedEndpoint != nil {
eps[i] = connectedEndpoint
continue
}
var addrPort netip.AddrPort
name := &state.names[i]
if name.Family == unix.AF_INET6 {
port := name.Port<<8 | name.Port>>8
addrPort = netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom16(name.Addr).Unmap(), port)
} else {
name4 := (*unix.RawSockaddrInet4)(unsafe.Pointer(name))
port := name4.Port<<8 | name4.Port>>8
addrPort = netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom4(name4.Addr), port)
}
eps[i] = &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: addrPort}
}
return numMsgs, nil
}, nil
}

View file

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
//go:build !darwin || ios
package conn
import (
"net"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
const supportsMsgX = false
const msgXBatchSize = 1
type msgXState struct{}
func (m *msgXState) reset() {
}
// SetSinglePeerMode is a no-op on platforms without sendmsg_x/recvmsg_x.
func (s *StdNetBind) SetSinglePeerMode() {
}
func (s *StdNetBind) sendMsgX(conn *net.UDPConn, msgs []ipv6.Message) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
func (s *StdNetBind) makeReceiveMsgX(conn *net.UDPConn, isV6 bool) (ReceiveFunc, error) {
panic("makeReceiveMsgX is not supported on this platform")
}

View file

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: unit coverage for the StdNetBind.hasReserved() gate that guards the
* receive-side reserved-clear. receiveIP zeroes bytes 1-3 (Cloudflare WARP
* "reserved") only when a non-zero reserved value is set for some endpoint;
* otherwise an AmneziaWG magic header landing in bytes 1-3 (small s1/s2/s4
* padding) would be corrupted and the packet dropped. This test pins the gate
* itself; the end-to-end handshake proof lives in the device package.
*/
package conn
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
func stdNetBindForTest(t *testing.T) *StdNetBind {
t.Helper()
b, ok := NewStdNetBind(nil).(*StdNetBind)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("NewStdNetBind did not return *StdNetBind")
}
return b
}
func TestStdNetBindHasReserved(t *testing.T) {
b := stdNetBindForTest(t)
if b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("fresh bind must report no reserved value")
}
ep := netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:51820")
// An all-zero reserved value is indistinguishable from "unset" and must
// not arm the clear.
b.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 0})
if b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("all-zero reserved must not count as reserved")
}
// Any non-zero byte (WARP anycast tag) arms the clear.
b.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 1})
if !b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("non-zero reserved (byte 3) must count as reserved")
}
// A second endpoint's non-zero value must also be seen.
b2 := stdNetBindForTest(t)
ep2 := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:2408")
b2.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 0})
b2.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep2, [3]byte{0xAB, 0, 0})
if !b2.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("non-zero reserved on any endpoint must count as reserved")
}
}

View file

@ -55,25 +55,6 @@ func commonBits(ip1, ip2 []byte) uint8 {
}
}
func commonBits4(ip1 []byte, ip2 [4]byte) uint8 {
a := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(ip1)
b := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(ip2[:])
return uint8(bits.LeadingZeros32(a ^ b))
}
func commonBits6(ip1 []byte, ip2 [16]byte) uint8 {
a := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip1)
b := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip2[:])
x := a ^ b
if x != 0 {
return uint8(bits.LeadingZeros64(x))
}
a = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip1[8:])
b = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip2[8:])
x = a ^ b
return 64 + uint8(bits.LeadingZeros64(x))
}
func (node *trieEntry) addToPeerEntries() {
node.perPeerElem = node.peer.trieEntries.PushBack(node)
}
@ -207,37 +188,7 @@ func (trie parentIndirection) insert(ip []byte, cidr uint8, peer *Peer) {
}
}
func (node *trieEntry) lookup4(ip [4]byte) *Peer {
var found *Peer
for node != nil && commonBits4(node.bits, ip) >= node.cidr {
if node.peer != nil {
found = node.peer
}
if node.bitAtByte == 4 {
break
}
bit := (ip[node.bitAtByte] >> node.bitAtShift) & 1
node = node.child[bit]
}
return found
}
func (node *trieEntry) lookup6(ip [16]byte) *Peer {
var found *Peer
for node != nil && commonBits6(node.bits, ip) >= node.cidr {
if node.peer != nil {
found = node.peer
}
if node.bitAtByte == 16 {
break
}
bit := (ip[node.bitAtByte] >> node.bitAtShift) & 1
node = node.child[bit]
}
return found
}
func (node *trieEntry) lookup(ip net.IP) *Peer {
func (node *trieEntry) lookup(ip []byte) *Peer {
var found *Peer
size := uint8(len(ip))
for node != nil && commonBits(node.bits, ip) >= node.cidr {
@ -254,17 +205,14 @@ func (node *trieEntry) lookup(ip net.IP) *Peer {
}
type AllowedIPs struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
ipv4 *trieEntry
ipv6 *trieEntry
peerByIPPacketFunc PeerByIPPacketFunc // if non-nil, called to look up peers by IP
device *Device // back-reference to parent device; non-nil only if peerByIPPacketFunc is set
IPv4 *trieEntry
IPv6 *trieEntry
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
func (table *AllowedIPs) EntriesForPeer(peer *Peer, cb func(prefix netip.Prefix) bool) {
table.mu.RLock()
defer table.mu.RUnlock()
table.mutex.RLock()
defer table.mutex.RUnlock()
for elem := peer.trieEntries.Front(); elem != nil; elem = elem.Next() {
node := elem.Value.(*trieEntry)
@ -309,17 +257,17 @@ func (node *trieEntry) remove() {
}
func (table *AllowedIPs) Remove(prefix netip.Prefix, peer *Peer) {
table.mu.Lock()
defer table.mu.Unlock()
table.mutex.Lock()
defer table.mutex.Unlock()
var node *trieEntry
var exact bool
if prefix.Addr().Is6() {
ip := prefix.Addr().As16()
node, exact = table.ipv6.nodePlacement(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()))
node, exact = table.IPv6.nodePlacement(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()))
} else if prefix.Addr().Is4() {
ip := prefix.Addr().As4()
node, exact = table.ipv4.nodePlacement(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()))
node, exact = table.IPv4.nodePlacement(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()))
} else {
panic(errors.New("removing unknown address type"))
}
@ -329,25 +277,10 @@ func (table *AllowedIPs) Remove(prefix netip.Prefix, peer *Peer) {
node.remove()
}
// setPeerPrefixes atomically removes all of peer's existing prefixes and adds
// the provided ones.
func (table *AllowedIPs) setPeerPrefixes(peer *Peer, prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
table.mu.Lock()
defer table.mu.Unlock()
table.removeByPeerLocked(peer)
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
table.insertLocked(prefix, peer)
}
}
func (table *AllowedIPs) RemoveByPeer(peer *Peer) {
table.mu.Lock()
defer table.mu.Unlock()
table.removeByPeerLocked(peer)
}
table.mutex.Lock()
defer table.mutex.Unlock()
func (table *AllowedIPs) removeByPeerLocked(peer *Peer) {
var next *list.Element
for elem := peer.trieEntries.Front(); elem != nil; elem = next {
next = elem.Next()
@ -356,135 +289,29 @@ func (table *AllowedIPs) removeByPeerLocked(peer *Peer) {
}
func (table *AllowedIPs) Insert(prefix netip.Prefix, peer *Peer) {
table.mu.Lock()
defer table.mu.Unlock()
table.insertLocked(prefix, peer)
}
table.mutex.Lock()
defer table.mutex.Unlock()
func (table *AllowedIPs) insertLocked(prefix netip.Prefix, peer *Peer) {
if prefix.Addr().Is6() {
ip := prefix.Addr().As16()
parentIndirection{&table.ipv6, 2}.insert(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()), peer)
parentIndirection{&table.IPv6, 2}.insert(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()), peer)
} else if prefix.Addr().Is4() {
ip := prefix.Addr().As4()
parentIndirection{&table.ipv4, 2}.insert(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()), peer)
parentIndirection{&table.IPv4, 2}.insert(ip[:], uint8(prefix.Bits()), peer)
} else {
panic(errors.New("inserting unknown address type"))
}
}
// LookupFromPacket looks up the peer to which an outbound IP packet should be
// sent. It lives on [AllowedIPs] for legacy/structural reasons: historically
// WireGuard's only peer-selection mechanism was the AllowedIPs trie, and the
// send path already had a reference to the table. When a [PeerByIPPacketFunc]
// has been registered via [Device.SetPeerByIPPacketFunc], that callback is used
// instead of the trie and the AllowedIPs table is not consulted at all.
//
// When no callback is registered, only dst is used (standard WireGuard
// AllowedIPs trie lookup). When a callback is registered, all three
// parameters are forwarded to it; see [PeerByIPPacketFunc] for details.
func (table *AllowedIPs) LookupFromPacket(src, dst netip.Addr, ipPkt []byte) *Peer {
table.mu.RLock()
if f := table.peerByIPPacketFunc; f != nil {
device := table.device
table.mu.RUnlock()
if pubk, ok := f(src, dst, ipPkt); ok {
return device.LookupPeer(pubk)
}
return nil
}
defer table.mu.RUnlock()
switch {
case dst.Is6():
return table.ipv6.lookup6(dst.As16())
case dst.Is4():
return table.ipv4.lookup4(dst.As4())
default:
panic(errors.New("looking up unknown address type"))
}
}
// Deprecated: Lookup is only used by legacy tests. It does not call
// [PeerByIPPacketFunc]; use [AllowedIPs.LookupFromPacket] for production lookups.
func (table *AllowedIPs) Lookup(ip []byte) *Peer {
table.mu.RLock()
defer table.mu.RUnlock()
return table.lookupLocked(ip)
}
// lookupLocked looks up the peer associated with the given IP address.
// It assumes the caller holds the read lock (or doesn't hold it, but also
// doesn't concurrently mutate AllowedIP).
//
// It returns nil if no peer is associated with the given IP address.
func (table *AllowedIPs) lookupLocked(ip []byte) *Peer {
table.mutex.RLock()
defer table.mutex.RUnlock()
switch len(ip) {
case net.IPv6len:
return table.ipv6.lookup(ip)
return table.IPv6.lookup(ip)
case net.IPv4len:
return table.ipv4.lookup(ip)
return table.IPv4.lookup(ip)
default:
panic(errors.New("looking up unknown address type"))
}
}
// AllowedPeerSourceIP reports whether the given source IP address is allowed
// for the given peer.
func (peer *Peer) AllowedPeerSourceIP(src netip.Addr) bool {
if f := peer.state.testAllowedIP.Load(); f != nil {
return (*f)(src)
}
table := &peer.device.allowedips
table.mu.RLock()
defer table.mu.RUnlock()
switch {
case src.Is6():
return table.ipv6.lookup6(src.As16()) == peer
case src.Is4():
return table.ipv4.lookup4(src.As4()) == peer
}
return false
}
// fakePeer is a zero Peer used only as a placeholder in tries used by mkIPInCIDRsTestFunc.
var fakePeer Peer
// mkIPInCIDRsTestFunc returns a function that tests whether an IP address is
// contained in any of the given CIDRs.
func mkIPInCIDRsTestFunc(cidrs []netip.Prefix) func(netip.Addr) bool {
if len(cidrs) == 0 {
return func(netip.Addr) bool { return false }
}
if len(cidrs) == 1 {
return func(addr netip.Addr) bool { return cidrs[0].Contains(addr) }
}
if len(cidrs) <= 4 {
// For small numbers of CIDRs, just do a linear search. The trie construction
// is more expensive than the linear search, and the test function is faster
// than the trie lookup, so this is a net win.
return func(addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, c := range cidrs {
if c.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
}
// Make a trie for faster lookups. We use a dummy Peer.
var a AllowedIPs
for _, c := range cidrs {
a.Insert(c, &fakePeer)
}
return func(addr netip.Addr) bool {
switch {
case addr.Is4():
return a.ipv4.lookup4(addr.As4()) == &fakePeer
default:
return a.ipv6.lookup6(addr.As16()) == &fakePeer
}
}
}

View file

@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: e2e regression for the reserved-clear vs AWG magic-header collision,
* exercised over the StdNetBind path (no detour) with real loopback UDP.
*
* Bug model. On receive, StdNetBind.receiveIP unconditionally zeroed bytes
* 1-3 of every datagram >3 bytes (the Cloudflare WARP "reserved" field).
* AmneziaWG reads its magic header as LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[padding:]),
* where padding is s1/s2 (handshake) or s4 (transport). With small padding
* (0..3) the 4-byte magic overlaps bytes 1-3, so the unconditional clear
* corrupts it: the value falls outside the ranged h1-h4 window, the packet is
* classified MessageUnknownType and dropped. WARP was never configured on
* these binds (no SetReservedForEndpoint), so the clear was pure collateral.
*
* The fix gates the clear behind StdNetBind.hasReserved(): bytes 1-3 are only
* zeroed when a non-zero reserved value is actually set for some endpoint.
* With no reserved value the magic survives and the handshake completes.
*
* This test provokes the worst case: padding = 0 (no s1/s2/s4 at all), so the
* h1 initiation magic sits in bytes [0..3] and its high bytes (1-3) are the
* ones the clear would destroy. The h1-h4 ranges are chosen entirely above
* 0x10000000, so after zeroing bytes 1-3 the surviving value is <= 255 and can
* never land back inside any range -> guaranteed drop on the buggy tree.
*
* GREEN on the fixed tree. To see RED, temporarily restore the unconditional
* clear in conn/bind_std.go receiveIP:
* if msg.N > 3 {
* common.ClearArray(bufs[i][1:4])
* }
* and the handshake times out (init magic zeroed in bytes 1-3).
*/
package device
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
)
// magic header ranges kept entirely above 0x10000000 (268435456). Any value
// the sender picks therefore has a non-zero byte among positions 1-3; zeroing
// those bytes collapses the value to <= 0xFF, which is below every range start,
// so a corrupted magic can never validate. Distinct windows per message type.
const (
lxH1Lo, lxH1Hi = 268500000, 268600000 // init
lxH2Lo, lxH2Hi = 300000000, 300100000 // response
lxH3Lo, lxH3Hi = 400000000, 400100000 // cookie
lxH4Lo, lxH4Hi = 500000000, 500100000 // transport
)
// lxReadListenPort parses listen_port=<n> out of a device's IpcGet dump.
func lxReadListenPort(t *testing.T, dev *Device) uint16 {
t.Helper()
dump, err := dev.IpcGet()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcGet: %v", err)
}
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(dump))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if v, ok := strings.CutPrefix(line, "listen_port="); ok {
p, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse listen_port %q: %v", v, err)
}
return uint16(p)
}
}
t.Fatalf("listen_port not found in dump:\n%s", dump)
return 0
}
// newStdNetPaddedPair builds two Up()'d Devices peered over real loopback UDP
// (NewStdNetBind), configured with ranged h1-h4 + junk and *no* s1/s2/s4
// (padding = 0). Endpoints are wired after Up, once the ephemeral ports are
// known. No reserved value is ever set, so hasReserved() is false.
func newStdNetPaddedPair(t *testing.T) (devA, devB *Device, tunA, tunB *chanTun) {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
tunA = newChanTun()
tunB = newChanTun()
devA = NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, conn.NewStdNetBind(nil), NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB = NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, conn.NewStdNetBind(nil), NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
// obfuscation shared by both ends. Ranged magic headers, junk packets,
// and deliberately no s1/s2/s4 so padding stays 0 for every message type.
obf := fmt.Sprintf(
"jc=3\njmin=8\njmax=16\n"+
"h1=%d-%d\nh2=%d-%d\nh3=%d-%d\nh4=%d-%d\n",
lxH1Lo, lxH1Hi, lxH2Lo, lxH2Hi, lxH3Lo, lxH3Hi, lxH4Lo, lxH4Hi)
// Bring both up on an ephemeral port (listen_port=0), no endpoint yet.
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf("private_key=%s\nlisten_port=0\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), obf, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf("private_key=%s\nlisten_port=0\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), obf, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if devA.paddings.init != 0 || devA.paddings.response != 0 || devA.paddings.transport != 0 {
t.Fatalf("padding must be 0 for this test: init=%d resp=%d transport=%d",
devA.paddings.init, devA.paddings.response, devA.paddings.transport)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
portA := lxReadListenPort(t, devA)
portB := lxReadListenPort(t, devB)
if portA == 0 || portB == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ephemeral ports not assigned: A=%d B=%d", portA, portB)
}
// Now that ports are known, point each peer at the other over loopback.
if err := devA.IpcSet(fmt.Sprintf("public_key=%s\nupdate_only=true\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:%d\n",
hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), portB)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set endpoint A->B: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(fmt.Sprintf("public_key=%s\nupdate_only=true\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:%d\n",
hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), portA)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set endpoint B->A: %v", err)
}
return devA, devB, tunA, tunB
}
// TestStdNetBindReservedClearVsMagic_ZeroPadding drives a real handshake and a
// data packet A->B over loopback UDP through StdNetBind, with padding=0 so the
// h1 magic overlaps the reserved bytes 1-3. It passes only when receive does
// not blindly clear those bytes (the fix).
func TestStdNetBindReservedClearVsMagic_ZeroPadding(t *testing.T) {
devA, _, tunA, tunB := newStdNetPaddedPair(t)
_ = devA
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
// Re-inject periodically: the first packet triggers the handshake and may
// be dropped until keys are established.
send := func() { tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
deadline := time.After(15 * time.Second)
retry := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer retry.Stop()
for {
select {
case got := <-tunB.fromDevice:
if bytes.Equal(got, pkt) {
return // delivered end to end: magic survived, handshake ok
}
t.Logf("ignoring unexpected packet len=%d", len(got))
case <-retry.C:
send()
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for packet on peer tun " +
"(handshake never completed: reserved-clear likely corrupted the h1 magic)")
}
}
}

View file

@ -83,21 +83,15 @@ func newAutodrainingInboundQueue(device *Device) *autodrainingInboundQueue {
q := &autodrainingInboundQueue{
c: make(chan *QueueInboundElementsContainer, QueueInboundSize),
}
if device.needsInboundQueueFinalizer() {
runtime.AddCleanup(q, device.flushInboundQueue, q.c)
}
runtime.SetFinalizer(q, device.flushInboundQueue)
return q
}
func (device *Device) needsInboundQueueFinalizer() bool {
return device.pool.messageBuffers.hasAccounting()
}
func (device *Device) flushInboundQueue(c <-chan *QueueInboundElementsContainer) {
func (device *Device) flushInboundQueue(q *autodrainingInboundQueue) {
for {
select {
case elemsContainer := <-c:
elemsContainer.filling.Wait()
case elemsContainer := <-q.c:
elemsContainer.Lock()
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
@ -122,23 +116,17 @@ func newAutodrainingOutboundQueue(device *Device) *autodrainingOutboundQueue {
q := &autodrainingOutboundQueue{
c: make(chan *QueueOutboundElementsContainer, QueueOutboundSize),
}
if device.needsOutboundQueueFinalizer() {
runtime.AddCleanup(q, device.flushOutboundQueue, q.c)
}
runtime.SetFinalizer(q, device.flushOutboundQueue)
return q
}
func (device *Device) needsOutboundQueueFinalizer() bool {
return device.pool.messageBuffers.hasAccounting()
}
func (device *Device) flushOutboundQueue(c <-chan *QueueOutboundElementsContainer) {
func (device *Device) flushOutboundQueue(q *autodrainingOutboundQueue) {
for {
select {
case elemsContainer := <-c:
elemsContainer.filling.Wait()
case elemsContainer := <-q.c:
elemsContainer.Lock()
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)

View file

@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ package device
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
@ -61,12 +59,8 @@ type Device struct {
peers struct {
sync.RWMutex // protects keyMap
keyMap map[NoisePublicKey]*Peer
lookupFunc PeerLookupFunc // or nil if unused
}
peerStateFn atomic.Pointer[PeerSessionStateFunc] // observes peer session state changes, nil if unset
priorityMsgFn atomic.Pointer[PeerPriorityMessageFunc] // returns a priority message to be sent around session establishment, nil if unset
rate struct {
underLoadUntil atomic.Int64
limiter ratelimiter.Ratelimiter
@ -77,11 +71,11 @@ type Device struct {
cookieChecker CookieChecker
pool struct {
inboundElementsContainer *sync.Pool
outboundElementsContainer *sync.Pool
inboundElementsContainer *WaitPool
outboundElementsContainer *WaitPool
messageBuffers *WaitPool
inboundElements *sync.Pool
outboundElements *sync.Pool
inboundElements *WaitPool
outboundElements *WaitPool
}
queue struct {
@ -122,20 +116,6 @@ type Device struct {
}
ipackets [5]*obfChain
// lx: SPEC 041 — passive self-heal state: reopen the bind once (fresh
// ephemeral port when freshPort is set) and immediately re-initiate, to
// heal dead per-flow path state (an expired NAT mapping or a poisoned DPI
// flow entry) that otherwise pins every retry to the same dead 5-tuple
// until a manual reconnect. The whole mechanism — three triggers (giveup /
// early / nudge) sharing this state and its debounce — lives in
// lx_giveup_rebind.go. Enabled by default; sing-box decides freshPort
// from whether the user pinned listen_port.
giveUpRebind struct {
enabled atomic.Bool
freshPort atomic.Bool
last atomic.Int64 // unix seconds of the last rebind (debounce)
}
}
// deviceState represents the state of a Device.
@ -227,22 +207,14 @@ func (device *Device) upLocked() error {
device.ipcMutex.Lock()
defer device.ipcMutex.Unlock()
// Collect peers under RLock and then release before calling into them,
// because SendKeepalive can reach CreateMessageInitiation which acquires
// staticIdentity.RLock; holding peers.RLock across that path would
// invert the staticIdentity < peers hierarchy (see lock-ordering.md).
device.peers.RLock()
peers := make([]*Peer, 0, len(device.peers.keyMap))
for _, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
peers = append(peers, peer)
}
device.peers.RUnlock()
for _, peer := range peers {
peer.Start()
if peer.persistentKeepaliveInterval.Load() > 0 {
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
}
device.peers.RUnlock()
return nil
}
@ -340,7 +312,6 @@ func (device *Device) SetPrivateKey(sk NoisePrivateKey) error {
func NewDevice(ctx context.Context, tunDevice tun.Device, bind conn.Bind, logger *Logger, workers int) *Device {
device := new(Device)
device.pauseManager = service.FromContext[pause.Manager](ctx)
device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Store(true) // lx: SPEC 041 — self-heal on by default
device.state.state.Store(uint32(deviceStateDown))
device.closed = make(chan struct{})
device.log = logger
@ -403,65 +374,12 @@ func (device *Device) BatchSize() int {
return size
}
// LookupPeer looks up a peer by its public key.
//
// If the peer does not exist and a [PeerLookupFunc] is set (via
// [Device.SetPeerLookupFunc]), then that function is used to create the peer
// before returning it. Peers created via this mechanism exist only until their
// state machine reaches idle, and then the peers are removed.
//
// If the peer does not exist and no [PeerLookupFunc] is set, nil is returned.
//
// Use [Device.LookupActivePeer] to only return already-existing peers, without
// using a [PeerLookupFunc].
func (device *Device) LookupPeer(pk NoisePublicKey) *Peer {
device.peers.RLock()
p, ok := device.peers.keyMap[pk]
lookupFunc := device.peers.lookupFunc
device.peers.RUnlock()
if ok || lookupFunc == nil {
return p
}
conf, ok := lookupFunc(pk)
if !ok || conf == nil {
return nil
}
p, err := device.NewPeer(pk)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errAddExistingPeer) {
device.peers.RLock()
defer device.peers.RUnlock()
return device.peers.keyMap[pk]
}
device.log.Errorf("Failed to create peer: %v", err)
return nil
}
p.SetAllowedIPs(conf.AllowedIPs)
p.deleteOnIdle = true
if conf.Endpoint != nil {
p.SetEndpointFromPacket(conf.Endpoint)
}
p.Start()
return p
}
// LookupActivePeer looks up a peer by its public key.
//
// Unlike [Device.LookupPeer], this function does not use a [PeerLookupFunc] to
// create the peer if it does not already exist.
//
// If the peer does not exist or was created lazily via [PeerLookupFunc]
// and has subsequently idled away, it returns (nil, false).
func (device *Device) LookupActivePeer(pk NoisePublicKey) (_ *Peer, ok bool) {
device.peers.RLock()
defer device.peers.RUnlock()
p, ok := device.peers.keyMap[pk]
return p, ok
}
var errAddExistingPeer = errors.New("adding existing peer")
return device.peers.keyMap[pk]
}
func (device *Device) RemovePeer(key NoisePublicKey) {
device.peers.Lock()
@ -485,151 +403,6 @@ func (device *Device) RemoveAllPeers() {
device.peers.keyMap = make(map[NoisePublicKey]*Peer)
}
// RemoveMatchingPeers removes all peers for which shouldRemove returns true.
//
// It returns the number of peers removed.
func (device *Device) RemoveMatchingPeers(shouldRemove func(NoisePublicKey) bool) (numRemoved int) {
device.peers.Lock()
defer device.peers.Unlock()
for key, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
if shouldRemove(key) {
removePeerLocked(device, peer, key)
numRemoved++
}
}
return numRemoved
}
// NewPeerConfig are the configuration parameters for a new peer created via a
// [PeerLookupFunc] func.
type NewPeerConfig struct {
// AllowedIPs is the initial set of allowed IPs for the new peer.
AllowedIPs []netip.Prefix
// Endpoint, if non-nil, sets the initial endpoint for newly
// created peers.
Endpoint conn.Endpoint
}
// PeerLookupFunc is the type of function used to look up peers by public key
// when receiving packets for unknown peers.
//
// If it returns nil, the peer is not known.
//
// Otherwise, returning non-nil signals that wireguard-go should create the peer
// with the provided allowed IPs.
//
// See [Device.SetPeerLookupFunc] and [Device.LookupPeer].
type PeerLookupFunc func(NoisePublicKey) (_ *NewPeerConfig, ok bool)
// PeerByIPPacketFunc is the type of function used to look up a peer to send to
// for a given src/dst IP pair. The ipPkt parameter is the raw IP packet being
// routed; callers needing transport-layer ports or other header fields may parse
// them from ipPkt, but must handle IP fragmentation (ports may be absent on
// non-first fragments) and protocols that do not use ports (e.g. ICMP).
//
// Except for experimental use cases, dst is the only address
// that should be relied upon when looking up a peer.
//
// If it returns ok=false, the peer is not known.
//
// See [Device.SetPeerByIPPacketFunc] and [Device.SetPeerLookupFunc].
type PeerByIPPacketFunc func(src, dst netip.Addr, ipPkt []byte) (_ NoisePublicKey, ok bool)
// PeerSessionState is the current WireGuard session state for a peer.
type PeerSessionState uint8
const (
// PeerSessionNone means there is no handshake in progress and no session key
// material retained for this peer.
PeerSessionNone PeerSessionState = iota
// PeerSessionHandshake means a handshake is in progress for this peer, but
// there is not currently a usable WireGuard session.
PeerSessionHandshake
// PeerSessionEstablished means the peer has a completed WireGuard session
// with usable session key material.
PeerSessionEstablished
// PeerSessionExpired means the peer's session key material is no longer
// considered usable, but final key cleanup or lazy peer removal may not have
// happened yet.
PeerSessionExpired
)
// PeerSessionStateFunc is called when a peer's WireGuard session state changes.
//
// Calls are serialized per peer and delivered in that peer's transition order. The
// callback must be cheap and must not call back into Device.
type PeerSessionStateFunc func(peer NoisePublicKey, state PeerSessionState)
// SetPeerLookupFunc sets the function used to look up peers by public key
// when receiving packets for unknown peers.
func (device *Device) SetPeerLookupFunc(f PeerLookupFunc) {
device.peers.Lock()
defer device.peers.Unlock()
device.peers.lookupFunc = f
}
// SetPeerByIPPacketFunc sets the function used to look up peers by IP address
// when sending packets to unknown peers.
func (device *Device) SetPeerByIPPacketFunc(f PeerByIPPacketFunc) {
device.allowedips.mu.Lock()
defer device.allowedips.mu.Unlock()
device.allowedips.peerByIPPacketFunc = f
device.allowedips.device = device
}
// SetSessionStateFunc sets the function used to observe peer WireGuard session
// state changes.
//
// It does not replay current state. Callers that need a complete view should set
// it before peers are started or lazily created, and maintain any snapshots,
// sequence numbers, and pubsub state outside wireguard-go.
//
// The callback must be concurrent-safe and must not call back into Device.
func (device *Device) SetSessionStateFunc(f PeerSessionStateFunc) {
if f == nil {
device.peerStateFn.Store(nil)
return
}
device.peerStateFn.Store(&f)
}
// MaxPriorityMessageContentSize is the maximum size of a message returned by a
// [PeerPriorityMessageFunc]. It's a power of 2 that leaves significant space
// when accounting for all WireGuard overhead and encapsulating network protocol
// headers. Future adjustments to this value should consider all these overheads
// and any [conn.Bind] implementation limitations.
const MaxPriorityMessageContentSize = 512
// PeerPriorityMessageFunc is called when a peer's WireGuard session keypair is
// established (or re-keyed) for forward data transmission.
//
// The returned message is transmitted to the peer in priority fashion. Priority
// means it cannot be evicted from the staged packet queue by non-priority
// (read from [tun.Device]) packets. It avoids the staged queue altogether.
//
// The callback must be cheap and must not call back into [Device]. A zero length
// message or a message whose length exceeds [MaxPriorityMessageContentSize] will
// be silently dropped. Message should start with an IPv4 or IPv6 header as it
// is subject to allowed IPs lookup on the receiver, same as any other transport
// message.
type PeerPriorityMessageFunc func(peer NoisePublicKey) (msg []byte)
// SetPriorityMessageOnEstablishmentFunc sets a function to be used for sending
// a priority message around session establishment. See [PeerPriorityMessageFunc]
// docs for more details. A nil value clears any previously set value.
func (device *Device) SetPriorityMessageOnEstablishmentFunc(f PeerPriorityMessageFunc) {
if f == nil {
device.priorityMsgFn.Store(nil)
return
}
device.priorityMsgFn.Store(&f)
}
func (device *Device) Close() {
device.state.Lock()
defer device.state.Unlock()
@ -671,25 +444,16 @@ func (device *Device) SendKeepalivesToPeersWithCurrentKeypair() {
return
}
// Collect the set of peers to keepalive under peers.RLock, then release
// before invoking SendKeepalive. SendKeepalive can reach
// CreateMessageInitiation which acquires staticIdentity.RLock; holding
// peers.RLock across that path would invert the
// staticIdentity < peers hierarchy (see lock-ordering.md).
var peers []*Peer
device.peers.RLock()
for _, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
peer.keypairs.RLock()
sendKeepalive := peer.keypairs.current != nil && !peer.keypairs.current.created.Add(RejectAfterTime).Before(time.Now())
peer.keypairs.RUnlock()
if sendKeepalive {
peers = append(peers, peer)
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
}
device.peers.RUnlock()
for _, peer := range peers {
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
}
// closeBindLocked closes the device's net.bind.

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package device

View file

@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 v2 behavioural red/green test for the EARLY give-up rebind.
* Field failure mode (the v1 field leftover, dump 2026-08-01): the v1 give-up
* rebind heals a dead 5-tuple, but only at ~90s after the first demand while
* the user pings within the first 5-35s after device wake and sees every node
* in ERR. The early trigger fires from the retry branch once >=3 initiations
* went unanswered AND the session is provably dead (no live keypair, or last
* handshake older than RejectAfterTime), shrinking the ERR window to ~15-20s.
*
* The test reuses the v1 harness (gateBind: first socket generation blackholes
* every send) and drives the peer to the 3rd retry expiry the state a real
* ~15s of unanswered retries ends in. Post-fix the retry branch rebinds and
* the tunnel comes up; pre-fix (v1 base) the retry keeps dying in the first
* socket generation and only the ~90s give-up would heal, so the packet never
* arrives within the test window.
*
* This file deliberately uses NO post-fix API, so it compiles and runs RED on
* the v1 base commit.
*/
package device
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestEarlyRebindSelfHeal: dead first socket, cold session (no keypair yet),
// 3rd retry expiry fires — the tunnel must come up and deliver traffic without
// waiting out the full 90s give-up cycle.
func TestEarlyRebindSelfHeal(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
// Traffic demand: stages the packet and sends the first (blackholed)
// initiation.
send()
pair.devA.peers.RLock()
peer := pair.devA.peers.keyMap[pair.pkB]
pair.devA.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
// Simulate reaching the 3rd retry expiry (~15s in the field): two retries
// already counted, the last initiation older than the retransmit timeout.
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(2)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

View file

@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 passive self-heal for a dead per-flow path (an expired NAT
* mapping or a poisoned DPI flow entry that pins every retry to the same dead
* 5-tuple until a manual reconnect). One mechanism reopen the bind (fresh
* ephemeral port when allowed) and immediately re-initiate with three
* triggers sharing one debounce window:
*
* giveup the handshake retry cycle exhausted (~90s of unanswered
* initiations under traffic demand); safety net, covers every path;
* early >=3 unanswered initiations against a provably dead session
* (see sessionProvablyDead): no point waiting out the rest of the
* cycle, rebind at ~15s instead of ~90s;
* nudge the consumer reports "device woke up" via
* Device.RebindIfSessionStale (wired through sing-box libbox);
* heals without waiting for traffic demand at all.
*
* Zero cost while healthy: no timers, no goroutines triggers 1-2 live in
* the existing retry cycle, trigger 3 is paid by the caller. The state lives
* in Device.giveUpRebind (device.go); enabled defaults to true in NewDevice,
* sing-box decides freshPort from whether the user pinned listen_port.
*/
package device
import "time"
// earlyGiveUpMinAttempts is the number of unanswered initiations (retry timer
// expiries) after which a provably dead session is rebound early instead of
// waiting out the full RekeyAttemptTime cycle: ~15s at RekeyTimeout=5s.
const earlyGiveUpMinAttempts = 3
// SetGiveUpRebind configures the self-heal (see the giveUpRebind field
// comment in device.go). freshPort must be false when the user pinned an
// explicit listen_port: the pinned port is preserved, at the cost of the
// rebind not changing the 5-tuple.
func (device *Device) SetGiveUpRebind(enabled, freshPort bool) {
device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Store(enabled)
device.giveUpRebind.freshPort.Store(freshPort)
}
// handleHandshakeGiveUp is invoked from the give-up branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake: ~90s of initiations went unanswered, so the
// current socket's 5-tuple is proven dead.
func (device *Device) handleHandshakeGiveUp(peer *Peer) {
device.selfHealRebind("giveup", peer)
}
// maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind is invoked from the RETRY branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake. Once enough initiations went unanswered AND the
// session is provably dead there is nothing left to protect — rebind now, at
// ~15s instead of ~90s. The retry cycle itself continues untouched: this only
// moves the socket under it. A live session with transient packet loss fails
// sessionProvablyDead and keeps byte-for-byte upstream behaviour; the shared
// debounce means this also suppresses the giveup rebind of the same series.
func (device *Device) maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind(peer *Peer) {
if peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Load() < earlyGiveUpMinAttempts {
return
}
if !device.sessionProvablyDead(peer) {
return
}
device.selfHealRebind("early", peer)
}
// sessionProvablyDead reports whether the peer's session is beyond saving: no
// live keypair, or the last successful handshake is older than
// RejectAfterTime (the keys are invalid after that, so a rebind loses
// nothing). The stale predicate shared by the early and nudge triggers.
func (device *Device) sessionProvablyDead(peer *Peer) bool {
if peer.keypairs.Current() == nil {
return true
}
return time.Since(time.Unix(0, peer.lastHandshakeNano.Load())) > RejectAfterTime
}
// RebindIfSessionStale is the wake-nudge entry (trigger 3): the consumer
// observed a device wake-up and asks for an immediate heal instead of waiting
// for traffic demand to walk the retry cycle. If any running peer's session
// is provably dead the bind is reopened once (shared debounce) and every such
// peer re-initiates immediately; a healthy device is a no-op. Returns whether
// a rebind was actually scheduled. Never blocks on the rebind itself — the
// heavy part runs in a goroutine (see selfHealRebind). On a down or closed
// device it is a no-op, so callers racing idle-suspend or Close are safe.
func (device *Device) RebindIfSessionStale() bool {
if !device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Load() || !device.isUp() {
return false
}
var stale []*Peer
device.peers.RLock()
for _, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
if peer.isRunning.Load() && device.sessionProvablyDead(peer) {
stale = append(stale, peer)
}
}
device.peers.RUnlock()
if len(stale) == 0 {
return false
}
return device.selfHealRebind("nudge", stale...)
}
// selfHealRebind is the shared action behind all three triggers. Runs the
// heavy part in a goroutine so a timer callback (or a nudge caller) never
// blocks on BindUpdate's worker drain. Debounced to one rebind per
// RekeyAttemptTime per device across ALL triggers (CAS on `last` settles
// concurrent multi-peer races): an early rebind at ~15s suppresses the giveup
// rebind of the same failed series at ~90s. On a down or closed device
// BindUpdate does not reopen the socket, so a rebind racing idle-suspend
// (SPEC 020) or Close degrades to a no-op.
func (device *Device) selfHealRebind(trigger string, peers ...*Peer) bool {
if !device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Load() {
return false
}
if device.isClosed() {
return false
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
last := device.giveUpRebind.last.Load()
if now-last < int64(RekeyAttemptTime/time.Second) {
return false
}
if !device.giveUpRebind.last.CompareAndSwap(last, now) {
return false
}
fresh := device.giveUpRebind.freshPort.Load()
go func() {
if fresh {
device.net.Lock()
device.net.port = 0
device.net.Unlock()
}
if err := device.BindUpdate(); err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed self-heal rebind (trigger=%s): %v", peers[0], trigger, err)
return
}
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Rebound socket for self-heal (trigger=%s, fresh port=%v)", peers[0], trigger, fresh)
for _, peer := range peers {
peer.SendHandshakeInitiation(false)
}
}()
return true
}

View file

@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 unit tests for the give-up rebind mechanics on top of the
* self-heal harness (lx_giveup_selfheal_test.go): fresh vs pinned port,
* debounce, and disabled = upstream parity. These use the post-fix API
* (SetGiveUpRebind) and are NOT expected to compile on the pre-fix base.
*/
package device
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
func waitOpens(t *testing.T, bind *gateBind, want int) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for bind.openCount() < want {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("bind reopened %d times, want %d", bind.openCount(), want)
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// Fresh mode (listen_port not pinned): the rebind must ask the OS for a new
// ephemeral port — Open is called with port 0.
func TestGiveUpRebindFreshPort(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, true)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 0 {
t.Fatalf("rebind requested port %d, want 0 (fresh ephemeral)", ports[1])
}
}
// Pinned mode (explicit listen_port): the rebind must keep the current port.
// chanBind.Open reports its source id (1) as the actual port, so the device
// stores net.port=1 after the first Open and must reuse it.
func TestGiveUpRebindPinnedPortPreserved(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("rebind requested port %d, want 1 (pinned)", ports[1])
}
}
// A second give-up inside the debounce window must not rebind again.
func TestGiveUpRebindDebounce(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("debounce failed: bind opened %d times, want 2", got)
}
}
// Disabled: the give-up branch must behave exactly like upstream — flush and
// stop, no rebind.
func TestGiveUpRebindDisabled(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(false, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("disabled mechanism still rebound: %d opens, want 1", got)
}
}

View file

@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 behavioural red/green test for the handshake give-up
* self-heal. Field failure mode (WARP/AWG after device sleep): the per-flow
* path state of the socket's 5-tuple dies (expired NAT mapping / poisoned DPI
* flow entry), every packet sent from the old socket vanishes, and upstream
* wireguard-go retries into that dead socket forever only a manual
* reconnect (new socket, new ephemeral port) heals the peer.
*
* The test models the dead 5-tuple with a bind whose FIRST socket generation
* silently swallows every send; any socket opened after a rebind delivers
* normally. It then drives the peer into the give-up branch of
* expiredRetransmitHandshake and expects traffic to flow end to end without
* any reconnect:
*
* - pre-fix (base): give-up only flushes staged packets, the bind is never
* reopened, every retry keeps dying in the first generation -> timeout;
* - post-fix: give-up rebinds the socket and re-initiates -> tunnel comes
* up and the packet arrives.
*
* This file deliberately uses NO post-fix API, so it compiles and runs RED on
* the pre-fix base commit. Reuses the chanBind/chanTun harness from
* transport_padding_test.go.
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
)
// gateBind wraps chanBind: it records every Open (the port argument the
// device asked for) and silently swallows sends while the socket generation
// is at most dropOpens — modelling a dead 5-tuple whose packets vanish on the
// path without any local error.
type gateBind struct {
*chanBind
mu sync.Mutex
openPorts []uint16
opens int
dropOpens int // swallow sends while opens <= dropOpens
}
func (b *gateBind) Open(port uint16) ([]conn.ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
fns, actual, err := b.chanBind.Open(port)
b.mu.Lock()
b.opens++
b.openPorts = append(b.openPorts, port)
b.mu.Unlock()
return fns, actual, err
}
func (b *gateBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, ep conn.Endpoint, offset int) error {
b.mu.Lock()
drop := b.opens <= b.dropOpens
b.mu.Unlock()
if drop {
return nil // the dead 5-tuple: no local error, the packet just vanishes
}
return b.chanBind.Send(bufs, ep, offset)
}
func (b *gateBind) openCount() int {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.opens
}
func (b *gateBind) portsSnapshot() []uint16 {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return append([]uint16(nil), b.openPorts...)
}
type giveUpPair struct {
devA, devB *Device
tunA, tunB *chanTun
bindA *gateBind
pkB NoisePublicKey
}
// newGiveUpPair builds two Up()'d peered devices; devA sits on a gateBind
// whose first socket generation optionally blackholes all sends.
func newGiveUpPair(t *testing.T, dropFirstOpen bool) *giveUpPair {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
rawA, rawB := newChanBindPair()
bindA := &gateBind{chanBind: rawA}
if dropFirstOpen {
bindA.dropOpens = 1
}
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, rawB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
return &giveUpPair{devA: devA, devB: devB, tunA: tunA, tunB: tunB, bindA: bindA, pkB: pkB}
}
// triggerGiveUp drives dev's peer into the give-up branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake exactly the way 90s of unanswered retries would:
// attempts past the limit, last initiation older than RekeyTimeout.
func triggerGiveUp(t *testing.T, dev *Device, pk NoisePublicKey) {
t.Helper()
dev.peers.RLock()
peer := dev.peers.keyMap[pk]
dev.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(MaxTimerHandshakes + 1)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
}
// TestHandshakeGiveUpSelfHeal: dead first socket, give-up fires — the tunnel
// must come up and deliver traffic without any reconnect.
func TestHandshakeGiveUpSelfHeal(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
// Traffic demand: stages the packet and sends the first (blackholed)
// initiation, exactly the state a real give-up cycle ends in.
send()
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

View file

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Pins the AWG get path: IpcGet must report every obfuscation parameter it
* accepted, including i1..i5. The I-slots are emitted by an `i%d=` loop rather
* than literal per-key sendf calls, which makes them easy to miss when auditing
* introspection parity against amneziawg-go by grep alone.
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestIpcGetReportsAWGParams(t *testing.T) {
sk, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey: %v", err)
}
bind, _ := newChanBindPair()
dev := NewDevice(context.Background(), newChanTun(), bind, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "dev: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(dev.Close)
set := strings.Join([]string{
"private_key=" + hex.EncodeToString(sk[:]),
"jc=4", "jmin=40", "jmax=70",
"s1=15", "s2=20", "s3=25", "s4=30",
"h1=1", "h2=2", "h3=3", "h4=100-200",
"i1=<b 0xf6a1>", "i3=<r 8>", "i5=<t>",
"",
}, "\n")
if err := dev.IpcSet(set); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet: %v", err)
}
got, err := dev.IpcGet()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcGet: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("IpcGet:\n%s", got)
for _, want := range []string{
"jc=4", "jmin=40", "jmax=70",
"s1=15", "s2=20", "s3=25", "s4=30",
"h1=1", "h2=2", "h3=3", "h4=100-200",
"i1=<b 0xf6a1>", "i3=<r 8>", "i5=<t>",
} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Errorf("IpcGet missing %q", want)
}
}
// Unset I-slots must stay absent, not surface as empty values.
for _, absent := range []string{"i2=", "i4="} {
if strings.Contains(got, absent) {
t.Errorf("IpcGet reported unset %q", absent)
}
}
}

View file

@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 v2 unit tests for the stale predicate, the wake nudge
* (RebindIfSessionStale) and the shared debounce across triggers, on top of
* the v1 harness (lx_giveup_selfheal_test.go). These use the post-fix API and
* are NOT expected to compile on the pre-fix base.
*/
package device
import (
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// establishTunnel completes a real handshake over a healthy pair so the peer
// holds a live keypair and a fresh lastHandshakeNano.
func establishTunnel(t *testing.T, pair *giveUpPair) {
t.Helper()
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
func peerOf(t *testing.T, dev *Device, pk NoisePublicKey) *Peer {
t.Helper()
dev.peers.RLock()
peer := dev.peers.keyMap[pk]
dev.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
return peer
}
// A cold peer (no keypair yet, nothing to lose): the nudge must rebind and
// immediately initiate — the tunnel comes up without any traffic demand.
func TestNudgeRebindsStaleSession(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a cold (keypair-less) session must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
// The immediate initiation must bring the tunnel up: traffic sent only
// AFTER the nudge flows end to end.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// A healthy session (live keypair, fresh handshake) must be a strict no-op.
func TestNudgeHealthySessionNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
opens := pair.bindA.openCount()
if pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a healthy session must not rebind")
}
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != opens {
t.Fatalf("healthy nudge reopened the bind: %d opens, want %d", got, opens)
}
}
// A live keypair whose last handshake is older than RejectAfterTime is
// provably dead (the keys are invalid): the nudge must rebind.
func TestNudgeExpiredHandshakeIsStale(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
peer.lastHandshakeNano.Store(time.Now().Add(-RejectAfterTime - time.Second).UnixNano())
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on an expired session must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
}
// A down device (how SPEC 020 idle-suspend leaves it) must be a no-op — the
// nudge never wakes sleepers.
func TestNudgeDownDeviceNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
if err := pair.devA.Down(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Down: %v", err)
}
if pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a down device must be a no-op")
}
}
// Pinned listen_port survives the nudge rebind.
func TestNudgePinnedPortPreserved(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, false)
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge must rebind a cold session")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("nudge rebind requested port %d, want 1 (pinned)", ports[1])
}
}
// The debounce window is SHARED across triggers: an early/nudge rebind
// suppresses the give-up rebind of the same failed series, and a later series
// (window elapsed) heals again — sliding window, not a latch.
func TestSharedDebounceAcrossTriggers(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
// First trigger of the series: nudge.
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("first nudge must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
// The give-up of the same series lands inside the window: suppressed.
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("give-up inside the shared window rebound: %d opens, want 2", got)
}
// Next series: age the window as wall clocks would — heals again.
pair.devA.giveUpRebind.last.Store(time.Now().Add(-RekeyAttemptTime - time.Second).Unix())
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 3)
}
// The early trigger must NOT fire before enough initiations went unanswered,
// even against a provably dead session.
func TestEarlyRebindNeedsMinAttempts(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(0) // this expiry brings it to 1 (< min)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("early rebind fired below the attempt floor: %d opens, want 1", got)
}
}
// A fresh session (live keypair, recent handshake) must keep the retry branch
// byte-for-byte upstream even past the attempt floor: no rebind.
func TestEarlyRebindFreshSessionNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
opens := pair.bindA.openCount()
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(earlyGiveUpMinAttempts)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != opens {
t.Fatalf("early rebind fired on a fresh session: %d opens, want %d", got, opens)
}
}
// Nudge racing Close: no panic, no deadlock, no race-detector report.
func TestNudgeRacesClose(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale()
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.Close()
}()
wg.Wait()
}
}
// Nudge racing Down/Up (the SPEC 020 suspend/resume shape): the device must
// end consistent — up, with a live bind.
func TestNudgeRacesSuspend(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale()
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
if err := pair.devA.Down(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Down: %v", err)
}
if err := pair.devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Up: %v", err)
}
}()
wg.Wait()
pair.devA.net.RLock()
bindAlive := pair.devA.net.bind != nil
pair.devA.net.RUnlock()
if !bindAlive || !pair.devA.isUp() {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: device inconsistent after nudge/suspend race (bind=%v up=%v)",
i, bindAlive, pair.devA.isUp())
}
pair.devA.Close()
pair.devB.Close()
}
}

View file

@ -57,9 +57,7 @@ func (h *magicHeader) Validate(val uint32) bool {
}
func (h *magicHeader) Generate() uint32 {
// Widen before arithmetic: end-start+1 in uint32 wraps to 0 for the
// full 0..2^32-1 range, which would panic rand.Int (bound <= 0).
high := int64(h.end) - int64(h.start) + 1
high := int64(h.end - h.start + 1)
r, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(high))
return h.start + uint32(r.Int64())
}

View file

@ -351,22 +351,17 @@ func (device *Device) ConsumeMessageInitiation(msg *MessageInitiation, endpoint
return nil
}
// Snapshot staticIdentity so we don't hold the RLock across LookupPeer,
// which may call NewPeer (reentrant RLock deadlocks against a pending
// SetPrivateKey writer; see lock-ordering.md).
device.staticIdentity.RLock()
publicKey := device.staticIdentity.publicKey
privateKey := device.staticIdentity.privateKey
device.staticIdentity.RUnlock()
defer device.staticIdentity.RUnlock()
mixHash(&hash, &InitialHash, publicKey[:])
mixHash(&hash, &InitialHash, device.staticIdentity.publicKey[:])
mixHash(&hash, &hash, msg.Ephemeral[:])
mixKey(&chainKey, &InitialChainKey, msg.Ephemeral[:])
// decrypt static key
var peerPK NoisePublicKey
var key [chacha20poly1305.KeySize]byte
ss, err := privateKey.sharedSecret(msg.Ephemeral)
ss, err := device.staticIdentity.privateKey.sharedSecret(msg.Ephemeral)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
@ -541,14 +536,6 @@ func (device *Device) ConsumeMessageResponse(msg *MessageResponse) *Peer {
chainKey [blake2s.Size]byte
)
// Snapshot the static private key before acquiring handshake.mutex so
// that handshake.mutex is never held while acquiring staticIdentity
// (which would invert the staticIdentity < handshake.mutex hierarchy;
// see lock-ordering.md).
device.staticIdentity.RLock()
privateKey := device.staticIdentity.privateKey
device.staticIdentity.RUnlock()
ok := func() bool {
// lock handshake state
@ -559,6 +546,11 @@ func (device *Device) ConsumeMessageResponse(msg *MessageResponse) *Peer {
return false
}
// lock private key for reading
device.staticIdentity.RLock()
defer device.staticIdentity.RUnlock()
// finish 3-way DH
mixHash(&hash, &handshake.hash, msg.Ephemeral[:])
@ -571,7 +563,7 @@ func (device *Device) ConsumeMessageResponse(msg *MessageResponse) *Peer {
mixKey(&chainKey, &chainKey, ss[:])
setZero(ss[:])
ss, err = privateKey.sharedSecret(msg.Ephemeral)
ss, err = device.staticIdentity.privateKey.sharedSecret(msg.Ephemeral)
if err != nil {
return false
}

View file

@ -3,26 +3,11 @@ package device
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
type obfBuilder func(val string) (obf, error)
// parseObfLen parses and bounds an obfuscator length argument: a negative
// value would panic slice bounds in obfChain.Obfuscate, a huge one would
// OOM in the handshake-time make (SendHandshakeInitiation).
func parseObfLen(val string) (int, error) {
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if length < 0 || length > MaxMessageSize {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("obfuscator length %d out of range [0, %d]", length, MaxMessageSize)
}
return length, nil
}
var obfBuilders = map[string]obfBuilder{
"b": newBytesObf,
"t": newTimestampObf,

View file

@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package device
import "strconv"
func newDataSizeObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View file

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Guards around AWG obfuscation config values: these tests pin the
* crash-on-config-value fixes (swapped jmin/jmax, out-of-range obfuscator
* lengths, full-range magic headers).
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"testing"
)
func TestParseObfLen(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
val string
want int
wantErr bool
}{
{"0", 0, false},
{"100", 100, false},
{fmt.Sprintf("%d", MaxMessageSize), MaxMessageSize, false},
{"-1", 0, true}, // would panic slice bounds in Obfuscate
{fmt.Sprintf("%d", MaxMessageSize+1), 0, true}, // would OOM the handshake make
{"2000000000", 0, true},
{"abc", 0, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got, err := parseObfLen(c.val)
if c.wantErr != (err != nil) {
t.Errorf("parseObfLen(%q): err = %v, wantErr = %v", c.val, err, c.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && got != c.want {
t.Errorf("parseObfLen(%q) = %d, want %d", c.val, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestMagicHeaderGenerateFullRange(t *testing.T) {
// end-start+1 computed in uint32 wraps to 0 for the full range and
// panics rand.Int; the fix widens to int64 before the arithmetic.
h := &magicHeader{start: 0, end: ^uint32(0)}
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
v := h.Generate()
if !h.Validate(v) {
t.Fatalf("generated value %d outside range", v)
}
}
}
// TestJunkSwappedBounds brings up a device pair whose junk config has
// jmin > jmax (passes per-field UAPI validation); without the swap guard
// the first handshake panics rand.Int with a non-positive bound.
func TestJunkSwappedBounds(t *testing.T) {
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
bindA, bindB := newChanBindPair()
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, bindB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
// jmin deliberately greater than jmax: each field alone is valid.
junk := "jc=2\njmin=100\njmax=50\n"
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), junk, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), junk, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
// Drive a packet end-to-end: the handshake (junk packets included)
// must complete without panicking the process.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 28)
devA.InputPacket(testIPB.AsSlice(), [][]byte{pkt})
awaitPacket(t, tunB, pkt, func() {
devA.InputPacket(testIPB.AsSlice(), [][]byte{pkt})
})
}

View file

@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"strconv"
)
func newRandObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View file

@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"strconv"
"unicode"
)
const chars52 = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
func newRandCharObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View file

@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"strconv"
"unicode"
)
const digits10 = "0123456789"
func newRandDigitsObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View file

@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ package device
import (
"container/list"
"errors"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
@ -27,20 +25,6 @@ type Peer struct {
rxBytes atomic.Uint64 // bytes received from peer
lastHandshakeNano atomic.Int64 // nano seconds since epoch
sessionState struct {
sync.Mutex
current PeerSessionState
sessionExpires time.Time
}
queuedOutboundPackets atomic.Int32 // packets in staged+outbound queues, for input backpressure
// deleteOnIdle indicates whether the peer should be deleted when idle
// because it was auto-created via a Device.PeerLookupFunc.
//
// This field should only be set once, before the peer is started.
deleteOnIdle bool
endpoint struct {
sync.Mutex
val conn.Endpoint
@ -52,7 +36,6 @@ type Peer struct {
retransmitHandshake *Timer
sendKeepalive *Timer
newHandshake *Timer
sessionExpired *Timer
zeroKeyMaterial *Timer
persistentKeepalive *Timer
handshakeAttempts atomic.Uint32
@ -61,14 +44,7 @@ type Peer struct {
}
state struct {
sync.Mutex // protects against concurrent Start/Stop, and fields below
allowedIPs []netip.Prefix
// testAllowedIP, if non-nil, is used to test whether the peer is
// allowed to send a packet from the given IP address. It can be read
// without locking, but must be set with the state mutex locked.
testAllowedIP atomic.Pointer[func(netip.Addr) bool]
sync.Mutex // protects against concurrent Start/Stop
}
queue struct {
@ -111,7 +87,7 @@ func (device *Device) NewPeer(pk NoisePublicKey) (*Peer, error) {
// map public key
_, ok := device.peers.keyMap[pk]
if ok {
return nil, errAddExistingPeer
return nil, errors.New("adding existing peer")
}
// pre-compute DH
@ -137,27 +113,6 @@ func (device *Device) NewPeer(pk NoisePublicKey) (*Peer, error) {
return peer, nil
}
// SetAllowedIPs sets the allowed IP prefixes for this peer.
//
// If the allowedIPs are unchanged since the last call, this method is a no-op.
// It's the caller's responsibility to ensure that no two peers have duplicate
// allowed IPs. If so, the last writer wins.
func (p *Peer) SetAllowedIPs(allowedIPs []netip.Prefix) {
p.state.Lock()
defer p.state.Unlock()
if slices.Equal(p.state.allowedIPs, allowedIPs) {
return
}
p.device.allowedips.setPeerPrefixes(p, allowedIPs)
allowedIPs = slices.Clone(allowedIPs) // avoid retaining caller's slice
p.state.allowedIPs = allowedIPs
f := mkIPInCIDRsTestFunc(allowedIPs)
p.state.testAllowedIP.Store(&f)
}
// SendBuffers sends buffers to peer. WireGuard packet data in each element of
// buffers must be preceded by MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize number of
// bytes.
@ -238,7 +193,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) Start() {
// reset routine state
peer.stopping.Wait()
peer.stopping.Add(2)
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Store(0)
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-(RekeyTimeout + time.Second))
@ -248,8 +202,8 @@ func (peer *Peer) Start() {
peer.timersStart()
device.flushInboundQueue(peer.queue.inbound.c)
device.flushOutboundQueue(peer.queue.outbound.c)
device.flushInboundQueue(peer.queue.inbound)
device.flushOutboundQueue(peer.queue.outbound)
// Use the device batch size, not the bind batch size, as the device size is
// the size of the batch pools.
@ -258,21 +212,10 @@ func (peer *Peer) Start() {
go peer.RoutineSequentialReceiver(batchSize)
peer.isRunning.Store(true)
// A lazily-created peer that never completes a handshake otherwise never
// arms its reaping timer. Arm it here, while running under state.Lock, so
// it's reclaimed after RejectAfterTime*3 of no session and is guaranteed to
// be torn down by a matching Stop. A completed handshake re-Mods it.
if peer.deleteOnIdle {
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.Mod(RejectAfterTime * 3)
}
}
func (peer *Peer) ZeroAndFlushAll() {
device := peer.device
if peer.timers.sessionExpired != nil {
peer.timers.sessionExpired.Del()
}
// clear key pairs
@ -295,11 +238,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) ZeroAndFlushAll() {
handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.FlushStagedPackets()
peer.sessionState.Lock()
peer.sessionState.sessionExpires = time.Time{}
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(PeerSessionNone)
peer.sessionState.Unlock()
}
func (peer *Peer) ExpireCurrentKeypairs() {
@ -319,11 +257,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) ExpireCurrentKeypairs() {
next.sendNonce.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
}
keypairs.Unlock()
peer.sessionState.Lock()
peer.sessionState.sessionExpires = time.Time{}
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(PeerSessionExpired)
peer.sessionState.Unlock()
}
func (peer *Peer) Stop() {
@ -346,51 +279,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) Stop() {
peer.ZeroAndFlushAll()
}
func (peer *Peer) noteSessionState(state PeerSessionState) {
peer.sessionState.Lock()
defer peer.sessionState.Unlock()
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(state)
}
// noteSessionStateLocked records a session state transition and delivers the
// callback. The caller must hold peer.sessionState.Mutex during the
// state determination and transition.
func (peer *Peer) noteSessionStateLocked(state PeerSessionState) {
if peer.sessionState.current == state {
return
}
peer.sessionState.current = state
if f := peer.device.peerStateFn.Load(); f != nil {
(*f)(peer.handshake.remoteStatic, state)
}
}
func (peer *Peer) noteSessionHandshakeStarted() {
peer.sessionState.Lock()
defer peer.sessionState.Unlock()
if peer.sessionState.current == PeerSessionEstablished {
return
}
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(PeerSessionHandshake)
}
func (peer *Peer) noteSessionHandshakeStopped() {
peer.sessionState.Lock()
defer peer.sessionState.Unlock()
state := PeerSessionNone
if peer.hasKeyMaterial() {
state = PeerSessionExpired
}
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(state)
}
func (peer *Peer) hasKeyMaterial() bool {
keypairs := &peer.keypairs
keypairs.RLock()
defer keypairs.RUnlock()
return keypairs.previous != nil || keypairs.current != nil || keypairs.next.Load() != nil
}
func (peer *Peer) SetEndpointFromPacket(endpoint conn.Endpoint) {
peer.endpoint.Lock()
defer peer.endpoint.Unlock()

View file

@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ package device
import (
"sync"
"github.com/sagernet/sing/common/buf"
)
type WaitPool struct {
@ -25,10 +23,6 @@ func NewWaitPool(max uint32, new func() any) *WaitPool {
return p
}
func (p *WaitPool) hasAccounting() bool {
return p != nil && p.max != 0
}
func (p *WaitPool) Get() any {
if p.max != 0 {
p.lock.Lock()
@ -53,27 +47,28 @@ func (p *WaitPool) Put(x any) {
}
func (device *Device) PopulatePools() {
device.pool.inboundElementsContainer = &sync.Pool{New: func() any {
device.pool.inboundElementsContainer = NewWaitPool(PreallocatedBuffersPerPool, func() any {
s := make([]*QueueInboundElement, 0, device.BatchSize())
return &QueueInboundElementsContainer{elems: s}
}}
device.pool.outboundElementsContainer = &sync.Pool{New: func() any {
})
device.pool.outboundElementsContainer = NewWaitPool(PreallocatedBuffersPerPool, func() any {
s := make([]*QueueOutboundElement, 0, device.BatchSize())
return &QueueOutboundElementsContainer{elems: s}
}}
})
device.pool.messageBuffers = NewWaitPool(PreallocatedBuffersPerPool, func() any {
return new([MaxMessageSize]byte)
})
device.pool.inboundElements = &sync.Pool{New: func() any {
device.pool.inboundElements = NewWaitPool(PreallocatedBuffersPerPool, func() any {
return new(QueueInboundElement)
}}
device.pool.outboundElements = &sync.Pool{New: func() any {
})
device.pool.outboundElements = NewWaitPool(PreallocatedBuffersPerPool, func() any {
return new(QueueOutboundElement)
}}
})
}
func (device *Device) GetInboundElementsContainer() *QueueInboundElementsContainer {
c := device.pool.inboundElementsContainer.Get().(*QueueInboundElementsContainer)
c.Mutex = sync.Mutex{}
return c
}
@ -87,6 +82,7 @@ func (device *Device) PutInboundElementsContainer(c *QueueInboundElementsContain
func (device *Device) GetOutboundElementsContainer() *QueueOutboundElementsContainer {
c := device.pool.outboundElementsContainer.Get().(*QueueOutboundElementsContainer)
c.Mutex = sync.Mutex{}
return c
}
@ -106,20 +102,6 @@ func (device *Device) PutMessageBuffer(msg *[MaxMessageSize]byte) {
device.pool.messageBuffers.Put(msg)
}
// Outbound buffers come from the sing allocator instead of the bounded
// messageBuffers pool: the injection paths (InputPacket/InputPackets) run on
// the caller's shared read loop, which must never block on pool exhaustion,
// and their packets are far smaller than MaxMessageSize, so they are allocated
// by actual size. This also keeps the bounded pool exclusively for the receive
// path, so outbound backlog can no longer starve it.
func (device *Device) GetOutboundBuffer(size int) []byte {
return buf.Get(size)
}
func (device *Device) PutOutboundBuffer(buffer []byte) {
_ = buf.Put(buffer)
}
func (device *Device) GetInboundElement() *QueueInboundElement {
return device.pool.inboundElements.Get().(*QueueInboundElement)
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package device
@ -14,6 +14,6 @@ const (
QueueOutboundSize = 1024
QueueInboundSize = 1024
QueueHandshakeSize = 1024
MaxSegmentSize = (1 << 16) - 1 // largest possible UDP datagram
MaxSegmentSize = 2200
PreallocatedBuffersPerPool = 4096
)

View file

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package device

View file

@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ package device
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"time"
@ -36,13 +34,8 @@ type QueueInboundElement struct {
}
type QueueInboundElementsContainer struct {
// filling is a one-shot barrier signaling decryption→receive
// handoff. RoutineReceiveIncoming calls Add(1) before sending the
// container down the decryption and inbound queues; RoutineDecryption
// calls Done after decrypting; RoutineSequentialReceiver calls Wait
// before reading the decrypted packets.
filling sync.WaitGroup
elems []*QueueInboundElement
sync.Mutex
elems []*QueueInboundElement
}
// clearPointers clears elem fields that contain pointers.
@ -103,13 +96,13 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(
elemsByPeer = make(map[*Peer]*QueueInboundElementsContainer, maxBatchSize)
)
for i := range bufsArrs {
for i := range maxBatchSize {
bufsArrs[i] = device.GetMessageBuffer()
bufs[i] = bufsArrs[i][:]
}
defer func() {
for i := 0; i < maxBatchSize; i++ {
for i := range maxBatchSize {
if bufsArrs[i] != nil {
device.PutMessageBuffer(bufsArrs[i])
}
@ -192,6 +185,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(
elemsForPeer, ok := elemsByPeer[peer]
if !ok {
elemsForPeer = device.GetInboundElementsContainer()
elemsForPeer.Lock()
elemsByPeer[peer] = elemsForPeer
}
elemsForPeer.elems = append(elemsForPeer.elems, elem)
@ -235,7 +229,6 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(
}
for peer, elemsContainer := range elemsByPeer {
if peer.isRunning.Load() {
elemsContainer.filling.Add(1)
peer.queue.inbound.c <- elemsContainer
device.queue.decryption.c <- elemsContainer
} else {
@ -277,7 +270,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineDecryption(id int) {
elem.packet = nil
}
}
elemsContainer.filling.Done()
elemsContainer.Unlock()
}
}
@ -439,7 +432,6 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
peer.timersSessionDerived()
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendPriorityMessage()
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
skip:
@ -461,130 +453,118 @@ func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialReceiver(maxBatchSize int) {
if elemsContainer == nil {
return
}
peer.processInboundContainer(elemsContainer, bufs[:0])
}
}
// processInboundContainer waits for the decryption routine to finish
// filling elemsContainer, then writes the valid packets to the TUN
// device and returns the container to the pool.
//
// scratch is a length-0 slice used to assemble the per-packet buffers
// passed to tun.device.Write; its backing array is reused across calls.
func (peer *Peer) processInboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueInboundElementsContainer, scratch [][]byte) {
// Invariants from RoutineSequentialReceiver; all should be unreachable.
if len(scratch) != 0 || cap(scratch) == 0 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("processInboundContainer: scratch must be empty with non-zero cap; got len=%d cap=%d",
len(scratch), cap(scratch)))
}
if cap(scratch) < len(elemsContainer.elems) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("processInboundContainer: scratch cap %d < elems %d",
cap(scratch), len(elemsContainer.elems)))
}
device := peer.device
defer device.PutInboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
// Wait for RoutineDecryption to finish filling the container. After
// Wait returns we have happens-before with that goroutine and are the
// sole owner of the container until Put hands it back to the pool.
elemsContainer.filling.Wait()
elems := elemsContainer.elems
validTailPacket := -1
dataPacketReceived := false
rxBytesLen := uint64(0)
for i, elem := range elems {
if elem.packet == nil {
// decryption failed
continue
}
if !elem.keypair.replayFilter.ValidateCounter(elem.counter, RejectAfterMessages) {
continue
}
validTailPacket = i
if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendPriorityMessage()
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
if ep, ok := elem.endpoint.(conn.PeerAwareEndpoint); ok {
ep.FromPeer(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
}
rxBytesLen += uint64(len(elem.packet) + MinMessageSize)
if len(elem.packet) == 0 {
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Receiving keepalive packet", peer)
continue
}
dataPacketReceived = true
switch elem.packet[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
continue
}
field := elem.packet[IPv4offsetTotalLength : IPv4offsetTotalLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) || int(length) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
continue
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len]
srcAddr, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(src)
if !peer.AllowedPeerSourceIP(srcAddr) {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv4 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
elemsContainer.Lock()
validTailPacket := -1
dataPacketReceived := false
rxBytesLen := uint64(0)
for i, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
if elem.packet == nil {
// decryption failed
continue
}
case 6:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
continue
}
field := elem.packet[IPv6offsetPayloadLength : IPv6offsetPayloadLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
length += ipv6.HeaderLen
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) {
continue
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len]
srcAddr, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(src)
if !peer.AllowedPeerSourceIP(srcAddr) {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv6 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
if !elem.keypair.replayFilter.ValidateCounter(elem.counter, RejectAfterMessages) {
continue
}
default:
device.log.Verbosef("Packet with invalid IP version from %v", peer)
continue
validTailPacket = i
if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
if ep, ok := elem.endpoint.(conn.PeerAwareEndpoint); ok {
ep.FromPeer(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
}
rxBytesLen += uint64(len(elem.packet) + MinMessageSize)
if len(elem.packet) == 0 {
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Receiving keepalive packet", peer)
continue
}
dataPacketReceived = true
switch elem.packet[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
continue
}
field := elem.packet[IPv4offsetTotalLength : IPv4offsetTotalLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) || int(length) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
continue
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len]
if device.allowedips.Lookup(src) != peer {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv4 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
continue
}
case 6:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
continue
}
field := elem.packet[IPv6offsetPayloadLength : IPv6offsetPayloadLength+2]
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field)
length += ipv6.HeaderLen
if int(length) > len(elem.packet) {
continue
}
elem.packet = elem.packet[:length]
src := elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len]
if device.allowedips.Lookup(src) != peer {
device.log.Verbosef("IPv6 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer)
continue
}
default:
device.log.Verbosef(
"Packet with invalid IP version from %v",
peer,
)
continue
}
bufs = append(
bufs,
elem.buffer[:MessageTransportOffsetContent+len(elem.packet)],
)
}
scratch = append(scratch, elem.buffer[:MessageTransportOffsetContent+len(elem.packet)])
}
peer.rxBytes.Add(rxBytesLen)
if validTailPacket >= 0 {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elems[validTailPacket].endpoint)
peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
}
if dataPacketReceived {
peer.timersDataReceived()
}
if len(scratch) > 0 {
_, err := device.tun.device.Write(scratch, MessageTransportOffsetContent)
if err != nil && !device.isClosed() {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to write packets to TUN device: %v", err)
peer.rxBytes.Add(rxBytesLen)
if validTailPacket >= 0 {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elemsContainer.elems[validTailPacket].endpoint)
peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
}
}
for _, elem := range elems {
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
if dataPacketReceived {
peer.timersDataReceived()
}
peer.rxBytes.Add(rxBytesLen)
if validTailPacket >= 0 {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elemsContainer.elems[validTailPacket].endpoint)
peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived()
}
if dataPacketReceived {
peer.timersDataReceived()
}
if len(bufs) > 0 {
_, err := device.tun.device.Write(bufs, MessageTransportOffsetContent)
if err != nil && !device.isClosed() {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to write packets to TUN device: %v", err)
}
}
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
}
bufs = bufs[:0]
device.PutInboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
}
}

View file

@ -10,10 +10,8 @@ import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"time"
@ -50,7 +48,7 @@ import (
*/
type QueueOutboundElement struct {
buffer []byte // sing-allocated buffer holding the packet data
buffer *[MaxMessageSize]byte // slice holding the packet data
// packet is always a slice of "buffer". The starting offset in buffer
// is either:
// a) MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageTransportHeaderSize (plaintext)
@ -62,18 +60,13 @@ type QueueOutboundElement struct {
}
type QueueOutboundElementsContainer struct {
// filling is a one-shot barrier signaling encryption→send handoff.
// SendStagedPackets calls Add(1) before sending the container down
// the encryption and outbound queues; RoutineEncryption calls Done
// after encrypting; RoutineSequentialSender calls Wait before
// reading the encrypted packets.
filling sync.WaitGroup
elems []*QueueOutboundElement
sync.Mutex
elems []*QueueOutboundElement
}
func (device *Device) NewOutboundElement() *QueueOutboundElement {
elem := device.GetOutboundElement()
elem.buffer = device.GetOutboundBuffer(MaxMessageSize)
elem.buffer = device.GetMessageBuffer()
elem.nonce = 0
// keypair and peer were cleared (if necessary) by clearPointers.
return elem
@ -99,10 +92,9 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendKeepalive() {
elemsContainer.elems = append(elemsContainer.elems, elem)
select {
case peer.queue.staged <- elemsContainer:
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(1)
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%v - Sending keepalive packet", peer)
default:
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
}
@ -110,70 +102,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendKeepalive() {
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
// SendPriorityMessage invokes the [PeerPriorityMessageFunc] callback if one is
// set, and queues the returned message for encryption and transmission if the
// current keypair is valid.
func (peer *Peer) SendPriorityMessage() {
f := peer.device.priorityMsgFn.Load()
if f == nil {
return
}
keypair := peer.keypairs.Current()
if keypair == nil || keypair.sendNonce.Load() >= RejectAfterMessages || time.Since(keypair.created) >= RejectAfterTime {
// SendStagedPackets initializes a handshake when the keypair is invalid,
// but we explicitly avoid that here. A priority message is only intended
// to flow around symmetric session establishment, but it should never
// trigger a new session. Reaching this branch due to nonce exhaustion
// or keypair expiration is highly unlikely considering where
// SendPriorityMessage is called (at current keypair establishment).
return
}
// get plaintext message to send
msg := (*f)(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
if len(msg) == 0 {
return
}
if len(msg) > MaxPriorityMessageContentSize {
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%v - Failed to queue priority message due to size", peer)
return
}
// get pooled elements
elem := peer.device.NewOutboundElement()
elemsContainer := peer.device.GetOutboundElementsContainer()
elemsContainer.elems = append(elemsContainer.elems, elem)
packetQueued := false
defer func() {
if !packetQueued {
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
}
}()
// initialize outbound element
const offset = MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize
n := copy(elem.buffer[offset:], msg)
elem.packet = elem.buffer[offset : offset+n]
elem.peer = peer
elem.nonce = keypair.sendNonce.Add(1) - 1
if elem.nonce >= RejectAfterMessages {
keypair.sendNonce.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
return
}
elem.keypair = keypair
// add to parallel and sequential queue
if peer.isRunning.Load() {
elemsContainer.filling.Add(1)
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(1)
peer.queue.outbound.c <- elemsContainer
peer.device.queue.encryption.c <- elemsContainer
packetQueued = true
}
}
func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeInitiation(isRetry bool) error {
if !isRetry {
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(0)
@ -215,11 +143,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeInitiation(isRetry bool) error {
jc := peer.device.junk.count
jmin := peer.device.junk.min
jmax := peer.device.junk.max
if jmax < jmin {
// UAPI validates jmin/jmax only individually; a swapped pair
// would panic rand.Int below with a non-positive bound.
jmin, jmax = jmax, jmin
}
for i := 0; i < jc; i++ {
nBig, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(jmax-jmin+1)))
@ -375,7 +298,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReadFromTUN() {
defer func() {
for _, elem := range elems {
if elem != nil {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
}
@ -399,17 +322,15 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReadFromTUN() {
if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
continue
}
src := netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte(elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len]))
dst := netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte(elem.packet[IPv4offsetDst : IPv4offsetDst+net.IPv4len]))
peer = device.allowedips.LookupFromPacket(src, dst, elem.packet)
dst := elem.packet[IPv4offsetDst : IPv4offsetDst+net.IPv4len]
peer = device.allowedips.Lookup(dst)
case 6:
if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
continue
}
src := netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte(elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len]))
dst := netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte(elem.packet[IPv6offsetDst : IPv6offsetDst+net.IPv6len]))
peer = device.allowedips.LookupFromPacket(src, dst, elem.packet)
dst := elem.packet[IPv6offsetDst : IPv6offsetDst+net.IPv6len]
peer = device.allowedips.Lookup(dst)
default:
device.log.Verbosef("Received packet with unknown IP version")
@ -434,7 +355,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReadFromTUN() {
peer.SendStagedPackets()
} else {
for _, elem := range elemsForPeer.elems {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsForPeer)
@ -461,77 +382,12 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReadFromTUN() {
}
}
// maxQueuedInputPackets bounds the staged+outbound backlog of a peer fed via
// InputPacket/InputPackets. Injected packets beyond it are dropped before they
// are copied into pooled message buffers, like a full qdisc: injection has no
// flow control, and the queues are bounded in containers (up to a full batch
// each), so without this cap a flood is buffered instead of dropped.
const maxQueuedInputPackets = 2048
func (device *Device) inputPacketPeer(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) *Peer {
var src, dst netip.Addr
switch len(destination) {
case net.IPv4len:
dst = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte(destination))
var srcBytes [net.IPv4len]byte
if !gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices, IPv4offsetSrc, srcBytes[:]) {
return nil
}
src = netip.AddrFrom4(srcBytes)
case net.IPv6len:
dst = netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte(destination))
var srcBytes [net.IPv6len]byte
if !gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices, IPv6offsetSrc, srcBytes[:]) {
return nil
}
src = netip.AddrFrom16(srcBytes)
default:
return nil
}
var ipPkt []byte
if len(packetSlices) == 1 {
ipPkt = packetSlices[0]
}
return device.allowedips.LookupFromPacket(src, dst, ipPkt)
}
func gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices [][]byte, offset int, destination []byte) bool {
for _, packetSlice := range packetSlices {
if offset >= len(packetSlice) {
offset -= len(packetSlice)
continue
}
n := copy(destination, packetSlice[offset:])
destination = destination[n:]
offset = 0
if len(destination) == 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (device *Device) InputPacket(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) {
peer := device.inputPacketPeer(destination, packetSlices)
peer := device.allowedips.Lookup(destination)
if peer == nil {
return
}
if peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Load() >= maxQueuedInputPackets {
return
}
var totalLength int
for _, packetSlice := range packetSlices {
totalLength += len(packetSlice)
}
// paddings.transport (AWG s4) is prepended in-buffer by
// RoutineSequentialSender; reserve headroom for the shift.
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead + device.paddings.transport
if allocLength > MaxMessageSize {
return
}
elem := device.GetOutboundElement()
elem.buffer = device.GetOutboundBuffer(allocLength)
elem.nonce = 0
elem := device.NewOutboundElement()
packet := elem.buffer[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageTransportHeaderSize:]
var n int
for _, packetSlice := range packetSlices {
@ -544,77 +400,13 @@ func (device *Device) InputPacket(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) {
peer.StagePackets(elemsForPeer)
peer.SendStagedPackets()
} else {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsForPeer)
}
}
type InputPacketRef struct {
Destination []byte
PacketSlices [][]byte
}
func (device *Device) InputPackets(packets []*InputPacketRef) []*InputPacketRef {
var unmatched []*InputPacketRef
elemsByPeer := make(map[*Peer][]*QueueOutboundElementsContainer, len(packets))
for _, packetRef := range packets {
peer := device.inputPacketPeer(packetRef.Destination, packetRef.PacketSlices)
if peer == nil {
unmatched = append(unmatched, packetRef)
continue
}
if peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Load() >= maxQueuedInputPackets {
continue
}
var totalLength int
for _, packetSlice := range packetRef.PacketSlices {
totalLength += len(packetSlice)
}
// paddings.transport (AWG s4) is prepended in-buffer by
// RoutineSequentialSender; reserve headroom for the shift.
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead + device.paddings.transport
if allocLength > MaxMessageSize {
continue
}
elem := device.GetOutboundElement()
elem.buffer = device.GetOutboundBuffer(allocLength)
elem.nonce = 0
packet := elem.buffer[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageTransportHeaderSize:]
var n int
for _, packetSlice := range packetRef.PacketSlices {
n += copy(packet[n:], packetSlice)
}
elem.packet = packet[:n]
containers := elemsByPeer[peer]
if len(containers) == 0 || len(containers[len(containers)-1].elems) >= conn.IdealBatchSize {
containers = append(containers, device.GetOutboundElementsContainer())
elemsByPeer[peer] = containers
}
elemsForPeer := containers[len(containers)-1]
elemsForPeer.elems = append(elemsForPeer.elems, elem)
}
for peer, containers := range elemsByPeer {
if peer.isRunning.Load() {
for _, elemsForPeer := range containers {
peer.StagePackets(elemsForPeer)
}
peer.SendStagedPackets()
} else {
for _, elemsForPeer := range containers {
for _, elem := range elemsForPeer.elems {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsForPeer)
}
}
}
return unmatched
}
func (peer *Peer) StagePackets(elems *QueueOutboundElementsContainer) {
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(int32(len(elems.elems)))
for {
select {
case peer.queue.staged <- elems:
@ -623,9 +415,8 @@ func (peer *Peer) StagePackets(elems *QueueOutboundElementsContainer) {
}
select {
case tooOld := <-peer.queue.staged:
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(tooOld.elems)))
for _, elem := range tooOld.elems {
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(tooOld)
@ -668,11 +459,10 @@ top:
elem.keypair = keypair
}
elemsContainer.Lock()
elemsContainer.elems = elemsContainer.elems[:i]
if elemsContainerOOO != nil {
// Already counted at their original staging; StagePackets will count them again.
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(elemsContainerOOO.elems)))
peer.StagePackets(elemsContainerOOO) // XXX: Out of order, but we can't front-load go chans
}
@ -683,13 +473,11 @@ top:
// add to parallel and sequential queue
if peer.isRunning.Load() {
elemsContainer.filling.Add(1)
peer.queue.outbound.c <- elemsContainer
peer.device.queue.encryption.c <- elemsContainer
} else {
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(elemsContainer.elems)))
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
@ -708,9 +496,8 @@ func (peer *Peer) FlushStagedPackets() {
for {
select {
case elemsContainer := <-peer.queue.staged:
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(elemsContainer.elems)))
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
@ -750,7 +537,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineEncryption(id int) {
for elemsContainer := range device.queue.encryption.c {
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
// populate header fields
header := elem.buffer[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize : MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageTransportHeaderSize]
header := elem.buffer[:MessageTransportHeaderSize]
fieldType := header[0:4]
fieldReceiver := header[4:8]
@ -776,7 +563,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineEncryption(id int) {
nil,
)
}
elemsContainer.filling.Done()
elemsContainer.Unlock()
}
}
@ -788,100 +575,71 @@ func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialSender(maxBatchSize int) {
}()
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential sender - started", peer)
bufs := make([][]byte, 0, max(maxBatchSize, conn.IdealBatchSize))
bufs := make([][]byte, 0, maxBatchSize)
for elemsContainer := range peer.queue.outbound.c {
bufs = bufs[:0]
if elemsContainer == nil {
return
}
peer.processOutboundContainer(elemsContainer, bufs[:0])
}
}
// processOutboundContainer waits for the encryption routine to finish
// filling elemsContainer, then sends the batch (or drops it, if the peer
// has been stopped) and returns the container to the pool.
//
// scratch is a length-0 slice used to assemble the per-packet buffers
// passed to SendBuffers; its backing array is reused across calls.
func (peer *Peer) processOutboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueOutboundElementsContainer, scratch [][]byte) {
// Invariants from RoutineSequentialSender; all should be unreachable.
if len(scratch) != 0 || cap(scratch) == 0 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("processOutboundContainer: scratch must be empty with non-zero cap; got len=%d cap=%d",
len(scratch), cap(scratch)))
}
if cap(scratch) < len(elemsContainer.elems) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("processOutboundContainer: scratch cap %d < elems %d",
cap(scratch), len(elemsContainer.elems)))
}
device := peer.device
defer device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
// Wait for RoutineEncryption to finish filling the container. After
// Wait returns we have happens-before with that goroutine and are the
// sole owner of the container until Put hands it back to the pool.
elemsContainer.filling.Wait()
if !peer.isRunning.Load() {
// peer has been stopped; return re-usable elems to the shared pool.
// This is an optimization only. It is possible for the peer to be stopped
// immediately after this check, in which case, elem will get processed.
// The timers and SendBuffers code are resilient to a few stragglers.
// TODO: rework peer shutdown order to ensure
// that we never accidentally keep timers alive longer than necessary.
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(elemsContainer.elems)))
if !peer.isRunning.Load() {
// peer has been stopped; return re-usable elems to the shared pool.
// This is an optimization only. It is possible for the peer to be stopped
// immediately after this check, in which case, elem will get processed.
// The timers and SendBuffers code are resilient to a few stragglers.
// TODO: rework peer shutdown order to ensure
// that we never accidentally keep timers alive longer than necessary.
elemsContainer.Lock()
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
continue
}
dataSent := false
elemsContainer.Lock()
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
if len(elem.packet) != MessageKeepaliveSize {
dataSent = true
}
if padding := device.paddings.transport; padding > 0 {
// elem.packet is stored at the start of elem.buffer
// with zero padding
for i := len(elem.packet) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
elem.buffer[i+padding] = elem.buffer[i]
}
rand.Read(elem.buffer[:padding])
elem.packet = elem.buffer[:padding+len(elem.packet)]
}
bufs = append(bufs, elem.packet)
}
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketSent()
err := peer.SendBuffers(bufs)
if dataSent {
peer.timersDataSent()
}
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
return
}
dataSent := false
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
if len(elem.packet[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize:]) != MessageKeepaliveSize {
dataSent = true
}
// lx:begin awg (SPEC 025 — AmneziaWG transport padding, S4)
// Prepend `transport` random bytes ahead of the transport header. The AWG
// path zeroes MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize (see noise-protocol.go), so
// elem.packet starts at buffer offset 0 and this shift is what creates the
// prefix; the buffer is allocated with PaddingMultiple headroom.
if padding := device.paddings.transport; padding > 0 {
for i := len(elem.packet) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
elem.buffer[i+padding] = elem.buffer[i]
device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
if err != nil {
var errGSO conn.ErrUDPGSODisabled
if errors.As(err, &errGSO) {
device.log.Verbosef(err.Error())
err = errGSO.RetryErr
}
rand.Read(elem.buffer[:padding])
elem.packet = elem.buffer[:padding+len(elem.packet)]
}
// lx:end awg
scratch = append(scratch, elem.packet)
}
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketSent()
err := peer.SendBuffers(scratch)
if dataSent {
peer.timersDataSent()
}
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(-int32(len(elemsContainer.elems)))
for _, elem := range elemsContainer.elems {
device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
}
if err != nil {
var errGSO conn.ErrUDPGSODisabled
if errors.As(err, &errGSO) {
device.log.Verbosef(err.Error())
err = errGSO.RetryErr
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to send data packets: %v", peer, err)
continue
}
}
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to send data packets: %v", peer, err)
return
}
peer.keepKeyFreshSending()
peer.keepKeyFreshSending()
}
}

View file

@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ import (
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/rwcancel"
)
func (device *Device) startRouteListener(_ conn.Bind) (*rwcancel.RWCancel, error) {
func (device *Device) startRouteListener(bind conn.Bind) (*rwcancel.RWCancel, error) {
return nil, nil
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*
* This implements userspace semantics of "sticky sockets", modeled after
* WireGuard's kernelspace implementation. This is more or less a straight port
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
*
* Currently there is no way to achieve this within the net package:
* See e.g. https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17930
* So this code remains platform dependent.
* So this code is remains platform dependent.
*/
package device
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (device *Device) startRouteListener(bind conn.Bind) (*rwcancel.RWCancel, er
return netlinkCancel, nil
}
func (device *Device) routineRouteListener(_ conn.Bind, netlinkSock int, netlinkCancel *rwcancel.RWCancel) {
func (device *Device) routineRouteListener(bind conn.Bind, netlinkSock int, netlinkCancel *rwcancel.RWCancel) {
type peerEndpointPtr struct {
peer *Peer
endpoint *conn.Endpoint

View file

@ -98,26 +98,10 @@ func expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer *Peer) {
if peer.timersActive() && !peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.IsPending() {
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.Mod(RejectAfterTime * 3)
}
peer.noteSessionHandshakeStopped()
/* lx: SPEC 041 the exhausted cycle just proved the current socket's
* 5-tuple dead (90s of initiations, zero replies). Rebind once and
* re-initiate, so a stale NAT mapping / poisoned DPI flow entry cannot
* pin this peer to a dead socket until a manual reconnect. Runs after
* the session-state notification so a consumer sees "handshake stopped"
* before the socket is recreated. */
peer.device.handleHandshakeGiveUp(peer)
} else {
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Add(1)
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%s - Handshake did not complete after %d seconds, retrying (try %d)", peer, int(RekeyTimeout.Seconds()), peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Load()+1)
/* lx: SPEC 041 v2 early self-heal: >=3 unanswered initiations against
* a provably dead session (no live keypair, or last handshake older
* than RejectAfterTime) prove the 5-tuple dead without waiting out the
* full cycle. Rebind now (debounced with the give-up trigger below);
* the retry cycle itself continues untouched. */
peer.device.maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind(peer)
/* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is the cause of trouble. */
peer.markEndpointSrcForClearing()
@ -145,24 +129,6 @@ func expiredNewHandshake(peer *Peer) {
func expiredZeroKeyMaterial(peer *Peer) {
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%s - Removing all keys, since we haven't received a new one in %d seconds", peer, int((RejectAfterTime * 3).Seconds()))
peer.ZeroAndFlushAll()
if peer.deleteOnIdle {
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%s - Removing idle lazy peer", peer)
// Remove the peer from the device in a new goroutine as we're currently
// holding timer locks which RemovePeer also needs. This is TOCTOU, but
// acceptable since the worst case is we remove the peer and the lazy
// peerfunc created it again after. We might lose some packets.
go peer.device.RemovePeer(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
}
}
func expiredSession(peer *Peer) {
peer.sessionState.Lock()
defer peer.sessionState.Unlock()
if peer.sessionState.sessionExpires.IsZero() || time.Now().Before(peer.sessionState.sessionExpires) {
return
}
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%s - Session expired after %d seconds", peer, int(RejectAfterTime.Seconds()))
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(PeerSessionExpired)
}
func expiredPersistentKeepalive(peer *Peer) {
@ -208,7 +174,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) timersHandshakeInitiated() {
if peer.timersActive() {
peer.timers.retransmitHandshake.Mod(RekeyTimeout + time.Millisecond*time.Duration(fastrandn(RekeyTimeoutJitterMaxMs)))
}
peer.noteSessionHandshakeStarted()
}
/* Should be called after a handshake response message is received and processed or when getting key confirmation via the first data message. */
@ -224,14 +189,7 @@ func (peer *Peer) timersHandshakeComplete() {
/* Should be called after an ephemeral key is created, which is before sending a handshake response or after receiving a handshake response. */
func (peer *Peer) timersSessionDerived() {
if peer.timersActive() {
peer.sessionState.Lock()
peer.sessionState.sessionExpires = time.Now().Add(RejectAfterTime)
peer.noteSessionStateLocked(PeerSessionEstablished)
peer.sessionState.Unlock()
peer.timers.sessionExpired.Mod(RejectAfterTime)
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.Mod(RejectAfterTime * 3)
} else {
peer.noteSessionState(PeerSessionEstablished)
}
}
@ -247,7 +205,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) timersInit() {
peer.timers.retransmitHandshake = peer.NewTimer(expiredRetransmitHandshake)
peer.timers.sendKeepalive = peer.NewTimer(expiredSendKeepalive)
peer.timers.newHandshake = peer.NewTimer(expiredNewHandshake)
peer.timers.sessionExpired = peer.NewTimer(expiredSession)
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial = peer.NewTimer(expiredZeroKeyMaterial)
peer.timers.persistentKeepalive = peer.NewTimer(expiredPersistentKeepalive)
}
@ -262,7 +219,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) timersStop() {
peer.timers.retransmitHandshake.DelSync()
peer.timers.sendKeepalive.DelSync()
peer.timers.newHandshake.DelSync()
peer.timers.sessionExpired.DelSync()
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.DelSync()
peer.timers.persistentKeepalive.DelSync()
}

View file

@ -1,361 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Regression test for the AWG transport-padding (uapi "s4") out-of-bounds
* crash: RoutineSequentialSender shifts elem.packet right by
* device.paddings.transport bytes inside elem.buffer to prepend a random
* padding prefix, but the injection paths (InputPacket/InputPackets)
* allocated elem.buffer tightly, without headroom for that shift:
*
* panic: runtime error: index out of range [123] with length 76
* device.(*Peer).RoutineSequentialSender
*
* (payload 28 bytes -> allocLength 76, sealed packet 64, s4=60 -> 63+60=123).
*
* The tests spin up two real Devices wired together through an in-memory
* conn.Bind (Go channels) and an in-memory tun.Device, configure s4=60 on
* both sides, and pass a small IPv4 packet end to end via both outbound
* paths: Device.InputPacket (the crashing path) and the regular tun read
* loop (in-place shift path).
*/
package device
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/tun"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
const testTransportPadding = 60 // uapi s4, matches the on-device crash
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory conn.Bind over Go channels (minimal bindtest.ChannelBind clone).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type chanEndpoint uint16
func (e chanEndpoint) ClearSrc() {}
func (e chanEndpoint) SrcToString() string { return "" }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstToString() string { return fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", uint16(e)) }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstToBytes() []byte { return []byte{byte(e), byte(e >> 8)} }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstIP() netip.Addr { return netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{127, 0, 0, 1}) }
func (e chanEndpoint) SrcIP() netip.Addr { return netip.Addr{} }
type chanBind struct {
rx, tx chan []byte
source chanEndpoint // "port" this bind listens on
target chanEndpoint // endpoint of the opposite bind
mu sync.Mutex
closeSignal chan struct{} // recreated on every Open (BindUpdate closes+reopens)
}
// newChanBindPair returns two Binds whose Send/Receive are cross-wired.
func newChanBindPair() (*chanBind, *chanBind) {
aToB := make(chan []byte, 1024)
bToA := make(chan []byte, 1024)
a := &chanBind{rx: bToA, tx: aToB, source: 1, target: 2}
b := &chanBind{rx: aToB, tx: bToA, source: 2, target: 1}
return a, b
}
func (b *chanBind) currentCloseSignal() chan struct{} {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.closeSignal
}
func (b *chanBind) Open(port uint16) ([]conn.ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
b.closeSignal = make(chan struct{})
closeSignal := b.closeSignal
b.mu.Unlock()
fn := func(packets [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []conn.Endpoint) (int, error) {
select {
case <-closeSignal:
// Must be net.ErrClosed: RoutineReceiveIncoming treats anything
// else as a transient error and death-spirals before exiting.
return 0, net.ErrClosed
case pkt, ok := <-b.rx:
if !ok {
return 0, net.ErrClosed
}
sizes[0] = copy(packets[0], pkt)
eps[0] = b.target
return 1, nil
}
}
return []conn.ReceiveFunc{fn}, uint16(b.source), nil
}
func (b *chanBind) Close() error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.closeSignal != nil {
select {
case <-b.closeSignal:
default:
close(b.closeSignal)
}
}
return nil
}
func (b *chanBind) SetMark(mark uint32) error { return nil }
func (b *chanBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, ep conn.Endpoint, offset int) error {
closeSignal := b.currentCloseSignal()
if closeSignal == nil {
return net.ErrClosed
}
for _, buf := range bufs {
pkt := make([]byte, len(buf)-offset)
copy(pkt, buf[offset:])
select {
case <-closeSignal:
return net.ErrClosed
case b.tx <- pkt:
}
}
return nil
}
func (b *chanBind) ParseEndpoint(s string) (conn.Endpoint, error) { return b.target, nil }
func (b *chanBind) BatchSize() int { return 1 }
func (b *chanBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, reserved [3]byte) {}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory tun.Device over Go channels (minimal tuntest.ChannelTUN clone).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type chanTun struct {
toDevice chan []byte // packets the device Reads (outbound plaintext)
fromDevice chan []byte // packets the device Writes (inbound plaintext)
events chan tun.Event
closed chan struct{}
closeOnce sync.Once
}
func newChanTun() *chanTun {
return &chanTun{
toDevice: make(chan []byte, 1024),
fromDevice: make(chan []byte, 1024),
events: make(chan tun.Event, 4),
closed: make(chan struct{}),
}
}
func (t *chanTun) File() *os.File { return nil }
func (t *chanTun) Read(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (int, error) {
select {
case <-t.closed:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
case pkt, ok := <-t.toDevice:
if !ok {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
sizes[0] = copy(bufs[0][offset:], pkt)
return 1, nil
}
}
func (t *chanTun) Write(bufs [][]byte, offset int) (int, error) {
for _, buf := range bufs {
pkt := make([]byte, len(buf)-offset)
copy(pkt, buf[offset:])
select {
case <-t.closed:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
case t.fromDevice <- pkt:
}
}
return len(bufs), nil
}
func (t *chanTun) MTU() (int, error) { return DefaultMTU, nil }
func (t *chanTun) Name() (string, error) { return "chantun", nil }
func (t *chanTun) Events() <-chan tun.Event { return t.events }
func (t *chanTun) BatchSize() int { return 1 }
func (t *chanTun) Close() error {
t.closeOnce.Do(func() {
close(t.closed)
close(t.events)
})
return nil
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test scaffolding.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
var (
testIPA = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
testIPB = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
)
// buildIPv4Packet builds a minimal, routable IPv4/UDP packet whose header
// fields satisfy the receive-side validation in RoutineSequentialReceiver
// (version, total-length field, allowed source address).
func buildIPv4Packet(src, dst netip.Addr, payloadLen int) []byte {
total := ipv4.HeaderLen + payloadLen
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[IPv4offsetTotalLength:IPv4offsetTotalLength+2], uint16(total))
pkt[8] = 64 // TTL
pkt[9] = 17 // protocol: UDP
copy(pkt[IPv4offsetSrc:], src.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[IPv4offsetDst:], dst.AsSlice())
for i := ipv4.HeaderLen; i < total; i++ {
pkt[i] = byte(i) // deterministic payload
}
return pkt
}
type paddedPair struct {
devA, devB *Device
tunA, tunB *chanTun
}
// newPaddedDevicePair builds two Up()'d devices peered with each other over
// the channel bind, both configured with s4 (transport padding) enabled.
func newPaddedDevicePair(t *testing.T) *paddedPair {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
bindA, bindB := newChanBindPair()
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, bindB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\ns4=%d\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), testTransportPadding, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\ns4=%d\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), testTransportPadding, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if devA.paddings.transport != testTransportPadding {
t.Fatalf("s4 not applied: paddings.transport = %d", devA.paddings.transport)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
return &paddedPair{devA: devA, devB: devB, tunA: tunA, tunB: tunB}
}
// awaitPacket waits for want to arrive on the receiving tun, periodically
// re-sending via resend (injection has no delivery guarantee before the
// handshake completes).
func awaitPacket(t *testing.T, from *chanTun, want []byte, resend func()) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.After(20 * time.Second)
retry := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Second)
defer retry.Stop()
for {
select {
case got := <-from.fromDevice:
if bytes.Equal(got, want) {
return
}
t.Logf("ignoring unexpected packet, len=%d", len(got))
case <-retry.C:
resend()
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for packet on peer tun")
}
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestTransportPaddingInputPacket exercises the exact crash path: an injected
// packet (Device.InputPacket) whose buffer was allocated by payload size.
// With s4=60 and a 28-byte IPv4 packet the pre-fix buffer was 76 bytes and
// the padding shift indexed [123] -> index out of range.
func TestTransportPaddingInputPacket(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
// 20-byte header + 8-byte payload = 28 bytes, the on-device crash size.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
dst := testIPB.AsSlice()
send := func() { pair.devA.InputPacket(dst, [][]byte{pkt}) }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// TestTransportPaddingInputPackets covers the batched injection path
// (Device.InputPackets), which had the same tight allocation.
func TestTransportPaddingInputPackets(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
refs := []*InputPacketRef{{
Destination: testIPB.AsSlice(),
PacketSlices: [][]byte{pkt[:12], pkt[12:]}, // multi-slice on purpose
}}
send := func() {
if unmatched := pair.devA.InputPackets(refs); len(unmatched) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("InputPackets returned %d unmatched refs", len(unmatched))
}
}
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// TestTransportPaddingTunPath covers the regular outbound path (tun read
// loop), whose MaxMessageSize buffers take the in-place shift branch.
func TestTransportPaddingTunPath(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package device

4
go.mod
View file

@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
module github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go
go 1.25
go 1.24
require (
github.com/sagernet/sing v0.7.10
golang.org/x/crypto v0.13.0
golang.org/x/net v0.15.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.12.0
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
)

4
go.sum
View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.13.0 h1:mvySKfSWJ+UKUii46M40LOvyWfN0s2U+46/jDd0e6Ck=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.13.0/go.mod h1:y6Z2r+Rw4iayiXXAIxJIDAJ1zMW4yaTpebo8fPOliYc=
golang.org/x/net v0.15.0 h1:ugBLEUaxABaB5AJqW9enI0ACdci2RUd4eP51NTBvuJ8=
golang.org/x/net v0.15.0/go.mod h1:idbUs1IY1+zTqbi8yxTbhexhEEk5ur9LInksu6HrEpk=
golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0 h1:rF+pYz3DAGSQAxAu1CbC7catZg4ebC4UIeIhKxBZvws=
golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.12.0 h1:CM0HF96J0hcLAwsHPJZjfdNzs0gftsLfgKt57wWHJ0o=
golang.org/x/sys v0.12.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2 h1:B82qJJgjvYKsXS9jeunTOisW56dUokqW/FOteYJJ/yg=
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2/go.mod h1:deeaetjYA+DHMHg+sMSMI58GrEteJUUzzw7en6TJQcI=

17
ipc/uapi_fake.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
//go:build wasm || plan9 || aix || solaris || illumos
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package ipc
// Made up sentinel error codes for {js,wasip1}/wasm, and plan9.
const (
IpcErrorIO = 1
IpcErrorInvalid = 2
IpcErrorPortInUse = 3
IpcErrorUnknown = 4
IpcErrorProtocol = 5
)

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package ipc

View file

@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
//go:build tamago
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
@ -5,7 +7,7 @@
package ipc
// Made up sentinel error codes for {js,wasip1}/wasm.
// Made up sentinel error codes for tamago platform.
const (
IpcErrorIO = 1
IpcErrorInvalid = 2

View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const (
// socketDirectory is variable because it is modified by a linker
// flag in wireguard-android.
var socketDirectory = "/var/run/wireguard"
var socketDirectory = "/var/run/amneziawg"
func sockPath(iface string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s.sock", socketDirectory, iface)

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package ipc

33
module_rename.py Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import os
import argparse
import fileinput
PKG_ORIGINAL = "github.com/tailscale/wireguard-go"
PKG_NEW = "github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go"
EXTENSIONS = [".go", ".md", ".mod", ".sh"]
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("-r", "--reverse", action="store_true")
args = parser.parse_args()
def replace_line(line):
if args.reverse:
return line.replace(PKG_NEW, PKG_ORIGINAL)
return line.replace(PKG_ORIGINAL, PKG_NEW)
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk("."):
# Skip hidden directories like .git
dirnames[:] = [d for d in dirnames if not d[0] == "."]
filenames = [f for f in filenames if os.path.splitext(f)[1] in EXTENSIONS]
for filename in filenames:
file_path = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)
with fileinput.FileInput(file_path, inplace=True) as file:
for line in file:
print(replace_line(line), end="")

View file

@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -e -o pipefail
GO_FILES=$(find . -name "*.go" | grep -v .git)
gofumpt -l -w $GO_FILES
gofmt -l -w $GO_FILES
gci write $GO_FILES

View file

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -e -o pipefail
OLD_MODULE_NAME="github.com/tailscale/wireguard-go"
NEW_MODULE_NAME="github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go"
rules=$(cat <<EOF
id: replace-module
language: go
rule:
kind: import_spec
pattern: \$OLD_IMPORT
constraints:
OLD_IMPORT:
has:
field: path
regex: ^"$OLD_MODULE_NAME
transform:
NEW_IMPORT:
replace:
source: \$OLD_IMPORT
replace: $OLD_MODULE_NAME(?<PATH>.*)
by: $NEW_MODULE_NAME\$PATH
fix: \$NEW_IMPORT
EOF
)
sg scan --inline-rules "$rules" -U
sed -i "s|module $OLD_MODULE_NAME|module $NEW_MODULE_NAME|" go.mod
go mod tidy
./reformat.sh
git commit -m "Rename module" -a

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//go:build !windows && !wasm
//go:build !windows && !wasm && !plan9 && !tamago
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//go:build windows || wasm
//go:build windows || wasm || plan9 || tamago
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT

View file

@ -3,111 +3,710 @@ package tun
import (
"encoding/binary"
"math/bits"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
// TODO: Explore SIMD and/or other assembly optimizations.
func checksumNoFold(b []byte, initial uint64) uint64 {
tmp := make([]byte, 8)
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(tmp, initial)
ac := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(tmp)
// checksumGeneric64 is a reference implementation of checksum using 64 bit
// arithmetic for use in testing or when an architecture-specific implementation
// is not available.
func checksumGeneric64(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
var ac uint64
var carry uint64
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac = uint64(initial)
} else {
ac = uint64(bits.ReverseBytes16(initial))
}
for len(b) >= 128 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), 0)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[64:72]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[72:80]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[80:88]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[88:96]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[96:104]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[104:112]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[112:120]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[120:128]), carry)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[64:72]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[72:80]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[80:88]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[88:96]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[96:104]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[104:112]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[112:120]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[120:128]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[64:72]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[72:80]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[80:88]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[88:96]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[96:104]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[104:112]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[112:120]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[120:128]), carry)
}
b = b[128:]
}
if len(b) >= 64 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), 0)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[32:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[40:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[48:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[56:64]), carry)
}
b = b[64:]
}
if len(b) >= 32 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), 0)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[16:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[24:32]), carry)
}
b = b[32:]
}
if len(b) >= 16 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), 0)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b[8:16]), carry)
}
b = b[16:]
}
if len(b) >= 8 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.NativeEndian.Uint64(b[:8]), 0)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b), carry)
}
b = b[8:]
}
if len(b) >= 4 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.NativeEndian.Uint32(b[:4])), 0)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b)), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b)), carry)
}
b = b[4:]
}
if len(b) >= 2 {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[:2])), 0)
ac += carry
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b)), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b)), carry)
}
b = b[2:]
}
if len(b) == 1 {
tmp := binary.NativeEndian.Uint16([]byte{b[0], 0})
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(tmp), 0)
ac += carry
if len(b) >= 1 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(b[0])<<8, carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add64(ac, uint64(b[0]), carry)
}
}
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(tmp, ac)
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(tmp)
folded := ipChecksumFold64(ac, carry)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
folded = bits.ReverseBytes16(folded)
}
return folded
}
func checksum(b []byte, initial uint64) uint16 {
ac := checksumNoFold(b, initial)
ac = (ac >> 16) + (ac & 0xffff)
ac = (ac >> 16) + (ac & 0xffff)
ac = (ac >> 16) + (ac & 0xffff)
ac = (ac >> 16) + (ac & 0xffff)
return uint16(ac)
// checksumGeneric32 is a reference implementation of checksum using 32 bit
// arithmetic for use in testing or when an architecture-specific implementation
// is not available.
func checksumGeneric32(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
var ac uint32
var carry uint32
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac = uint32(initial)
} else {
ac = uint32(bits.ReverseBytes16(initial))
}
for len(b) >= 64 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[32:36]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[36:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[40:44]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[44:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[48:52]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[52:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[56:60]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[60:64]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[32:36]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[36:40]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[40:44]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[44:48]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[48:52]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[52:56]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[56:60]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[60:64]), carry)
}
b = b[64:]
}
if len(b) >= 32 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]), carry)
}
b = b[32:]
}
if len(b) >= 16 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]), carry)
}
b = b[16:]
}
if len(b) >= 8 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]), carry)
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]), carry)
}
b = b[8:]
}
if len(b) >= 4 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b), carry)
}
b = b[4:]
}
if len(b) >= 2 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b)), carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b)), carry)
}
b = b[2:]
}
if len(b) >= 1 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, uint32(b[0])<<8, carry)
} else {
ac, carry = bits.Add32(ac, uint32(b[0]), carry)
}
}
folded := ipChecksumFold32(ac, carry)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
folded = bits.ReverseBytes16(folded)
}
return folded
}
// Checksum computes an IP checksum starting with the provided initial value.
func Checksum(data []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return checksum(data, uint64(initial))
// checksumGeneric32Alternate is an alternate reference implementation of
// checksum using 32 bit arithmetic for use in testing or when an
// architecture-specific implementation is not available.
func checksumGeneric32Alternate(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
var ac uint32
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac = uint32(initial)
} else {
ac = uint32(bits.ReverseBytes16(initial))
}
for len(b) >= 64 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[16:18]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[18:20]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[20:22]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[22:24]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[24:26]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[26:28]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[28:30]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[30:32]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[32:34]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[34:36]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[36:38]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[38:40]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[40:42]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[42:44]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[44:46]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[46:48]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[48:50]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[50:52]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[52:54]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[54:56]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[56:58]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[58:60]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[60:62]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[62:64]))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[16:18]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[18:20]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[20:22]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[22:24]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[24:26]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[26:28]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[28:30]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[30:32]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[32:34]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[34:36]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[36:38]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[38:40]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[40:42]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[42:44]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[44:46]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[46:48]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[48:50]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[50:52]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[52:54]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[54:56]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[56:58]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[58:60]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[60:62]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[62:64]))
}
b = b[64:]
}
if len(b) >= 32 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[16:18]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[18:20]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[20:22]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[22:24]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[24:26]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[26:28]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[28:30]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[30:32]))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[16:18]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[18:20]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[20:22]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[22:24]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[24:26]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[26:28]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[28:30]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[30:32]))
}
b = b[32:]
}
if len(b) >= 16 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[8:10]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[10:12]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[12:14]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[14:16]))
}
b = b[16:]
}
if len(b) >= 8 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[6:8]))
}
b = b[8:]
}
if len(b) >= 4 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[:2]))
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b[2:4]))
}
b = b[4:]
}
if len(b) >= 2 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b))
} else {
ac += uint32(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b))
}
b = b[2:]
}
if len(b) >= 1 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint32(b[0]) << 8
} else {
ac += uint32(b[0])
}
}
folded := ipChecksumFold32(ac, 0)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
folded = bits.ReverseBytes16(folded)
}
return folded
}
func pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(protocol uint8, srcAddr, dstAddr []byte, totalLen uint16) uint64 {
sum := checksumNoFold(srcAddr, 0)
sum = checksumNoFold(dstAddr, sum)
sum = checksumNoFold([]byte{0, protocol}, sum)
tmp := make([]byte, 2)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(tmp, totalLen)
return checksumNoFold(tmp, sum)
// checksumGeneric64Alternate is an alternate reference implementation of
// checksum using 64 bit arithmetic for use in testing or when an
// architecture-specific implementation is not available.
func checksumGeneric64Alternate(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
var ac uint64
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac = uint64(initial)
} else {
ac = uint64(bits.ReverseBytes16(initial))
}
for len(b) >= 64 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[32:36]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[36:40]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[40:44]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[44:48]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[48:52]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[52:56]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[56:60]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[60:64]))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[32:36]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[36:40]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[40:44]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[44:48]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[48:52]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[52:56]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[56:60]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[60:64]))
}
b = b[64:]
}
if len(b) >= 32 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[16:20]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[20:24]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[24:28]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[28:32]))
}
b = b[32:]
}
if len(b) >= 16 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[8:12]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[12:16]))
}
b = b[16:]
}
if len(b) >= 8 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[:4]))
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b[4:8]))
}
b = b[8:]
}
if len(b) >= 4 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(b))
}
b = b[4:]
}
if len(b) >= 2 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b))
} else {
ac += uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(b))
}
b = b[2:]
}
if len(b) >= 1 {
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
ac += uint64(b[0]) << 8
} else {
ac += uint64(b[0])
}
}
folded := ipChecksumFold64(ac, 0)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
folded = bits.ReverseBytes16(folded)
}
return folded
}
func ipChecksumFold64(unfolded uint64, initialCarry uint64) uint16 {
sum, carry := bits.Add32(uint32(unfolded>>32), uint32(unfolded&0xffff_ffff), uint32(initialCarry))
// if carry != 0, sum <= 0xffff_fffe, otherwise sum <= 0xffff_ffff
// therefore (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff) + carry <= 0x1_fffe; so there is
// no need to save the carry flag
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff) + carry
// sum <= 0x1_fffe therefore this is the last fold needed:
// if (sum >> 16) > 0 then
// (sum >> 16) == 1 && (sum & 0xffff) <= 0xfffe and therefore
// the addition will not overflow
// otherwise (sum >> 16) == 0 and sum will be unchanged
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff)
return uint16(sum)
}
func ipChecksumFold32(unfolded uint32, initialCarry uint32) uint16 {
sum := (unfolded >> 16) + (unfolded & 0xffff) + initialCarry
// sum <= 0x1_ffff:
// 0xffff + 0xffff = 0x1_fffe
// initialCarry is 0 or 1, for a combined maximum of 0x1_ffff
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff)
// sum <= 0x1_0000 therefore this is the last fold needed:
// if (sum >> 16) > 0 then
// (sum >> 16) == 1 && (sum & 0xffff) == 0 and therefore
// the addition will not overflow
// otherwise (sum >> 16) == 0 and sum will be unchanged
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff)
return uint16(sum)
}
func addrPartialChecksum64(addr []byte, initial, carryIn uint64) (sum, carry uint64) {
sum, carry = initial, carryIn
switch len(addr) {
case 4: // IPv4
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr)), carry)
} else {
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr)), carry)
}
case 16: // IPv6
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(addr), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(addr[8:]), carry)
} else {
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(addr), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add64(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(addr[8:]), carry)
}
default:
panic("bad addr length")
}
return sum, carry
}
func addrPartialChecksum32(addr []byte, initial, carryIn uint32) (sum, carry uint32) {
sum, carry = initial, carryIn
switch len(addr) {
case 4: // IPv4
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr), carry)
} else {
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr), carry)
}
case 16: // IPv6
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr[4:8]), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr[8:12]), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(addr[12:16]), carry)
} else {
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr[4:8]), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr[8:12]), carry)
sum, carry = bits.Add32(sum, binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(addr[12:16]), carry)
}
default:
panic("bad addr length")
}
return sum, carry
}
func pseudoHeaderChecksum64(protocol uint8, srcAddr, dstAddr []byte, totalLen uint16) uint16 {
var sum uint64
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum = uint64(totalLen) + uint64(protocol)
} else {
sum = uint64(bits.ReverseBytes16(totalLen)) + uint64(protocol)<<8
}
sum, carry := addrPartialChecksum64(srcAddr, sum, 0)
sum, carry = addrPartialChecksum64(dstAddr, sum, carry)
foldedSum := ipChecksumFold64(sum, carry)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
foldedSum = bits.ReverseBytes16(foldedSum)
}
return foldedSum
}
func pseudoHeaderChecksum32(protocol uint8, srcAddr, dstAddr []byte, totalLen uint16) uint16 {
var sum uint32
if cpu.IsBigEndian {
sum = uint32(totalLen) + uint32(protocol)
} else {
sum = uint32(bits.ReverseBytes16(totalLen)) + uint32(protocol)<<8
}
sum, carry := addrPartialChecksum32(srcAddr, sum, 0)
sum, carry = addrPartialChecksum32(dstAddr, sum, carry)
foldedSum := ipChecksumFold32(sum, carry)
if !cpu.IsBigEndian {
foldedSum = bits.ReverseBytes16(foldedSum)
}
return foldedSum
}
// PseudoHeaderChecksum computes an IP pseudo-header checksum. srcAddr and
// dstAddr must be 4 or 16 bytes in length.
func PseudoHeaderChecksum(protocol uint8, srcAddr, dstAddr []byte, totalLen uint16) uint16 {
return checksum([]byte{}, pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(protocol, srcAddr, dstAddr, totalLen))
if strconv.IntSize < 64 {
return pseudoHeaderChecksum32(protocol, srcAddr, dstAddr, totalLen)
}
return pseudoHeaderChecksum64(protocol, srcAddr, dstAddr, totalLen)
}

23
tun/checksum_amd64.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
package tun
import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
var checksum = checksumAMD64
// Checksum computes an IP checksum starting with the provided initial value.
// The length of data should be at least 128 bytes for best performance. Smaller
// buffers will still compute a correct result.
func Checksum(data []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return checksum(data, initial)
}
func init() {
if cpu.X86.HasAVX && cpu.X86.HasAVX2 && cpu.X86.HasBMI2 {
checksum = checksumAVX2
return
}
if cpu.X86.HasSSE2 {
checksum = checksumSSE2
return
}
}

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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
// Code generated by command: go run generate_amd64.go -out checksum_generated_amd64.s -stubs checksum_generated_amd64.go. DO NOT EDIT.
package tun
// checksumAVX2 computes an IP checksum using amd64 v3 instructions (AVX2, BMI2)
//
//go:noescape
func checksumAVX2(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// checksumSSE2 computes an IP checksum using amd64 baseline instructions (SSE2)
//
//go:noescape
func checksumSSE2(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// checksumAMD64 computes an IP checksum using amd64 baseline instructions
//
//go:noescape
func checksumAMD64(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16

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@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
// Code generated by command: go run generate_amd64.go -out checksum_generated_amd64.s -stubs checksum_generated_amd64.go. DO NOT EDIT.
#include "textflag.h"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+0(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+16(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+32(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+48(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+64(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+80(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
DATA xmmLoadMasks<>+96(SB)/16, $"\x00\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
GLOBL xmmLoadMasks<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $112
// func checksumAVX2(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// Requires: AVX, AVX2, BMI2
TEXT ·checksumAVX2(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-34
MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVQ b_base+0(FP), DX
MOVQ b_len+8(FP), BX
// handle odd length buffers; they are difficult to handle in general
TESTQ $0x00000001, BX
JZ lengthIsEven
MOVBQZX -1(DX)(BX*1), CX
DECQ BX
ADDQ CX, AX
lengthIsEven:
// handle tiny buffers (<=31 bytes) specially
CMPQ BX, $0x1f
JGT bufferIsNotTiny
XORQ CX, CX
XORQ SI, SI
XORQ DI, DI
// shift twice to start because length is guaranteed to be even
// n = n >> 2; CF = originalN & 2
SHRQ $0x02, BX
JNC handleTiny4
// tmp2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]); buf = buf[2:]
MOVWQZX (DX), CX
ADDQ $0x02, DX
handleTiny4:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 4
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny8
// tmp4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buf[:4]); buf = buf[4:]
MOVLQZX (DX), SI
ADDQ $0x04, DX
handleTiny8:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 8
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny16
// tmp8 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[:8]); buf = buf[8:]
MOVQ (DX), DI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleTiny16:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 16
// n == 0 now, otherwise we would have branched after comparing with tinyBufferSize
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTinyFinish
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
handleTinyFinish:
// CF should be included from the previous add, so we use ADCQ.
// If we arrived via the JNC above, then CF=0 due to the branch condition,
// so ADCQ will still produce the correct result.
ADCQ CX, AX
ADCQ SI, AX
ADCQ DI, AX
JMP foldAndReturn
bufferIsNotTiny:
// skip all SIMD for small buffers
CMPQ BX, $0x00000100
JGE startSIMD
// Accumulate carries in this register. It is never expected to overflow.
XORQ SI, SI
// We will perform an overlapped read for buffers with length not a multiple of 8.
// Overlapped in this context means some memory will be read twice, but a shift will
// eliminate the duplicated data. This extra read is performed at the end of the buffer to
// preserve any alignment that may exist for the start of the buffer.
MOVQ BX, CX
SHRQ $0x03, BX
ANDQ $0x07, CX
JZ handleRemaining8
LEAQ (DX)(BX*8), DI
MOVQ -8(DI)(CX*1), DI
// Shift out the duplicated data: overlapRead = overlapRead >> (64 - leftoverBytes*8)
SHLQ $0x03, CX
NEGQ CX
ADDQ $0x40, CX
SHRQ CL, DI
ADDQ DI, AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
handleRemaining8:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining16
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleRemaining16:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining32
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x10, DX
handleRemaining32:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining64
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x20, DX
handleRemaining64:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining128
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x40, DX
handleRemaining128:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemainingComplete
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ 64(DX), AX
ADCQ 72(DX), AX
ADCQ 80(DX), AX
ADCQ 88(DX), AX
ADCQ 96(DX), AX
ADCQ 104(DX), AX
ADCQ 112(DX), AX
ADCQ 120(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x80, DX
handleRemainingComplete:
ADDQ SI, AX
JMP foldAndReturn
startSIMD:
VPXOR Y0, Y0, Y0
VPXOR Y1, Y1, Y1
VPXOR Y2, Y2, Y2
VPXOR Y3, Y3, Y3
MOVQ BX, CX
// Update number of bytes remaining after the loop completes
ANDQ $0xff, BX
// Number of 256 byte iterations
SHRQ $0x08, CX
JZ smallLoop
bigLoop:
VPMOVZXWD (DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
VPMOVZXWD 16(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y1, Y1
VPMOVZXWD 32(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y2, Y2
VPMOVZXWD 48(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y3, Y3
VPMOVZXWD 64(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
VPMOVZXWD 80(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y1, Y1
VPMOVZXWD 96(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y2, Y2
VPMOVZXWD 112(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y3, Y3
VPMOVZXWD 128(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
VPMOVZXWD 144(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y1, Y1
VPMOVZXWD 160(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y2, Y2
VPMOVZXWD 176(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y3, Y3
VPMOVZXWD 192(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
VPMOVZXWD 208(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y1, Y1
VPMOVZXWD 224(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y2, Y2
VPMOVZXWD 240(DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y3, Y3
ADDQ $0x00000100, DX
DECQ CX
JNZ bigLoop
CMPQ BX, $0x10
JLT doneSmallLoop
// now read a single 16 byte unit of data at a time
smallLoop:
VPMOVZXWD (DX), Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
ADDQ $0x10, DX
SUBQ $0x10, BX
CMPQ BX, $0x10
JGE smallLoop
doneSmallLoop:
CMPQ BX, $0x00
JE doneSIMD
// There are between 1 and 15 bytes remaining. Perform an overlapped read.
LEAQ xmmLoadMasks<>+0(SB), CX
VMOVDQU -16(DX)(BX*1), X4
VPAND -16(CX)(BX*8), X4, X4
VPMOVZXWD X4, Y4
VPADDD Y4, Y0, Y0
doneSIMD:
// Multi-chain loop is done, combine the accumulators
VPADDD Y1, Y0, Y0
VPADDD Y2, Y0, Y0
VPADDD Y3, Y0, Y0
// extract the YMM into a pair of XMM and sum them
VEXTRACTI128 $0x01, Y0, X1
VPADDD X0, X1, X0
// extract the XMM into GP64
VPEXTRQ $0x00, X0, CX
VPEXTRQ $0x01, X0, DX
// no more AVX code, clear upper registers to avoid SSE slowdowns
VZEROUPPER
ADDQ CX, AX
ADCQ DX, AX
foldAndReturn:
// add CF and fold
RORXQ $0x20, AX, CX
ADCL CX, AX
RORXL $0x10, AX, CX
ADCW CX, AX
ADCW $0x00, AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
RET
// func checksumSSE2(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// Requires: SSE2
TEXT ·checksumSSE2(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-34
MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVQ b_base+0(FP), DX
MOVQ b_len+8(FP), BX
// handle odd length buffers; they are difficult to handle in general
TESTQ $0x00000001, BX
JZ lengthIsEven
MOVBQZX -1(DX)(BX*1), CX
DECQ BX
ADDQ CX, AX
lengthIsEven:
// handle tiny buffers (<=31 bytes) specially
CMPQ BX, $0x1f
JGT bufferIsNotTiny
XORQ CX, CX
XORQ SI, SI
XORQ DI, DI
// shift twice to start because length is guaranteed to be even
// n = n >> 2; CF = originalN & 2
SHRQ $0x02, BX
JNC handleTiny4
// tmp2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]); buf = buf[2:]
MOVWQZX (DX), CX
ADDQ $0x02, DX
handleTiny4:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 4
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny8
// tmp4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buf[:4]); buf = buf[4:]
MOVLQZX (DX), SI
ADDQ $0x04, DX
handleTiny8:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 8
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny16
// tmp8 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[:8]); buf = buf[8:]
MOVQ (DX), DI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleTiny16:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 16
// n == 0 now, otherwise we would have branched after comparing with tinyBufferSize
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTinyFinish
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
handleTinyFinish:
// CF should be included from the previous add, so we use ADCQ.
// If we arrived via the JNC above, then CF=0 due to the branch condition,
// so ADCQ will still produce the correct result.
ADCQ CX, AX
ADCQ SI, AX
ADCQ DI, AX
JMP foldAndReturn
bufferIsNotTiny:
// skip all SIMD for small buffers
CMPQ BX, $0x00000100
JGE startSIMD
// Accumulate carries in this register. It is never expected to overflow.
XORQ SI, SI
// We will perform an overlapped read for buffers with length not a multiple of 8.
// Overlapped in this context means some memory will be read twice, but a shift will
// eliminate the duplicated data. This extra read is performed at the end of the buffer to
// preserve any alignment that may exist for the start of the buffer.
MOVQ BX, CX
SHRQ $0x03, BX
ANDQ $0x07, CX
JZ handleRemaining8
LEAQ (DX)(BX*8), DI
MOVQ -8(DI)(CX*1), DI
// Shift out the duplicated data: overlapRead = overlapRead >> (64 - leftoverBytes*8)
SHLQ $0x03, CX
NEGQ CX
ADDQ $0x40, CX
SHRQ CL, DI
ADDQ DI, AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
handleRemaining8:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining16
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleRemaining16:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining32
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x10, DX
handleRemaining32:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining64
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x20, DX
handleRemaining64:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining128
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x40, DX
handleRemaining128:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemainingComplete
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ 64(DX), AX
ADCQ 72(DX), AX
ADCQ 80(DX), AX
ADCQ 88(DX), AX
ADCQ 96(DX), AX
ADCQ 104(DX), AX
ADCQ 112(DX), AX
ADCQ 120(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x80, DX
handleRemainingComplete:
ADDQ SI, AX
JMP foldAndReturn
startSIMD:
PXOR X0, X0
PXOR X1, X1
PXOR X2, X2
PXOR X3, X3
PXOR X4, X4
MOVQ BX, CX
// Update number of bytes remaining after the loop completes
ANDQ $0xff, BX
// Number of 256 byte iterations
SHRQ $0x08, CX
JZ smallLoop
bigLoop:
MOVOU (DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X2
MOVOU 16(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X1
PADDD X6, X3
MOVOU 32(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X2
PADDD X6, X0
MOVOU 48(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X3
PADDD X6, X1
MOVOU 64(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X2
MOVOU 80(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X1
PADDD X6, X3
MOVOU 96(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X2
PADDD X6, X0
MOVOU 112(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X3
PADDD X6, X1
MOVOU 128(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X2
MOVOU 144(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X1
PADDD X6, X3
MOVOU 160(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X2
PADDD X6, X0
MOVOU 176(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X3
PADDD X6, X1
MOVOU 192(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X2
MOVOU 208(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X1
PADDD X6, X3
MOVOU 224(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X2
PADDD X6, X0
MOVOU 240(DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X3
PADDD X6, X1
ADDQ $0x00000100, DX
DECQ CX
JNZ bigLoop
CMPQ BX, $0x10
JLT doneSmallLoop
// now read a single 16 byte unit of data at a time
smallLoop:
MOVOU (DX), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X1
ADDQ $0x10, DX
SUBQ $0x10, BX
CMPQ BX, $0x10
JGE smallLoop
doneSmallLoop:
CMPQ BX, $0x00
JE doneSIMD
// There are between 1 and 15 bytes remaining. Perform an overlapped read.
LEAQ xmmLoadMasks<>+0(SB), CX
MOVOU -16(DX)(BX*1), X5
PAND -16(CX)(BX*8), X5
MOVOA X5, X6
PUNPCKHWL X4, X5
PUNPCKLWL X4, X6
PADDD X5, X0
PADDD X6, X1
doneSIMD:
// Multi-chain loop is done, combine the accumulators
PADDD X1, X0
PADDD X2, X0
PADDD X3, X0
// extract the XMM into GP64
MOVQ X0, CX
PSRLDQ $0x08, X0
MOVQ X0, DX
ADDQ CX, AX
ADCQ DX, AX
foldAndReturn:
// add CF and fold
MOVL AX, CX
ADCQ $0x00, CX
SHRQ $0x20, AX
ADDQ CX, AX
MOVWQZX AX, CX
SHRQ $0x10, AX
ADDQ CX, AX
MOVW AX, CX
SHRQ $0x10, AX
ADDW CX, AX
ADCW $0x00, AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
RET
// func checksumAMD64(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16
TEXT ·checksumAMD64(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-34
MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVQ b_base+0(FP), DX
MOVQ b_len+8(FP), BX
// handle odd length buffers; they are difficult to handle in general
TESTQ $0x00000001, BX
JZ lengthIsEven
MOVBQZX -1(DX)(BX*1), CX
DECQ BX
ADDQ CX, AX
lengthIsEven:
// handle tiny buffers (<=31 bytes) specially
CMPQ BX, $0x1f
JGT bufferIsNotTiny
XORQ CX, CX
XORQ SI, SI
XORQ DI, DI
// shift twice to start because length is guaranteed to be even
// n = n >> 2; CF = originalN & 2
SHRQ $0x02, BX
JNC handleTiny4
// tmp2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]); buf = buf[2:]
MOVWQZX (DX), CX
ADDQ $0x02, DX
handleTiny4:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 4
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny8
// tmp4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buf[:4]); buf = buf[4:]
MOVLQZX (DX), SI
ADDQ $0x04, DX
handleTiny8:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 8
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTiny16
// tmp8 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[:8]); buf = buf[8:]
MOVQ (DX), DI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleTiny16:
// n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 16
// n == 0 now, otherwise we would have branched after comparing with tinyBufferSize
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleTinyFinish
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
handleTinyFinish:
// CF should be included from the previous add, so we use ADCQ.
// If we arrived via the JNC above, then CF=0 due to the branch condition,
// so ADCQ will still produce the correct result.
ADCQ CX, AX
ADCQ SI, AX
ADCQ DI, AX
JMP foldAndReturn
bufferIsNotTiny:
// Number of 256 byte iterations into loop counter
MOVQ BX, CX
// Update number of bytes remaining after the loop completes
ANDQ $0xff, BX
SHRQ $0x08, CX
JZ startCleanup
CLC
XORQ SI, SI
XORQ DI, DI
XORQ R8, R8
XORQ R9, R9
XORQ R10, R10
XORQ R11, R11
XORQ R12, R12
bigLoop:
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ 32(DX), DI
ADCQ 40(DX), DI
ADCQ 48(DX), DI
ADCQ 56(DX), DI
ADCQ $0x00, R8
ADDQ 64(DX), R9
ADCQ 72(DX), R9
ADCQ 80(DX), R9
ADCQ 88(DX), R9
ADCQ $0x00, R10
ADDQ 96(DX), R11
ADCQ 104(DX), R11
ADCQ 112(DX), R11
ADCQ 120(DX), R11
ADCQ $0x00, R12
ADDQ 128(DX), AX
ADCQ 136(DX), AX
ADCQ 144(DX), AX
ADCQ 152(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ 160(DX), DI
ADCQ 168(DX), DI
ADCQ 176(DX), DI
ADCQ 184(DX), DI
ADCQ $0x00, R8
ADDQ 192(DX), R9
ADCQ 200(DX), R9
ADCQ 208(DX), R9
ADCQ 216(DX), R9
ADCQ $0x00, R10
ADDQ 224(DX), R11
ADCQ 232(DX), R11
ADCQ 240(DX), R11
ADCQ 248(DX), R11
ADCQ $0x00, R12
ADDQ $0x00000100, DX
SUBQ $0x01, CX
JNZ bigLoop
ADDQ SI, AX
ADCQ DI, AX
ADCQ R8, AX
ADCQ R9, AX
ADCQ R10, AX
ADCQ R11, AX
ADCQ R12, AX
// accumulate CF (twice, in case the first time overflows)
ADCQ $0x00, AX
ADCQ $0x00, AX
startCleanup:
// Accumulate carries in this register. It is never expected to overflow.
XORQ SI, SI
// We will perform an overlapped read for buffers with length not a multiple of 8.
// Overlapped in this context means some memory will be read twice, but a shift will
// eliminate the duplicated data. This extra read is performed at the end of the buffer to
// preserve any alignment that may exist for the start of the buffer.
MOVQ BX, CX
SHRQ $0x03, BX
ANDQ $0x07, CX
JZ handleRemaining8
LEAQ (DX)(BX*8), DI
MOVQ -8(DI)(CX*1), DI
// Shift out the duplicated data: overlapRead = overlapRead >> (64 - leftoverBytes*8)
SHLQ $0x03, CX
NEGQ CX
ADDQ $0x40, CX
SHRQ CL, DI
ADDQ DI, AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
handleRemaining8:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining16
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x08, DX
handleRemaining16:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining32
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x10, DX
handleRemaining32:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining64
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x20, DX
handleRemaining64:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemaining128
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x40, DX
handleRemaining128:
SHRQ $0x01, BX
JNC handleRemainingComplete
ADDQ (DX), AX
ADCQ 8(DX), AX
ADCQ 16(DX), AX
ADCQ 24(DX), AX
ADCQ 32(DX), AX
ADCQ 40(DX), AX
ADCQ 48(DX), AX
ADCQ 56(DX), AX
ADCQ 64(DX), AX
ADCQ 72(DX), AX
ADCQ 80(DX), AX
ADCQ 88(DX), AX
ADCQ 96(DX), AX
ADCQ 104(DX), AX
ADCQ 112(DX), AX
ADCQ 120(DX), AX
ADCQ $0x00, SI
ADDQ $0x80, DX
handleRemainingComplete:
ADDQ SI, AX
foldAndReturn:
// add CF and fold
MOVL AX, CX
ADCQ $0x00, CX
SHRQ $0x20, AX
ADDQ CX, AX
MOVWQZX AX, CX
SHRQ $0x10, AX
ADDQ CX, AX
MOVW AX, CX
SHRQ $0x10, AX
ADDW CX, AX
ADCW $0x00, AX
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
RET

15
tun/checksum_generic.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
// This file contains IP checksum algorithms that are not specific to any
// architecture and don't use hardware acceleration.
//go:build !amd64
package tun
import "strconv"
func Checksum(data []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
if strconv.IntSize < 64 {
return checksumGeneric32(data, initial)
}
return checksumGeneric64(data, initial)
}

579
tun/generate_amd64.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
//go:build ignore
//go:generate go run generate_amd64.go -out checksum_generated_amd64.s -stubs checksum_generated_amd64.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"math"
"math/bits"
. "github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/build"
"github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/operand"
"github.com/mmcloughlin/avo/reg"
)
const checksumSignature = "func(b []byte, initial uint16) uint16"
func loadParams() (accum, buf, n reg.GPVirtual) {
accum, buf, n = GP64(), GP64(), GP64()
Load(Param("initial"), accum)
XCHGB(accum.As8H(), accum.As8L())
Load(Param("b").Base(), buf)
Load(Param("b").Len(), n)
return
}
type simdStrategy int
const (
sse2 = iota
avx2
)
const tinyBufferSize = 31 // A buffer is tiny if it has at most 31 bytes.
func generateSIMDChecksum(name, doc string, minSIMDSize, chains int, strategy simdStrategy) {
TEXT(name, NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, checksumSignature)
Pragma("noescape")
Doc(doc)
accum64, buf, n := loadParams()
handleOddLength(n, buf, accum64)
// no chance of overflow because accum64 was initialized by a uint16 and
// handleOddLength adds at most a uint8
handleTinyBuffers(n, buf, accum64, operand.LabelRef("foldAndReturn"), operand.LabelRef("bufferIsNotTiny"))
Label("bufferIsNotTiny")
const simdReadSize = 16
if minSIMDSize > tinyBufferSize {
Comment("skip all SIMD for small buffers")
if minSIMDSize <= math.MaxUint8 {
CMPQ(n, operand.U8(minSIMDSize))
} else {
CMPQ(n, operand.U32(minSIMDSize))
}
JGE(operand.LabelRef("startSIMD"))
handleRemaining(n, buf, accum64, minSIMDSize-1)
JMP(operand.LabelRef("foldAndReturn"))
}
Label("startSIMD")
// chains is the number of accumulators to use. This improves speed via
// reduced data dependency. We combine the accumulators once when the big
// loop is complete.
simdAccumulate := make([]reg.VecVirtual, chains)
for i := range simdAccumulate {
switch strategy {
case sse2:
simdAccumulate[i] = XMM()
PXOR(simdAccumulate[i], simdAccumulate[i])
case avx2:
simdAccumulate[i] = YMM()
VPXOR(simdAccumulate[i], simdAccumulate[i], simdAccumulate[i])
}
}
var zero reg.VecVirtual
if strategy == sse2 {
zero = XMM()
PXOR(zero, zero)
}
// Number of loads per big loop
const unroll = 16
// Number of bytes
loopSize := uint64(simdReadSize * unroll)
if bits.Len64(loopSize) != bits.Len64(loopSize-1)+1 {
panic("loopSize is not a power of 2")
}
loopCount := GP64()
MOVQ(n, loopCount)
Comment("Update number of bytes remaining after the loop completes")
ANDQ(operand.Imm(loopSize-1), n)
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("Number of %d byte iterations", loopSize))
SHRQ(operand.Imm(uint64(bits.Len64(loopSize-1))), loopCount)
JZ(operand.LabelRef("smallLoop"))
Label("bigLoop")
for i := 0; i < unroll; i++ {
chain := i % chains
switch strategy {
case sse2:
sse2AccumulateStep(i*simdReadSize, buf, zero, simdAccumulate[chain], simdAccumulate[(chain+chains/2)%chains])
case avx2:
avx2AccumulateStep(i*simdReadSize, buf, simdAccumulate[chain])
}
}
ADDQ(operand.U32(loopSize), buf)
DECQ(loopCount)
JNZ(operand.LabelRef("bigLoop"))
Label("bigCleanup")
CMPQ(n, operand.Imm(uint64(simdReadSize)))
JLT(operand.LabelRef("doneSmallLoop"))
Commentf("now read a single %d byte unit of data at a time", simdReadSize)
Label("smallLoop")
switch strategy {
case sse2:
sse2AccumulateStep(0, buf, zero, simdAccumulate[0], simdAccumulate[1])
case avx2:
avx2AccumulateStep(0, buf, simdAccumulate[0])
}
ADDQ(operand.Imm(uint64(simdReadSize)), buf)
SUBQ(operand.Imm(uint64(simdReadSize)), n)
CMPQ(n, operand.Imm(uint64(simdReadSize)))
JGE(operand.LabelRef("smallLoop"))
Label("doneSmallLoop")
CMPQ(n, operand.Imm(0))
JE(operand.LabelRef("doneSIMD"))
Commentf("There are between 1 and %d bytes remaining. Perform an overlapped read.", simdReadSize-1)
maskDataPtr := GP64()
LEAQ(operand.NewDataAddr(operand.NewStaticSymbol("xmmLoadMasks"), 0), maskDataPtr)
dataAddr := operand.Mem{Index: n, Scale: 1, Base: buf, Disp: -simdReadSize}
// scale 8 is only correct here because n is guaranteed to be even and we
// do not generate masks for odd lengths
maskAddr := operand.Mem{Base: maskDataPtr, Index: n, Scale: 8, Disp: -16}
remainder := XMM()
switch strategy {
case sse2:
MOVOU(dataAddr, remainder)
PAND(maskAddr, remainder)
low := XMM()
MOVOA(remainder, low)
PUNPCKHWL(zero, remainder)
PUNPCKLWL(zero, low)
PADDD(remainder, simdAccumulate[0])
PADDD(low, simdAccumulate[1])
case avx2:
// Note: this is very similar to the sse2 path but MOVOU has a massive
// performance hit if used here, presumably due to switching between SSE
// and AVX2 modes.
VMOVDQU(dataAddr, remainder)
VPAND(maskAddr, remainder, remainder)
temp := YMM()
VPMOVZXWD(remainder, temp)
VPADDD(temp, simdAccumulate[0], simdAccumulate[0])
}
Label("doneSIMD")
Comment("Multi-chain loop is done, combine the accumulators")
for i := range simdAccumulate {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
switch strategy {
case sse2:
PADDD(simdAccumulate[i], simdAccumulate[0])
case avx2:
VPADDD(simdAccumulate[i], simdAccumulate[0], simdAccumulate[0])
}
}
if strategy == avx2 {
Comment("extract the YMM into a pair of XMM and sum them")
tmp := YMM()
VEXTRACTI128(operand.Imm(1), simdAccumulate[0], tmp.AsX())
xAccumulate := XMM()
VPADDD(simdAccumulate[0].AsX(), tmp.AsX(), xAccumulate)
simdAccumulate = []reg.VecVirtual{xAccumulate}
}
Comment("extract the XMM into GP64")
low, high := GP64(), GP64()
switch strategy {
case sse2:
MOVQ(simdAccumulate[0], low)
PSRLDQ(operand.Imm(8), simdAccumulate[0])
MOVQ(simdAccumulate[0], high)
case avx2:
VPEXTRQ(operand.Imm(0), simdAccumulate[0], low)
VPEXTRQ(operand.Imm(1), simdAccumulate[0], high)
Comment("no more AVX code, clear upper registers to avoid SSE slowdowns")
VZEROUPPER()
}
ADDQ(low, accum64)
ADCQ(high, accum64)
Label("foldAndReturn")
foldWithCF(accum64, strategy == avx2)
XCHGB(accum64.As8H(), accum64.As8L())
Store(accum64.As16(), ReturnIndex(0))
RET()
}
// handleOddLength generates instructions to incorporate the last byte into
// accum64 if the length is odd. CF may be set if accum64 overflows; be sure to
// handle that if overflow is possible.
func handleOddLength(n, buf, accum64 reg.GPVirtual) {
Comment("handle odd length buffers; they are difficult to handle in general")
TESTQ(operand.U32(1), n)
JZ(operand.LabelRef("lengthIsEven"))
tmp := GP64()
MOVBQZX(operand.Mem{Base: buf, Index: n, Scale: 1, Disp: -1}, tmp)
DECQ(n)
ADDQ(tmp, accum64)
Label("lengthIsEven")
}
func sse2AccumulateStep(offset int, buf reg.GPVirtual, zero, accumulate1, accumulate2 reg.VecVirtual) {
high, low := XMM(), XMM()
MOVOU(operand.Mem{Disp: offset, Base: buf}, high)
MOVOA(high, low)
PUNPCKHWL(zero, high)
PUNPCKLWL(zero, low)
PADDD(high, accumulate1)
PADDD(low, accumulate2)
}
func avx2AccumulateStep(offset int, buf reg.GPVirtual, accumulate reg.VecVirtual) {
tmp := YMM()
VPMOVZXWD(operand.Mem{Disp: offset, Base: buf}, tmp)
VPADDD(tmp, accumulate, accumulate)
}
func generateAMD64Checksum(name, doc string) {
TEXT(name, NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, checksumSignature)
Pragma("noescape")
Doc(doc)
accum64, buf, n := loadParams()
handleOddLength(n, buf, accum64)
// no chance of overflow because accum64 was initialized by a uint16 and
// handleOddLength adds at most a uint8
handleTinyBuffers(n, buf, accum64, operand.LabelRef("foldAndReturn"), operand.LabelRef("bufferIsNotTiny"))
Label("bufferIsNotTiny")
const (
// numChains is the number of accumulators and carry counters to use.
// This improves speed via reduced data dependency. We combine the
// accumulators and carry counters once when the loop is complete.
numChains = 4
unroll = 32 // The number of 64-bit reads to perform per iteration of the loop.
loopSize = 8 * unroll // The number of bytes read per iteration of the loop.
)
if bits.Len(loopSize) != bits.Len(loopSize-1)+1 {
panic("loopSize is not a power of 2")
}
loopCount := GP64()
Comment(fmt.Sprintf("Number of %d byte iterations into loop counter", loopSize))
MOVQ(n, loopCount)
Comment("Update number of bytes remaining after the loop completes")
ANDQ(operand.Imm(loopSize-1), n)
SHRQ(operand.Imm(uint64(bits.Len(loopSize-1))), loopCount)
JZ(operand.LabelRef("startCleanup"))
CLC()
chains := make([]struct {
accum reg.GPVirtual
carries reg.GPVirtual
}, numChains)
for i := range chains {
if i == 0 {
chains[i].accum = accum64
} else {
chains[i].accum = GP64()
XORQ(chains[i].accum, chains[i].accum)
}
chains[i].carries = GP64()
XORQ(chains[i].carries, chains[i].carries)
}
Label("bigLoop")
var curChain int
for i := 0; i < unroll; i++ {
// It is significantly faster to use a ADCX/ADOX pair instead of plain
// ADC, which results in two dependency chains, however those require
// ADX support, which was added after AVX2. If AVX2 is available, that's
// even better than ADCX/ADOX.
//
// However, multiple dependency chains using multiple accumulators and
// occasionally storing CF into temporary counters seems to work almost
// as well.
addr := operand.Mem{Disp: i * 8, Base: buf}
if i%4 == 0 {
if i > 0 {
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), chains[curChain].carries)
curChain = (curChain + 1) % len(chains)
}
ADDQ(addr, chains[curChain].accum)
} else {
ADCQ(addr, chains[curChain].accum)
}
}
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), chains[curChain].carries)
ADDQ(operand.U32(loopSize), buf)
SUBQ(operand.Imm(1), loopCount)
JNZ(operand.LabelRef("bigLoop"))
for i := range chains {
if i == 0 {
ADDQ(chains[i].carries, accum64)
continue
}
ADCQ(chains[i].accum, accum64)
ADCQ(chains[i].carries, accum64)
}
accumulateCF(accum64)
Label("startCleanup")
handleRemaining(n, buf, accum64, loopSize-1)
Label("foldAndReturn")
foldWithCF(accum64, false)
XCHGB(accum64.As8H(), accum64.As8L())
Store(accum64.As16(), ReturnIndex(0))
RET()
}
// handleTinyBuffers computes checksums if the buffer length (the n parameter)
// is less than 32. After computing the checksum, a jump to returnLabel will
// be executed. Otherwise, if the buffer length is at least 32, nothing will be
// modified; a jump to continueLabel will be executed instead.
//
// When jumping to returnLabel, CF may be set and must be accommodated e.g.
// using foldWithCF or accumulateCF.
//
// Anecdotally, this appears to be faster than attempting to coordinate an
// overlapped read (which would also require special handling for buffers
// smaller than 8).
func handleTinyBuffers(n, buf, accum reg.GPVirtual, returnLabel, continueLabel operand.LabelRef) {
Comment("handle tiny buffers (<=31 bytes) specially")
CMPQ(n, operand.Imm(tinyBufferSize))
JGT(continueLabel)
tmp2, tmp4, tmp8 := GP64(), GP64(), GP64()
XORQ(tmp2, tmp2)
XORQ(tmp4, tmp4)
XORQ(tmp8, tmp8)
Comment("shift twice to start because length is guaranteed to be even",
"n = n >> 2; CF = originalN & 2")
SHRQ(operand.Imm(2), n)
JNC(operand.LabelRef("handleTiny4"))
Comment("tmp2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]); buf = buf[2:]")
MOVWQZX(operand.Mem{Base: buf}, tmp2)
ADDQ(operand.Imm(2), buf)
Label("handleTiny4")
Comment("n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 4")
SHRQ(operand.Imm(1), n)
JNC(operand.LabelRef("handleTiny8"))
Comment("tmp4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buf[:4]); buf = buf[4:]")
MOVLQZX(operand.Mem{Base: buf}, tmp4)
ADDQ(operand.Imm(4), buf)
Label("handleTiny8")
Comment("n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 8")
SHRQ(operand.Imm(1), n)
JNC(operand.LabelRef("handleTiny16"))
Comment("tmp8 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[:8]); buf = buf[8:]")
MOVQ(operand.Mem{Base: buf}, tmp8)
ADDQ(operand.Imm(8), buf)
Label("handleTiny16")
Comment("n = n >> 1; CF = originalN & 16",
"n == 0 now, otherwise we would have branched after comparing with tinyBufferSize")
SHRQ(operand.Imm(1), n)
JNC(operand.LabelRef("handleTinyFinish"))
ADDQ(operand.Mem{Base: buf}, accum)
ADCQ(operand.Mem{Base: buf, Disp: 8}, accum)
Label("handleTinyFinish")
Comment("CF should be included from the previous add, so we use ADCQ.",
"If we arrived via the JNC above, then CF=0 due to the branch condition,",
"so ADCQ will still produce the correct result.")
ADCQ(tmp2, accum)
ADCQ(tmp4, accum)
ADCQ(tmp8, accum)
JMP(returnLabel)
}
// handleRemaining generates a series of conditional unrolled additions,
// starting with 8 bytes long and doubling each time until the length reaches
// max. This is the reverse order of what may be intuitive, but makes the branch
// conditions convenient to compute: perform one right shift each time and test
// against CF.
//
// When done, CF may be set and must be accommodated e.g., using foldWithCF or
// accumulateCF.
//
// If n is not a multiple of 8, an extra 64 bit read at the end of the buffer
// will be performed, overlapping with data that will be read later. The
// duplicate data will be shifted off.
//
// The original buffer length must have been at least 8 bytes long, even if
// n < 8, otherwise this will access memory before the start of the buffer,
// which may be unsafe.
func handleRemaining(n, buf, accum64 reg.GPVirtual, max int) {
Comment("Accumulate carries in this register. It is never expected to overflow.")
carries := GP64()
XORQ(carries, carries)
Comment("We will perform an overlapped read for buffers with length not a multiple of 8.",
"Overlapped in this context means some memory will be read twice, but a shift will",
"eliminate the duplicated data. This extra read is performed at the end of the buffer to",
"preserve any alignment that may exist for the start of the buffer.")
leftover := reg.RCX
MOVQ(n, leftover)
SHRQ(operand.Imm(3), n) // n is now the number of 64 bit reads remaining
ANDQ(operand.Imm(0x7), leftover) // leftover is now the number of bytes to read from the end
JZ(operand.LabelRef("handleRemaining8"))
endBuf := GP64()
// endBuf is the position near the end of the buffer that is just past the
// last multiple of 8: (buf + len(buf)) & ^0x7
LEAQ(operand.Mem{Base: buf, Index: n, Scale: 8}, endBuf)
overlapRead := GP64()
// equivalent to overlapRead = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[len(buf)-8:len(buf)])
MOVQ(operand.Mem{Base: endBuf, Index: leftover, Scale: 1, Disp: -8}, overlapRead)
Comment("Shift out the duplicated data: overlapRead = overlapRead >> (64 - leftoverBytes*8)")
SHLQ(operand.Imm(3), leftover) // leftover = leftover * 8
NEGQ(leftover) // leftover = -leftover; this completes the (-leftoverBytes*8) part of the expression
ADDQ(operand.Imm(64), leftover) // now we have (64 - leftoverBytes*8)
SHRQ(reg.CL, overlapRead) // shift right by (64 - leftoverBytes*8); CL is the low 8 bits of leftover (set to RCX above) and variable shift only accepts CL
ADDQ(overlapRead, accum64)
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), carries)
for curBytes := 8; curBytes <= max; curBytes *= 2 {
Label(fmt.Sprintf("handleRemaining%d", curBytes))
SHRQ(operand.Imm(1), n)
if curBytes*2 <= max {
JNC(operand.LabelRef(fmt.Sprintf("handleRemaining%d", curBytes*2)))
} else {
JNC(operand.LabelRef("handleRemainingComplete"))
}
numLoads := curBytes / 8
for i := 0; i < numLoads; i++ {
addr := operand.Mem{Base: buf, Disp: i * 8}
// It is possible to add the multiple dependency chains trick here
// that generateAMD64Checksum uses but anecdotally it does not
// appear to outweigh the cost.
if i == 0 {
ADDQ(addr, accum64)
continue
}
ADCQ(addr, accum64)
}
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), carries)
if curBytes > math.MaxUint8 {
ADDQ(operand.U32(uint64(curBytes)), buf)
} else {
ADDQ(operand.U8(uint64(curBytes)), buf)
}
if curBytes*2 >= max {
continue
}
JMP(operand.LabelRef(fmt.Sprintf("handleRemaining%d", curBytes*2)))
}
Label("handleRemainingComplete")
ADDQ(carries, accum64)
}
func accumulateCF(accum64 reg.GPVirtual) {
Comment("accumulate CF (twice, in case the first time overflows)")
// accum64 += CF
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), accum64)
// accum64 += CF again if the previous add overflowed. The previous add was
// 0 or 1. If it overflowed, then accum64 == 0, so adding another 1 can
// never overflow.
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), accum64)
}
// foldWithCF generates instructions to fold accum (a GP64) into a 16-bit value
// according to ones-complement arithmetic. BMI2 instructions will be used if
// allowBMI2 is true (requires fewer instructions).
func foldWithCF(accum reg.GPVirtual, allowBMI2 bool) {
Comment("add CF and fold")
// CF|accum max value starts as 0x1_ffff_ffff_ffff_ffff
tmp := GP64()
if allowBMI2 {
// effectively, tmp = accum >> 32 (technically, this is a rotate)
RORXQ(operand.Imm(32), accum, tmp)
// accum as uint32 = uint32(accum) + uint32(tmp64) + CF; max value 0xffff_ffff + CF set
ADCL(tmp.As32(), accum.As32())
// effectively, tmp64 as uint32 = uint32(accum) >> 16 (also a rotate)
RORXL(operand.Imm(16), accum.As32(), tmp.As32())
// accum as uint16 = uint16(accum) + uint16(tmp) + CF; max value 0xffff + CF unset or 0xfffe + CF set
ADCW(tmp.As16(), accum.As16())
} else {
// tmp = uint32(accum); max value 0xffff_ffff
// MOVL clears the upper 32 bits of a GP64 so this is equivalent to the
// non-existent MOVLQZX.
MOVL(accum.As32(), tmp.As32())
// tmp += CF; max value 0x1_0000_0000, CF unset
ADCQ(operand.Imm(0), tmp)
// accum = accum >> 32; max value 0xffff_ffff
SHRQ(operand.Imm(32), accum)
// accum = accum + tmp; max value 0x1_ffff_ffff + CF unset
ADDQ(tmp, accum)
// tmp = uint16(accum); max value 0xffff
MOVWQZX(accum.As16(), tmp)
// accum = accum >> 16; max value 0x1_ffff
SHRQ(operand.Imm(16), accum)
// accum = accum + tmp; max value 0x2_fffe + CF unset
ADDQ(tmp, accum)
// tmp as uint16 = uint16(accum); max value 0xffff
MOVW(accum.As16(), tmp.As16())
// accum = accum >> 16; max value 0x2
SHRQ(operand.Imm(16), accum)
// accum as uint16 = uint16(accum) + uint16(tmp); max value 0xffff + CF unset or 0x2 + CF set
ADDW(tmp.As16(), accum.As16())
}
// accum as uint16 += CF; will not overflow: either CF was 0 or accum <= 0xfffe
ADCW(operand.Imm(0), accum.As16())
}
func generateLoadMasks() {
var offset int
// xmmLoadMasks is a table of masks that can be used with PAND to zero all but the last N bytes in an XMM, N=2,4,6,8,10,12,14
GLOBL("xmmLoadMasks", RODATA|NOPTR)
for n := 2; n < 16; n += 2 {
var pattern [16]byte
for i := 0; i < len(pattern); i++ {
if i < len(pattern)-n {
pattern[i] = 0
continue
}
pattern[i] = 0xff
}
DATA(offset, operand.String(pattern[:]))
offset += len(pattern)
}
}
func main() {
generateLoadMasks()
generateSIMDChecksum("checksumAVX2", "checksumAVX2 computes an IP checksum using amd64 v3 instructions (AVX2, BMI2)", 256, 4, avx2)
generateSIMDChecksum("checksumSSE2", "checksumSSE2 computes an IP checksum using amd64 baseline instructions (SSE2)", 256, 4, sse2)
generateAMD64Checksum("checksumAMD64", "checksumAMD64 computes an IP checksum using amd64 baseline instructions")
Generate()
}

View file

@ -55,25 +55,32 @@ type GSOOptions struct {
}
const (
gsoIPv4SrcAddrOffset = 12
gsoIPv6SrcAddrOffset = 8
gsoTCPFlagsOffset = 13
gsoIPProtoTCP = 6
gsoIPProtoUDP = 17
ipv4SrcAddrOffset = 12
ipv6SrcAddrOffset = 8
)
const tcpFlagsOffset = 13
const (
tcpFlagFIN uint8 = 0x01
tcpFlagPSH uint8 = 0x08
tcpFlagACK uint8 = 0x10
)
const (
gsoTCPFlagFIN uint8 = 0x01
gsoTCPFlagPSH uint8 = 0x08
// defined here in order to avoid importation of any platform-specific pkgs
ipProtoTCP = 6
ipProtoUDP = 17
)
// GSOSplit splits packets from in into outBufs[<index>][outOffset:], writing
// GSOSplit splits packets from 'in' into outBufs[<index>][outOffset:], writing
// the size of each element into sizes. It returns the number of buffers
// populated, and/or an error. Callers may pass an in slice that overlaps with
// the first element of outBufs, i.e. &in[0] may be equal to
// populated, and/or an error. Callers may pass an 'in' slice that overlaps with
// the first element of outBuffers, i.e. &in[0] may be equal to
// &outBufs[0][outOffset]. GSONone is a valid options.GSOType regardless of the
// value of options.NeedsCsum. Length of each outBufs element must be greater
// than or equal to the length of in, otherwise output may be silently truncated.
// than or equal to the length of 'in', otherwise output may be silently
// truncated.
func GSOSplit(in []byte, options GSOOptions, outBufs [][]byte, sizes []int, outOffset int) (int, error) {
cSumAt := int(options.CsumStart) + int(options.CsumOffset)
if cSumAt+1 >= len(in) {
@ -84,12 +91,15 @@ func GSOSplit(in []byte, options GSOOptions, outBufs [][]byte, sizes []int, outO
return 0, fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < GSO HdrLen (%d)", len(in), options.HdrLen)
}
// Handle the conditions where we are copying a single element to outBuffs.
payloadLen := len(in) - int(options.HdrLen)
if options.GSOType == GSONone || payloadLen < int(options.GSOSize) {
if len(in) > len(outBufs[0][outOffset:]) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) exceeds output element length (%d)", len(in), len(outBufs[0][outOffset:]))
}
if options.NeedsCsum {
// The initial value at the checksum offset should be summed with
// the checksum we compute. This is typically the pseudo-header sum.
initial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(in[cSumAt:])
in[cSumAt], in[cSumAt+1] = 0, 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(in[cSumAt:], ^Checksum(in[options.CsumStart:], initial))
@ -123,24 +133,24 @@ func GSOSplit(in []byte, options GSOOptions, outBufs [][]byte, sizes []int, outO
}
iphLen := int(options.CsumStart)
srcAddrOffset := gsoIPv6SrcAddrOffset
srcAddrOffset := ipv6SrcAddrOffset
addrLen := 16
if ipVersion == 4 {
srcAddrOffset = gsoIPv4SrcAddrOffset
srcAddrOffset = ipv4SrcAddrOffset
addrLen = 4
}
transportCsumAt := int(options.CsumStart + options.CsumOffset)
var firstTCPSeqNum uint32
var protocol uint8
if options.GSOType == GSOTCPv4 || options.GSOType == GSOTCPv6 {
protocol = gsoIPProtoTCP
protocol = ipProtoTCP
if len(in) < int(options.CsumStart)+20 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < GSO CsumStart (%d) + minimum TCP header size (%d)",
len(in), options.CsumStart, 20)
}
firstTCPSeqNum = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in[options.CsumStart+4:])
} else {
protocol = gsoIPProtoUDP
protocol = ipProtoUDP
}
nextSegmentDataAt := int(options.HdrLen)
i := 0
@ -159,35 +169,45 @@ func GSOSplit(in []byte, options GSOOptions, outBufs [][]byte, sizes []int, outO
copy(out, in[:iphLen])
if ipVersion == 4 {
// For IPv4 we are responsible for incrementing the ID field,
// updating the total len field, and recalculating the header
// checksum.
if i > 0 {
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(out[4:])
id += uint16(i)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], id)
}
out[10], out[11] = 0, 0
out[10], out[11] = 0, 0 // clear ipv4 header checksum
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(totalLen))
ipv4CSum := ^Checksum(out[:iphLen], 0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[10:], ipv4CSum)
} else {
// For IPv6 we are responsible for updating the payload length field.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], uint16(totalLen-iphLen))
}
// copy transport header
copy(out[options.CsumStart:options.HdrLen], in[options.CsumStart:options.HdrLen])
if protocol == gsoIPProtoTCP {
if protocol == ipProtoTCP {
// set TCP seq and adjust TCP flags
tcpSeq := firstTCPSeqNum + uint32(options.GSOSize*uint16(i))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[options.CsumStart+4:], tcpSeq)
if nextSegmentEnd != len(in) {
clearFlags := gsoTCPFlagFIN | gsoTCPFlagPSH
out[options.CsumStart+gsoTCPFlagsOffset] &^= clearFlags
// FIN and PSH should only be set on last segment
clearFlags := tcpFlagFIN | tcpFlagPSH
out[options.CsumStart+tcpFlagsOffset] &^= clearFlags
}
} else {
// set UDP header len
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[options.CsumStart+4:], uint16(segmentDataLen)+(options.HdrLen-options.CsumStart))
}
// payload
copy(out[options.HdrLen:], in[nextSegmentDataAt:nextSegmentEnd])
out[transportCsumAt], out[transportCsumAt+1] = 0, 0
// transport checksum
out[transportCsumAt], out[transportCsumAt+1] = 0, 0 // clear tcp/udp checksum
transportHeaderLen := int(options.HdrLen - options.CsumStart)
lenForPseudo := uint16(transportHeaderLen + segmentDataLen)
transportCSum := PseudoHeaderChecksum(protocol, in[srcAddrOffset:srcAddrOffset+addrLen], in[srcAddrOffset+addrLen:srcAddrOffset+addrLen*2], lenForPseudo)

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package tun
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"unsafe"
@ -16,14 +17,6 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const tcpFlagsOffset = 13
const (
tcpFlagFIN uint8 = 0x01
tcpFlagPSH uint8 = 0x08
tcpFlagACK uint8 = 0x10
)
// virtioNetHdr is defined in the kernel in include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h. The
// kernel symbol is virtio_net_hdr.
type virtioNetHdr struct {
@ -35,6 +28,30 @@ type virtioNetHdr struct {
csumOffset uint16
}
func (v *virtioNetHdr) toGSOOptions() (GSOOptions, error) {
var gsoType GSOType
switch v.gsoType {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE:
gsoType = GSONone
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
gsoType = GSOTCPv4
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
gsoType = GSOTCPv6
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
gsoType = GSOUDPL4
default:
return GSOOptions{}, fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio gsoType: %d", v.gsoType)
}
return GSOOptions{
GSOType: gsoType,
HdrLen: v.hdrLen,
CsumStart: v.csumStart,
CsumOffset: v.csumOffset,
GSOSize: v.gsoSize,
NeedsCsum: v.flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0,
}, nil
}
func (v *virtioNetHdr) decode(b []byte) error {
if len(b) < virtioNetHdrLen {
return io.ErrShortBuffer
@ -393,8 +410,8 @@ func checksumValid(pkt []byte, iphLen, proto uint8, isV6 bool) bool {
addrSize = 16
}
lenForPseudo := uint16(len(pkt) - int(iphLen))
cSum := pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(proto, pkt[srcAddrAt:srcAddrAt+addrSize], pkt[srcAddrAt+addrSize:srcAddrAt+addrSize*2], lenForPseudo)
return ^checksum(pkt[iphLen:], cSum) == 0
cSum := PseudoHeaderChecksum(proto, pkt[srcAddrAt:srcAddrAt+addrSize], pkt[srcAddrAt+addrSize:srcAddrAt+addrSize*2], lenForPseudo)
return ^Checksum(pkt[iphLen:], cSum) == 0
}
// coalesceResult represents the result of attempting to coalesce two TCP
@ -510,9 +527,7 @@ const (
)
const (
ipv4SrcAddrOffset = 12
ipv6SrcAddrOffset = 8
maxUint16 = 1<<16 - 1
maxUint16 = 1<<16 - 1
)
type groResult int
@ -644,7 +659,7 @@ func applyTCPCoalesceAccounting(bufs [][]byte, offset int, table *tcpGROTable) e
hdr.gsoType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4
pkt[10], pkt[11] = 0, 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:], uint16(len(pkt))) // set new total length
iphCSum := ^checksum(pkt[:item.iphLen], 0) // compute IPv4 header checksum
iphCSum := ^Checksum(pkt[:item.iphLen], 0) // compute IPv4 header checksum
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[10:], iphCSum) // set IPv4 header checksum field
}
err := hdr.encode(bufs[item.bufsIndex][offset-virtioNetHdrLen:])
@ -664,8 +679,8 @@ func applyTCPCoalesceAccounting(bufs [][]byte, offset int, table *tcpGROTable) e
srcAddrAt := offset + addrOffset
srcAddr := bufs[item.bufsIndex][srcAddrAt : srcAddrAt+addrLen]
dstAddr := bufs[item.bufsIndex][srcAddrAt+addrLen : srcAddrAt+addrLen*2]
psum := pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(unix.IPPROTO_TCP, srcAddr, dstAddr, uint16(len(pkt)-int(item.iphLen)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[hdr.csumStart+hdr.csumOffset:], checksum([]byte{}, psum))
psum := PseudoHeaderChecksum(unix.IPPROTO_TCP, srcAddr, dstAddr, uint16(len(pkt)-int(item.iphLen)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[hdr.csumStart+hdr.csumOffset:], Checksum([]byte{}, psum))
} else {
hdr := virtioNetHdr{}
err := hdr.encode(bufs[item.bufsIndex][offset-virtioNetHdrLen:])
@ -701,7 +716,7 @@ func applyUDPCoalesceAccounting(bufs [][]byte, offset int, table *udpGROTable) e
} else {
pkt[10], pkt[11] = 0, 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:], uint16(len(pkt))) // set new total length
iphCSum := ^checksum(pkt[:item.iphLen], 0) // compute IPv4 header checksum
iphCSum := ^Checksum(pkt[:item.iphLen], 0) // compute IPv4 header checksum
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[10:], iphCSum) // set IPv4 header checksum field
}
err := hdr.encode(bufs[item.bufsIndex][offset-virtioNetHdrLen:])
@ -724,8 +739,8 @@ func applyUDPCoalesceAccounting(bufs [][]byte, offset int, table *udpGROTable) e
srcAddrAt := offset + addrOffset
srcAddr := bufs[item.bufsIndex][srcAddrAt : srcAddrAt+addrLen]
dstAddr := bufs[item.bufsIndex][srcAddrAt+addrLen : srcAddrAt+addrLen*2]
psum := pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(unix.IPPROTO_UDP, srcAddr, dstAddr, uint16(len(pkt)-int(item.iphLen)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[hdr.csumStart+hdr.csumOffset:], checksum([]byte{}, psum))
psum := PseudoHeaderChecksum(unix.IPPROTO_UDP, srcAddr, dstAddr, uint16(len(pkt)-int(item.iphLen)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[hdr.csumStart+hdr.csumOffset:], Checksum([]byte{}, psum))
} else {
hdr := virtioNetHdr{}
err := hdr.encode(bufs[item.bufsIndex][offset-virtioNetHdrLen:])
@ -894,100 +909,3 @@ func handleGRO(bufs [][]byte, offset int, tcpTable *tcpGROTable, udpTable *udpGR
errUDP := applyUDPCoalesceAccounting(bufs, offset, udpTable)
return errors.Join(errTCP, errUDP)
}
// gsoSplit splits packets from in into outBuffs, writing the size of each
// element into sizes. It returns the number of buffers populated, and/or an
// error.
func gsoSplit(in []byte, hdr virtioNetHdr, outBuffs [][]byte, sizes []int, outOffset int, isV6 bool) (int, error) {
iphLen := int(hdr.csumStart)
srcAddrOffset := ipv6SrcAddrOffset
addrLen := 16
if !isV6 {
in[10], in[11] = 0, 0 // clear ipv4 header checksum
srcAddrOffset = ipv4SrcAddrOffset
addrLen = 4
}
transportCsumAt := int(hdr.csumStart + hdr.csumOffset)
in[transportCsumAt], in[transportCsumAt+1] = 0, 0 // clear tcp/udp checksum
var firstTCPSeqNum uint32
var protocol uint8
if hdr.gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 || hdr.gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6 {
protocol = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
firstTCPSeqNum = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in[hdr.csumStart+4:])
} else {
protocol = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
}
nextSegmentDataAt := int(hdr.hdrLen)
i := 0
for ; nextSegmentDataAt < len(in); i++ {
if i == len(outBuffs) {
return i - 1, ErrTooManySegments
}
nextSegmentEnd := nextSegmentDataAt + int(hdr.gsoSize)
if nextSegmentEnd > len(in) {
nextSegmentEnd = len(in)
}
segmentDataLen := nextSegmentEnd - nextSegmentDataAt
totalLen := int(hdr.hdrLen) + segmentDataLen
sizes[i] = totalLen
out := outBuffs[i][outOffset:]
copy(out, in[:iphLen])
if !isV6 {
// For IPv4 we are responsible for incrementing the ID field,
// updating the total len field, and recalculating the header
// checksum.
if i > 0 {
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(out[4:])
id += uint16(i)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], id)
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(totalLen))
ipv4CSum := ^checksum(out[:iphLen], 0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[10:], ipv4CSum)
} else {
// For IPv6 we are responsible for updating the payload length field.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], uint16(totalLen-iphLen))
}
// copy transport header
copy(out[hdr.csumStart:hdr.hdrLen], in[hdr.csumStart:hdr.hdrLen])
if protocol == unix.IPPROTO_TCP {
// set TCP seq and adjust TCP flags
tcpSeq := firstTCPSeqNum + uint32(hdr.gsoSize*uint16(i))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[hdr.csumStart+4:], tcpSeq)
if nextSegmentEnd != len(in) {
// FIN and PSH should only be set on last segment
clearFlags := tcpFlagFIN | tcpFlagPSH
out[hdr.csumStart+tcpFlagsOffset] &^= clearFlags
}
} else {
// set UDP header len
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[hdr.csumStart+4:], uint16(segmentDataLen)+(hdr.hdrLen-hdr.csumStart))
}
// payload
copy(out[hdr.hdrLen:], in[nextSegmentDataAt:nextSegmentEnd])
// transport checksum
transportHeaderLen := int(hdr.hdrLen - hdr.csumStart)
lenForPseudo := uint16(transportHeaderLen + segmentDataLen)
transportCSumNoFold := pseudoHeaderChecksumNoFold(protocol, in[srcAddrOffset:srcAddrOffset+addrLen], in[srcAddrOffset+addrLen:srcAddrOffset+addrLen*2], lenForPseudo)
transportCSum := ^checksum(out[hdr.csumStart:totalLen], transportCSumNoFold)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[hdr.csumStart+hdr.csumOffset:], transportCSum)
nextSegmentDataAt += int(hdr.gsoSize)
}
return i, nil
}
func gsoNoneChecksum(in []byte, cSumStart, cSumOffset uint16) error {
cSumAt := cSumStart + cSumOffset
// The initial value at the checksum offset should be summed with the
// checksum we compute. This is typically the pseudo-header checksum.
initial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(in[cSumAt:])
in[cSumAt], in[cSumAt+1] = 0, 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(in[cSumAt:], ^checksum(in[cSumStart:], uint64(initial)))
return nil
}

View file

@ -56,12 +56,21 @@ type Device interface {
// versions may have offload bugs. Where these bugs negatively impact throughput
// or break connectivity entirely we can use these methods to disable the
// related offload.
//
// Linux has the following known, GRO bugs.
//
// torvalds/linux@e269d79c7d35aa3808b1f3c1737d63dab504ddc8 broke virtio_net
// TCP & UDP GRO causing GRO writes to return EINVAL. The bug was then
// resolved later in
// torvalds/linux@89add40066f9ed9abe5f7f886fe5789ff7e0c50e. The offending
// commit was pulled into various LTS releases.
//
// UDP GRO writes end up blackholing/dropping packets destined for a
// vxlan/geneve interface on kernel versions prior to 6.8.5.
type GRODevice interface {
Device
// DisableUDPGRO disables UDP GRO if it is enabled.
DisableUDPGRO()
// DisableTCPGRO disables TCP GRO if it is enabled.
DisableTCPGRO()
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2025 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package tun
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ type NativeTun struct {
readOpMu sync.Mutex // readOpMu guards readBuff
readBuff [virtioNetHdrLen + 65535]byte // if vnetHdr every read() is prefixed by virtioNetHdr
writeOpMu sync.Mutex // writeOpMu guards toWrite, tcpGROTable, udpGROTable, gro
writeOpMu sync.Mutex // writeOpMu guards the following fields
toWrite []int
tcpGROTable *tcpGROTable
udpGROTable *udpGROTable
@ -269,21 +269,15 @@ func (tun *NativeTun) setMTU(n int) error {
defer unix.Close(fd)
// do ioctl call
var ifr [ifReqSize]byte
copy(ifr[:], name)
*(*uint32)(unsafe.Pointer(&ifr[unix.IFNAMSIZ])) = uint32(n)
_, _, errno := unix.Syscall(
unix.SYS_IOCTL,
uintptr(fd),
uintptr(unix.SIOCSIFMTU),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ifr[0])),
)
if errno != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set MTU of TUN device: %w", errno)
req, err := unix.NewIfreq(name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unix.NewIfreq(%q): %w", name, err)
}
req.SetUint32(uint32(n))
err = unix.IoctlIfreq(fd, unix.SIOCSIFMTU, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set MTU of TUN device %q: %w", name, err)
}
return nil
}
@ -402,73 +396,32 @@ func handleVirtioRead(in []byte, bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (int, e
return 0, err
}
in = in[virtioNetHdrLen:]
if hdr.gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
if hdr.flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
// This means CHECKSUM_PARTIAL in skb context. We are responsible
// for computing the checksum starting at hdr.csumStart and placing
// at hdr.csumOffset.
err = gsoNoneChecksum(in, hdr.csumStart, hdr.csumOffset)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
if len(in) > len(bufs[0][offset:]) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("read len %d overflows bufs element len %d", len(in), len(bufs[0][offset:]))
}
n := copy(bufs[0][offset:], in)
sizes[0] = n
return 1, nil
}
if hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 && hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6 && hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio GSO type: %d", hdr.gsoType)
options, err := hdr.toGSOOptions()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
ipVersion := in[0] >> 4
switch ipVersion {
case 4:
if hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 && hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ip header version: %d, GSO type: %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
}
case 6:
if hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6 && hdr.gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ip header version: %d, GSO type: %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
}
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid ip header version: %d", ipVersion)
}
// Don't trust hdr.hdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
// Don't trust HdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
// of the entire first packet when the kernel is handling it as part of a
// FORWARD path. Instead, parse the transport header length and add it onto
// csumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
if hdr.gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
hdr.hdrLen = hdr.csumStart + 8
} else {
if len(in) <= int(hdr.csumStart+12) {
// CsumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
if options.GSOType == GSOUDPL4 {
options.HdrLen = options.CsumStart + 8
} else if options.GSOType != GSONone {
if len(in) <= int(options.CsumStart+12) {
return 0, errors.New("packet is too short")
}
tcpHLen := uint16(in[hdr.csumStart+12] >> 4 * 4)
tcpHLen := uint16(in[options.CsumStart+12] >> 4 * 4)
if tcpHLen < 20 || tcpHLen > 60 {
// A TCP header must be between 20 and 60 bytes in length.
return 0, fmt.Errorf("tcp header len is invalid: %d", tcpHLen)
}
hdr.hdrLen = hdr.csumStart + tcpHLen
options.HdrLen = options.CsumStart + tcpHLen
}
if len(in) < int(hdr.hdrLen) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < virtioNetHdr.hdrLen (%d)", len(in), hdr.hdrLen)
}
if hdr.hdrLen < hdr.csumStart {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("virtioNetHdr.hdrLen (%d) < virtioNetHdr.csumStart (%d)", hdr.hdrLen, hdr.csumStart)
}
cSumAt := int(hdr.csumStart + hdr.csumOffset)
if cSumAt+1 >= len(in) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("end of checksum offset (%d) exceeds packet length (%d)", cSumAt+1, len(in))
}
return gsoSplit(in, hdr, bufs, sizes, offset, ipVersion == 6)
return GSOSplit(in, options, bufs, sizes, offset)
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Read(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (int, error) {
@ -525,14 +478,16 @@ func (tun *NativeTun) BatchSize() int {
return tun.batchSize
}
// DisableUDPGRO disables UDP GRO if it is enabled.
// DisableUDPGRO disables UDP GRO if it is enabled. See the GRODevice interface
// for cases where it should be called.
func (tun *NativeTun) DisableUDPGRO() {
tun.writeOpMu.Lock()
tun.gro.disableUDPGRO()
tun.writeOpMu.Unlock()
}
// DisableTCPGRO disables TCP GRO if it is enabled.
// DisableTCPGRO disables TCP GRO if it is enabled. See the GRODevice interface
// for cases where it should be called.
func (tun *NativeTun) DisableTCPGRO() {
tun.writeOpMu.Lock()
tun.gro.disableTCPGRO()

147
tun/tun_plan9.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
package tun
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
)
type NativeTun struct {
name string // "/net/ipifc/2"
ctlFile *os.File
dataFile *os.File
events chan Event
errors chan error
closeOnce sync.Once
}
func CreateTUN(_ string, mtu int) (Device, error) {
ctl, err := os.OpenFile("/net/ipifc/clone", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
nbuf := make([]byte, 5)
n, err := ctl.Read(nbuf)
if err != nil {
ctl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading from clone file: %w", err)
}
ifn, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(nbuf[:n])))
if err != nil {
ctl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error converting clone result %q to int: %w", nbuf[:n], err)
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(ctl, "bind pkt\n"); err != nil {
ctl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error binding to pkt: %w", err)
}
if mtu > 0 {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(ctl, "mtu %d\n", mtu); err != nil {
ctl.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error setting MTU: %w", err)
}
}
dataFile, err := os.OpenFile(fmt.Sprintf("/net/ipifc/%d/data", ifn), os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
ctl.Close()
return nil, err
}
tun := &NativeTun{
ctlFile: ctl,
dataFile: dataFile,
name: fmt.Sprintf("/net/ipifc/%d", ifn),
events: make(chan Event, 10),
errors: make(chan error, 5),
}
tun.events <- EventUp
return tun, nil
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Name() (string, error) {
return tun.name, nil
}
func (tun *NativeTun) File() *os.File {
return tun.ctlFile
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Events() <-chan Event {
return tun.events
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Read(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (int, error) {
select {
case err := <-tun.errors:
return 0, err
default:
n, err := tun.dataFile.Read(bufs[0][offset:])
if n == 1 && bufs[0][offset] == 0 {
// EOF
err = io.EOF
n = 0
}
sizes[0] = n
return 1, err
}
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Write(bufs [][]byte, offset int) (int, error) {
for i, buf := range bufs {
if _, err := tun.dataFile.Write(buf[offset:]); err != nil {
return i, err
}
}
return len(bufs), nil
}
func (tun *NativeTun) Close() error {
var err1, err2 error
tun.closeOnce.Do(func() {
_, err1 := fmt.Fprintf(tun.ctlFile, "unbind\n")
if err := tun.ctlFile.Close(); err != nil && err1 == nil {
err1 = err
}
err2 = tun.dataFile.Close()
})
if err1 != nil {
return err1
}
return err2
}
func (tun *NativeTun) MTU() (int, error) {
var buf [100]byte
f, err := os.Open(tun.name + "/status")
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer f.Close()
n, err := f.Read(buf[:])
_, res, ok := strings.Cut(string(buf[:n]), " maxtu ")
if ok {
if mtus, _, ok := strings.Cut(res, " "); ok {
mtu, err := strconv.Atoi(mtus)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("error converting mtu %q to int: %w", mtus, err)
}
return mtu, nil
}
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("no 'maxtu' field found in %s/status", tun.name)
}
func (tun *NativeTun) BatchSize() int {
return 1
}