eburet-oss/wireguard-go-awg2-lx
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

Compare commits

base: eburet-oss:3909adbf87f2007d7ce87c6c3ca74a1afa243da3
Branches Tags
eburet-oss:lx
eburet-oss:lx-awg2-v005
eburet-oss:lx-awg2-v003
..
compare: eburet-oss:15b912c1c0f41babf41d653d1d154513009626a5
Branches Tags
eburet-oss:lx-awg2-v005
eburet-oss:lx-awg2-v003
eburet-oss:lx

No commits in common. "3909adbf87f2007d7ce87c6c3ca74a1afa243da3" and "15b912c1c0f41babf41d653d1d154513009626a5" have entirely different histories.
3909adbf87 ... 15b912c1c0

30 changed files with 57 additions and 2694 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

18
conn/bind_std.go
View file

@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ again:
return 0, err
}
sizes[0] = dataLength
if dataLength > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: SPEC 026 — gate reserved-clear on the egress receive path too, so a small-padding AmneziaWG magic in bytes 1-3 survives when no WARP reserved value is set
if dataLength > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
endpoints[0] = &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: source}
@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) receiveIP(
if sizes[i] == 0 {
continue
}
if msg.N > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if msg.N > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[i][1:4])
}
ep := &StdNetEndpoint{AddrPort: M.AddrPortFromNet(msg.Addr)} // TODO: remove allocation
@ -539,20 +539,6 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, reserved
s.reservedForEndpoint[destination] = reserved
}
// lx: hasReserved reports whether any Cloudflare "reserved" value is set. The
// receive path must only zero bytes 1-3 when a reserved value exists (WARP);
// otherwise an AmneziaWG magic header that lands in bytes 1-3 (small s1/s2/s4
// padding) would be corrupted and the packet dropped. The send path already
// gates its stamp on a per-endpoint `loaded` check, so no change is needed there.
func (s *StdNetBind) hasReserved() bool {
for _, reserved := range s.reservedForEndpoint {
if reserved != [3]uint8{} {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *StdNetBind) send(conn *net.UDPConn, pc batchWriter, msgs []ipv6.Message) error {
var (
n int

16
conn/bind_windows.go
View file

@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) receiveIPv4(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint)
bind.mu.RLock()
defer bind.mu.RUnlock()
n, ep, err := bind.v4.Receive(bufs[0], &bind.isOpen)
if n > 3 && bind.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if n > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
sizes[0] = n
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) receiveIPv6(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []Endpoint)
bind.mu.RLock()
defer bind.mu.RUnlock()
n, ep, err := bind.v6.Receive(bufs[0], &bind.isOpen)
if n > 3 && bind.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if n > 3 {
common.ClearArray(bufs[0][1:4])
}
sizes[0] = n
@ -576,18 +576,6 @@ func (bind *WinRingBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, rese
bind.reservedForEndpoint[*endpoint.(*WinRingEndpoint)] = reserved
}
// lx: hasReserved reports whether any Cloudflare "reserved" value is set. See
// the StdNetBind.hasReserved comment — the unconditional receive clear would
// corrupt an AmneziaWG magic header sitting in bytes 1-3 (small padding).
func (bind *WinRingBind) hasReserved() bool {
for _, reserved := range bind.reservedForEndpoint {
if reserved != [3]uint8{} {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *StdNetBind) BindSocketToInterface4(interfaceIndex uint32, blackhole bool) error {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()

4
conn/msgx_darwin.go
View file

@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) receiveSingle(conn *net.UDPConn, bufs [][]byte, sizes []int
return 0, err
}
sizes[0] = n
if n > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if n > 3 {
bufs[0][1] = 0
bufs[0][2] = 0
bufs[0][3] = 0
@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (s *StdNetBind) makeReceiveMsgX(conn *net.UDPConn, isV6 bool) (ReceiveFunc,
numMsgs := int(n)
for i := 0; i < numMsgs; i++ {
sizes[i] = int(state.hdrs[i].DataLen)
if sizes[i] > 3 && s.hasReserved() { // lx: only strip reserved bytes for WARP (see hasReserved)
if sizes[i] > 3 {
bufs[i][1] = 0
bufs[i][2] = 0
bufs[i][3] = 0

56
conn/reserved_gate_lx_test.go
View file

@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: unit coverage for the StdNetBind.hasReserved() gate that guards the
* receive-side reserved-clear. receiveIP zeroes bytes 1-3 (Cloudflare WARP
* "reserved") only when a non-zero reserved value is set for some endpoint;
* otherwise an AmneziaWG magic header landing in bytes 1-3 (small s1/s2/s4
* padding) would be corrupted and the packet dropped. This test pins the gate
* itself; the end-to-end handshake proof lives in the device package.
*/
package conn
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
func stdNetBindForTest(t *testing.T) *StdNetBind {
t.Helper()
b, ok := NewStdNetBind(nil).(*StdNetBind)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("NewStdNetBind did not return *StdNetBind")
}
return b
}
func TestStdNetBindHasReserved(t *testing.T) {
b := stdNetBindForTest(t)
if b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("fresh bind must report no reserved value")
}
ep := netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:51820")
// An all-zero reserved value is indistinguishable from "unset" and must
// not arm the clear.
b.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 0})
if b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("all-zero reserved must not count as reserved")
}
// Any non-zero byte (WARP anycast tag) arms the clear.
b.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 1})
if !b.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("non-zero reserved (byte 3) must count as reserved")
}
// A second endpoint's non-zero value must also be seen.
b2 := stdNetBindForTest(t)
ep2 := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:2408")
b2.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep, [3]byte{0, 0, 0})
b2.SetReservedForEndpoint(ep2, [3]byte{0xAB, 0, 0})
if !b2.hasReserved() {
t.Fatal("non-zero reserved on any endpoint must count as reserved")
}
}

190
device/awg_stdnetbind_reserved_lx_test.go
View file

@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: e2e regression for the reserved-clear vs AWG magic-header collision,
* exercised over the StdNetBind path (no detour) with real loopback UDP.
*
* Bug model. On receive, StdNetBind.receiveIP unconditionally zeroed bytes
* 1-3 of every datagram >3 bytes (the Cloudflare WARP "reserved" field).
* AmneziaWG reads its magic header as LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[padding:]),
* where padding is s1/s2 (handshake) or s4 (transport). With small padding
* (0..3) the 4-byte magic overlaps bytes 1-3, so the unconditional clear
* corrupts it: the value falls outside the ranged h1-h4 window, the packet is
* classified MessageUnknownType and dropped. WARP was never configured on
* these binds (no SetReservedForEndpoint), so the clear was pure collateral.
*
* The fix gates the clear behind StdNetBind.hasReserved(): bytes 1-3 are only
* zeroed when a non-zero reserved value is actually set for some endpoint.
* With no reserved value the magic survives and the handshake completes.
*
* This test provokes the worst case: padding = 0 (no s1/s2/s4 at all), so the
* h1 initiation magic sits in bytes [0..3] and its high bytes (1-3) are the
* ones the clear would destroy. The h1-h4 ranges are chosen entirely above
* 0x10000000, so after zeroing bytes 1-3 the surviving value is <= 255 and can
* never land back inside any range -> guaranteed drop on the buggy tree.
*
* GREEN on the fixed tree. To see RED, temporarily restore the unconditional
* clear in conn/bind_std.go receiveIP:
* if msg.N > 3 {
* common.ClearArray(bufs[i][1:4])
* }
* and the handshake times out (init magic zeroed in bytes 1-3).
*/
package device
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
)
// magic header ranges kept entirely above 0x10000000 (268435456). Any value
// the sender picks therefore has a non-zero byte among positions 1-3; zeroing
// those bytes collapses the value to <= 0xFF, which is below every range start,
// so a corrupted magic can never validate. Distinct windows per message type.
const (
lxH1Lo, lxH1Hi = 268500000, 268600000 // init
lxH2Lo, lxH2Hi = 300000000, 300100000 // response
lxH3Lo, lxH3Hi = 400000000, 400100000 // cookie
lxH4Lo, lxH4Hi = 500000000, 500100000 // transport
)
// lxReadListenPort parses listen_port=<n> out of a device's IpcGet dump.
func lxReadListenPort(t *testing.T, dev *Device) uint16 {
t.Helper()
dump, err := dev.IpcGet()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcGet: %v", err)
}
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(dump))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if v, ok := strings.CutPrefix(line, "listen_port="); ok {
p, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse listen_port %q: %v", v, err)
}
return uint16(p)
}
}
t.Fatalf("listen_port not found in dump:\n%s", dump)
return 0
}
// newStdNetPaddedPair builds two Up()'d Devices peered over real loopback UDP
// (NewStdNetBind), configured with ranged h1-h4 + junk and *no* s1/s2/s4
// (padding = 0). Endpoints are wired after Up, once the ephemeral ports are
// known. No reserved value is ever set, so hasReserved() is false.
func newStdNetPaddedPair(t *testing.T) (devA, devB *Device, tunA, tunB *chanTun) {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
tunA = newChanTun()
tunB = newChanTun()
devA = NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, conn.NewStdNetBind(nil), NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB = NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, conn.NewStdNetBind(nil), NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
// obfuscation shared by both ends. Ranged magic headers, junk packets,
// and deliberately no s1/s2/s4 so padding stays 0 for every message type.
obf := fmt.Sprintf(
"jc=3\njmin=8\njmax=16\n"+
"h1=%d-%d\nh2=%d-%d\nh3=%d-%d\nh4=%d-%d\n",
lxH1Lo, lxH1Hi, lxH2Lo, lxH2Hi, lxH3Lo, lxH3Hi, lxH4Lo, lxH4Hi)
// Bring both up on an ephemeral port (listen_port=0), no endpoint yet.
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf("private_key=%s\nlisten_port=0\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), obf, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf("private_key=%s\nlisten_port=0\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), obf, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if devA.paddings.init != 0 || devA.paddings.response != 0 || devA.paddings.transport != 0 {
t.Fatalf("padding must be 0 for this test: init=%d resp=%d transport=%d",
devA.paddings.init, devA.paddings.response, devA.paddings.transport)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
portA := lxReadListenPort(t, devA)
portB := lxReadListenPort(t, devB)
if portA == 0 || portB == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ephemeral ports not assigned: A=%d B=%d", portA, portB)
}
// Now that ports are known, point each peer at the other over loopback.
if err := devA.IpcSet(fmt.Sprintf("public_key=%s\nupdate_only=true\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:%d\n",
hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), portB)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set endpoint A->B: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(fmt.Sprintf("public_key=%s\nupdate_only=true\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:%d\n",
hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), portA)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set endpoint B->A: %v", err)
}
return devA, devB, tunA, tunB
}
// TestStdNetBindReservedClearVsMagic_ZeroPadding drives a real handshake and a
// data packet A->B over loopback UDP through StdNetBind, with padding=0 so the
// h1 magic overlaps the reserved bytes 1-3. It passes only when receive does
// not blindly clear those bytes (the fix).
func TestStdNetBindReservedClearVsMagic_ZeroPadding(t *testing.T) {
devA, _, tunA, tunB := newStdNetPaddedPair(t)
_ = devA
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
// Re-inject periodically: the first packet triggers the handshake and may
// be dropped until keys are established.
send := func() { tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
deadline := time.After(15 * time.Second)
retry := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer retry.Stop()
for {
select {
case got := <-tunB.fromDevice:
if bytes.Equal(got, pkt) {
return // delivered end to end: magic survived, handshake ok
}
t.Logf("ignoring unexpected packet len=%d", len(got))
case <-retry.C:
send()
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for packet on peer tun " +
"(handshake never completed: reserved-clear likely corrupted the h1 magic)")
}
}
}

3
device/cookie.go
View file

@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ func (st *CookieChecker) CreateReply(
msg []byte,
recv uint32,
src []byte,
msgType uint32,
) (*MessageCookieReply, error) {
st.RLock()
@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ func (st *CookieChecker) CreateReply(
smac1 := smac2 - blake2s.Size128
reply := new(MessageCookieReply)
reply.Type = msgType
reply.Type = MessageCookieReplyType
reply.Receiver = recv
_, err := rand.Read(reply.Nonce[:])

79
device/device.go
View file

@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type Device struct {
}
peerStateFn atomic.Pointer[PeerSessionStateFunc] // observes peer session state changes, nil if unset
priorityMsgFn atomic.Pointer[PeerPriorityMessageFunc] // returns a priority message to be sent around session establishment, nil if unset
rate struct {
underLoadUntil atomic.Int64
@ -99,43 +98,6 @@ type Device struct {
closed chan struct{}
log *Logger
pauseManager pause.Manager
// lx: AmneziaWG obfuscation state (grafted from amneziawg-go).
junk struct {
min int
max int
count int
}
headers struct {
init *magicHeader
cookie *magicHeader
response *magicHeader
transport *magicHeader
}
paddings struct {
init int
response int
cookie int
transport int
}
ipackets [5]*obfChain
// lx: SPEC 041 — passive self-heal state: reopen the bind once (fresh
// ephemeral port when freshPort is set) and immediately re-initiate, to
// heal dead per-flow path state (an expired NAT mapping or a poisoned DPI
// flow entry) that otherwise pins every retry to the same dead 5-tuple
// until a manual reconnect. The whole mechanism — three triggers (giveup /
// early / nudge) sharing this state and its debounce — lives in
// lx_giveup_rebind.go. Enabled by default; sing-box decides freshPort
// from whether the user pinned listen_port.
giveUpRebind struct {
enabled atomic.Bool
freshPort atomic.Bool
last atomic.Int64 // unix seconds of the last rebind (debounce)
}
}
// deviceState represents the state of a Device.
@ -209,8 +171,7 @@ func (device *Device) changeState(want deviceState) (err error) {
err = errDown
}
}
device.log.Verbosef(
"Interface state was %s, requested %s, now %s", old, want, device.deviceState())
device.log.Verbosef("Interface state was %s, requested %s, now %s", old, want, device.deviceState())
return
}
@ -340,7 +301,6 @@ func (device *Device) SetPrivateKey(sk NoisePrivateKey) error {
func NewDevice(ctx context.Context, tunDevice tun.Device, bind conn.Bind, logger *Logger, workers int) *Device {
device := new(Device)
device.pauseManager = service.FromContext[pause.Manager](ctx)
device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Store(true) // lx: SPEC 041 — self-heal on by default
device.state.state.Store(uint32(deviceStateDown))
device.closed = make(chan struct{})
device.log = logger
@ -356,11 +316,6 @@ func NewDevice(ctx context.Context, tunDevice tun.Device, bind conn.Bind, logger
device.rate.limiter.Init()
device.indexTable.Init()
device.headers.init = &magicHeader{start: MessageInitiationType, end: MessageInitiationType}
device.headers.response = &magicHeader{start: MessageResponseType, end: MessageResponseType}
device.headers.cookie = &magicHeader{start: MessageCookieReplyType, end: MessageCookieReplyType}
device.headers.transport = &magicHeader{start: MessageTransportType, end: MessageTransportType}
device.PopulatePools()
// create queues
@ -598,38 +553,6 @@ func (device *Device) SetSessionStateFunc(f PeerSessionStateFunc) {
device.peerStateFn.Store(&f)
}
// MaxPriorityMessageContentSize is the maximum size of a message returned by a
// [PeerPriorityMessageFunc]. It's a power of 2 that leaves significant space
// when accounting for all WireGuard overhead and encapsulating network protocol
// headers. Future adjustments to this value should consider all these overheads
// and any [conn.Bind] implementation limitations.
const MaxPriorityMessageContentSize = 512
// PeerPriorityMessageFunc is called when a peer's WireGuard session keypair is
// established (or re-keyed) for forward data transmission.
//
// The returned message is transmitted to the peer in priority fashion. Priority
// means it cannot be evicted from the staged packet queue by non-priority
// (read from [tun.Device]) packets. It avoids the staged queue altogether.
//
// The callback must be cheap and must not call back into [Device]. A zero length
// message or a message whose length exceeds [MaxPriorityMessageContentSize] will
// be silently dropped. Message should start with an IPv4 or IPv6 header as it
// is subject to allowed IPs lookup on the receiver, same as any other transport
// message.
type PeerPriorityMessageFunc func(peer NoisePublicKey) (msg []byte)
// SetPriorityMessageOnEstablishmentFunc sets a function to be used for sending
// a priority message around session establishment. See [PeerPriorityMessageFunc]
// docs for more details. A nil value clears any previously set value.
func (device *Device) SetPriorityMessageOnEstablishmentFunc(f PeerPriorityMessageFunc) {
if f == nil {
device.priorityMsgFn.Store(nil)
return
}
device.priorityMsgFn.Store(&f)
}
func (device *Device) Close() {
device.state.Lock()
defer device.state.Unlock()

58
device/lx_early_rebind_test.go
View file

@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 v2 — behavioural red/green test for the EARLY give-up rebind.
* Field failure mode (the v1 field leftover, dump 2026-08-01): the v1 give-up
* rebind heals a dead 5-tuple, but only at ~90s after the first demand — while
* the user pings within the first 5-35s after device wake and sees every node
* in ERR. The early trigger fires from the retry branch once >=3 initiations
* went unanswered AND the session is provably dead (no live keypair, or last
* handshake older than RejectAfterTime), shrinking the ERR window to ~15-20s.
*
* The test reuses the v1 harness (gateBind: first socket generation blackholes
* every send) and drives the peer to the 3rd retry expiry — the state a real
* ~15s of unanswered retries ends in. Post-fix the retry branch rebinds and
* the tunnel comes up; pre-fix (v1 base) the retry keeps dying in the first
* socket generation and only the ~90s give-up would heal, so the packet never
* arrives within the test window.
*
* This file deliberately uses NO post-fix API, so it compiles and runs RED on
* the v1 base commit.
*/
package device
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestEarlyRebindSelfHeal: dead first socket, cold session (no keypair yet),
// 3rd retry expiry fires — the tunnel must come up and deliver traffic without
// waiting out the full 90s give-up cycle.
func TestEarlyRebindSelfHeal(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
// Traffic demand: stages the packet and sends the first (blackholed)
// initiation.
send()
pair.devA.peers.RLock()
peer := pair.devA.peers.keyMap[pair.pkB]
pair.devA.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
// Simulate reaching the 3rd retry expiry (~15s in the field): two retries
// already counted, the last initiation older than the retransmit timeout.
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(2)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

143
device/lx_giveup_rebind.go
View file

@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 — passive self-heal for a dead per-flow path (an expired NAT
* mapping or a poisoned DPI flow entry that pins every retry to the same dead
* 5-tuple until a manual reconnect). One mechanism — reopen the bind (fresh
* ephemeral port when allowed) and immediately re-initiate — with three
* triggers sharing one debounce window:
*
* giveup — the handshake retry cycle exhausted (~90s of unanswered
* initiations under traffic demand); safety net, covers every path;
* early — >=3 unanswered initiations against a provably dead session
* (see sessionProvablyDead): no point waiting out the rest of the
* cycle, rebind at ~15s instead of ~90s;
* nudge — the consumer reports "device woke up" via
* Device.RebindIfSessionStale (wired through sing-box libbox);
* heals without waiting for traffic demand at all.
*
* Zero cost while healthy: no timers, no goroutines — triggers 1-2 live in
* the existing retry cycle, trigger 3 is paid by the caller. The state lives
* in Device.giveUpRebind (device.go); enabled defaults to true in NewDevice,
* sing-box decides freshPort from whether the user pinned listen_port.
*/
package device
import "time"
// earlyGiveUpMinAttempts is the number of unanswered initiations (retry timer
// expiries) after which a provably dead session is rebound early instead of
// waiting out the full RekeyAttemptTime cycle: ~15s at RekeyTimeout=5s.
const earlyGiveUpMinAttempts = 3
// SetGiveUpRebind configures the self-heal (see the giveUpRebind field
// comment in device.go). freshPort must be false when the user pinned an
// explicit listen_port: the pinned port is preserved, at the cost of the
// rebind not changing the 5-tuple.
func (device *Device) SetGiveUpRebind(enabled, freshPort bool) {
device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Store(enabled)
device.giveUpRebind.freshPort.Store(freshPort)
}
// handleHandshakeGiveUp is invoked from the give-up branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake: ~90s of initiations went unanswered, so the
// current socket's 5-tuple is proven dead.
func (device *Device) handleHandshakeGiveUp(peer *Peer) {
device.selfHealRebind("giveup", peer)
}
// maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind is invoked from the RETRY branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake. Once enough initiations went unanswered AND the
// session is provably dead there is nothing left to protect — rebind now, at
// ~15s instead of ~90s. The retry cycle itself continues untouched: this only
// moves the socket under it. A live session with transient packet loss fails
// sessionProvablyDead and keeps byte-for-byte upstream behaviour; the shared
// debounce means this also suppresses the giveup rebind of the same series.
func (device *Device) maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind(peer *Peer) {
if peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Load() < earlyGiveUpMinAttempts {
return
}
if !device.sessionProvablyDead(peer) {
return
}
device.selfHealRebind("early", peer)
}
// sessionProvablyDead reports whether the peer's session is beyond saving: no
// live keypair, or the last successful handshake is older than
// RejectAfterTime (the keys are invalid after that, so a rebind loses
// nothing). The stale predicate shared by the early and nudge triggers.
func (device *Device) sessionProvablyDead(peer *Peer) bool {
if peer.keypairs.Current() == nil {
return true
}
return time.Since(time.Unix(0, peer.lastHandshakeNano.Load())) > RejectAfterTime
}
// RebindIfSessionStale is the wake-nudge entry (trigger 3): the consumer
// observed a device wake-up and asks for an immediate heal instead of waiting
// for traffic demand to walk the retry cycle. If any running peer's session
// is provably dead the bind is reopened once (shared debounce) and every such
// peer re-initiates immediately; a healthy device is a no-op. Returns whether
// a rebind was actually scheduled. Never blocks on the rebind itself — the
// heavy part runs in a goroutine (see selfHealRebind). On a down or closed
// device it is a no-op, so callers racing idle-suspend or Close are safe.
func (device *Device) RebindIfSessionStale() bool {
if !device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Load() || !device.isUp() {
return false
}
var stale []*Peer
device.peers.RLock()
for _, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
if peer.isRunning.Load() && device.sessionProvablyDead(peer) {
stale = append(stale, peer)
}
}
device.peers.RUnlock()
if len(stale) == 0 {
return false
}
return device.selfHealRebind("nudge", stale...)
}
// selfHealRebind is the shared action behind all three triggers. Runs the
// heavy part in a goroutine so a timer callback (or a nudge caller) never
// blocks on BindUpdate's worker drain. Debounced to one rebind per
// RekeyAttemptTime per device across ALL triggers (CAS on `last` settles
// concurrent multi-peer races): an early rebind at ~15s suppresses the giveup
// rebind of the same failed series at ~90s. On a down or closed device
// BindUpdate does not reopen the socket, so a rebind racing idle-suspend
// (SPEC 020) or Close degrades to a no-op.
func (device *Device) selfHealRebind(trigger string, peers ...*Peer) bool {
if !device.giveUpRebind.enabled.Load() {
return false
}
if device.isClosed() {
return false
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
last := device.giveUpRebind.last.Load()
if now-last < int64(RekeyAttemptTime/time.Second) {
return false
}
if !device.giveUpRebind.last.CompareAndSwap(last, now) {
return false
}
fresh := device.giveUpRebind.freshPort.Load()
go func() {
if fresh {
device.net.Lock()
device.net.port = 0
device.net.Unlock()
}
if err := device.BindUpdate(); err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed self-heal rebind (trigger=%s): %v", peers[0], trigger, err)
return
}
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Rebound socket for self-heal (trigger=%s, fresh port=%v)", peers[0], trigger, fresh)
for _, peer := range peers {
peer.SendHandshakeInitiation(false)
}
}()
return true
}

83
device/lx_giveup_rebind_test.go
View file

@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 — unit tests for the give-up rebind mechanics on top of the
* self-heal harness (lx_giveup_selfheal_test.go): fresh vs pinned port,
* debounce, and disabled = upstream parity. These use the post-fix API
* (SetGiveUpRebind) and are NOT expected to compile on the pre-fix base.
*/
package device
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
func waitOpens(t *testing.T, bind *gateBind, want int) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for bind.openCount() < want {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("bind reopened %d times, want %d", bind.openCount(), want)
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// Fresh mode (listen_port not pinned): the rebind must ask the OS for a new
// ephemeral port — Open is called with port 0.
func TestGiveUpRebindFreshPort(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, true)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 0 {
t.Fatalf("rebind requested port %d, want 0 (fresh ephemeral)", ports[1])
}
}
// Pinned mode (explicit listen_port): the rebind must keep the current port.
// chanBind.Open reports its source id (1) as the actual port, so the device
// stores net.port=1 after the first Open and must reuse it.
func TestGiveUpRebindPinnedPortPreserved(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("rebind requested port %d, want 1 (pinned)", ports[1])
}
}
// A second give-up inside the debounce window must not rebind again.
func TestGiveUpRebindDebounce(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("debounce failed: bind opened %d times, want 2", got)
}
}
// Disabled: the give-up branch must behave exactly like upstream — flush and
// stop, no rebind.
func TestGiveUpRebindDisabled(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(false, false)
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("disabled mechanism still rebound: %d opens, want 1", got)
}
}

172
device/lx_giveup_selfheal_test.go
View file

@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 — behavioural red/green test for the handshake give-up
* self-heal. Field failure mode (WARP/AWG after device sleep): the per-flow
* path state of the socket's 5-tuple dies (expired NAT mapping / poisoned DPI
* flow entry), every packet sent from the old socket vanishes, and upstream
* wireguard-go retries into that dead socket forever — only a manual
* reconnect (new socket, new ephemeral port) heals the peer.
*
* The test models the dead 5-tuple with a bind whose FIRST socket generation
* silently swallows every send; any socket opened after a rebind delivers
* normally. It then drives the peer into the give-up branch of
* expiredRetransmitHandshake and expects traffic to flow end to end without
* any reconnect:
*
* - pre-fix (base): give-up only flushes staged packets, the bind is never
* reopened, every retry keeps dying in the first generation -> timeout;
* - post-fix: give-up rebinds the socket and re-initiates -> tunnel comes
* up and the packet arrives.
*
* This file deliberately uses NO post-fix API, so it compiles and runs RED on
* the pre-fix base commit. Reuses the chanBind/chanTun harness from
* transport_padding_test.go.
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
)
// gateBind wraps chanBind: it records every Open (the port argument the
// device asked for) and silently swallows sends while the socket generation
// is at most dropOpens — modelling a dead 5-tuple whose packets vanish on the
// path without any local error.
type gateBind struct {
*chanBind
mu sync.Mutex
openPorts []uint16
opens int
dropOpens int // swallow sends while opens <= dropOpens
}
func (b *gateBind) Open(port uint16) ([]conn.ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
fns, actual, err := b.chanBind.Open(port)
b.mu.Lock()
b.opens++
b.openPorts = append(b.openPorts, port)
b.mu.Unlock()
return fns, actual, err
}
func (b *gateBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, ep conn.Endpoint, offset int) error {
b.mu.Lock()
drop := b.opens <= b.dropOpens
b.mu.Unlock()
if drop {
return nil // the dead 5-tuple: no local error, the packet just vanishes
}
return b.chanBind.Send(bufs, ep, offset)
}
func (b *gateBind) openCount() int {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.opens
}
func (b *gateBind) portsSnapshot() []uint16 {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return append([]uint16(nil), b.openPorts...)
}
type giveUpPair struct {
devA, devB *Device
tunA, tunB *chanTun
bindA *gateBind
pkB NoisePublicKey
}
// newGiveUpPair builds two Up()'d peered devices; devA sits on a gateBind
// whose first socket generation optionally blackholes all sends.
func newGiveUpPair(t *testing.T, dropFirstOpen bool) *giveUpPair {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
rawA, rawB := newChanBindPair()
bindA := &gateBind{chanBind: rawA}
if dropFirstOpen {
bindA.dropOpens = 1
}
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, rawB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
return &giveUpPair{devA: devA, devB: devB, tunA: tunA, tunB: tunB, bindA: bindA, pkB: pkB}
}
// triggerGiveUp drives dev's peer into the give-up branch of
// expiredRetransmitHandshake exactly the way 90s of unanswered retries would:
// attempts past the limit, last initiation older than RekeyTimeout.
func triggerGiveUp(t *testing.T, dev *Device, pk NoisePublicKey) {
t.Helper()
dev.peers.RLock()
peer := dev.peers.keyMap[pk]
dev.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(MaxTimerHandshakes + 1)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
}
// TestHandshakeGiveUpSelfHeal: dead first socket, give-up fires — the tunnel
// must come up and deliver traffic without any reconnect.
func TestHandshakeGiveUpSelfHeal(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
// Traffic demand: stages the packet and sends the first (blackholed)
// initiation, exactly the state a real give-up cycle ends in.
send()
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

63
device/lx_ipcget_awg_test.go
View file

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Pins the AWG get path: IpcGet must report every obfuscation parameter it
* accepted, including i1..i5. The I-slots are emitted by an `i%d=` loop rather
* than literal per-key sendf calls, which makes them easy to miss when auditing
* introspection parity against amneziawg-go by grep alone.
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestIpcGetReportsAWGParams(t *testing.T) {
sk, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey: %v", err)
}
bind, _ := newChanBindPair()
dev := NewDevice(context.Background(), newChanTun(), bind, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "dev: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(dev.Close)
set := strings.Join([]string{
"private_key=" + hex.EncodeToString(sk[:]),
"jc=4", "jmin=40", "jmax=70",
"s1=15", "s2=20", "s3=25", "s4=30",
"h1=1", "h2=2", "h3=3", "h4=100-200",
"i1=<b 0xf6a1>", "i3=<r 8>", "i5=<t>",
"",
}, "\n")
if err := dev.IpcSet(set); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet: %v", err)
}
got, err := dev.IpcGet()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcGet: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("IpcGet:\n%s", got)
for _, want := range []string{
"jc=4", "jmin=40", "jmax=70",
"s1=15", "s2=20", "s3=25", "s4=30",
"h1=1", "h2=2", "h3=3", "h4=100-200",
"i1=<b 0xf6a1>", "i3=<r 8>", "i5=<t>",
} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Errorf("IpcGet missing %q", want)
}
}
// Unset I-slots must stay absent, not surface as empty values.
for _, absent := range []string{"i2=", "i4="} {
if strings.Contains(got, absent) {
t.Errorf("IpcGet reported unset %q", absent)
}
}
}

228
device/lx_stale_rebind_test.go
View file

@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* lx: SPEC 041 v2 — unit tests for the stale predicate, the wake nudge
* (RebindIfSessionStale) and the shared debounce across triggers, on top of
* the v1 harness (lx_giveup_selfheal_test.go). These use the post-fix API and
* are NOT expected to compile on the pre-fix base.
*/
package device
import (
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// establishTunnel completes a real handshake over a healthy pair so the peer
// holds a live keypair and a fresh lastHandshakeNano.
func establishTunnel(t *testing.T, pair *giveUpPair) {
t.Helper()
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
func peerOf(t *testing.T, dev *Device, pk NoisePublicKey) *Peer {
t.Helper()
dev.peers.RLock()
peer := dev.peers.keyMap[pk]
dev.peers.RUnlock()
if peer == nil {
t.Fatal("peer not found")
}
return peer
}
// A cold peer (no keypair yet, nothing to lose): the nudge must rebind and
// immediately initiate — the tunnel comes up without any traffic demand.
func TestNudgeRebindsStaleSession(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a cold (keypair-less) session must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
// The immediate initiation must bring the tunnel up: traffic sent only
// AFTER the nudge flows end to end.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// A healthy session (live keypair, fresh handshake) must be a strict no-op.
func TestNudgeHealthySessionNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
opens := pair.bindA.openCount()
if pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a healthy session must not rebind")
}
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != opens {
t.Fatalf("healthy nudge reopened the bind: %d opens, want %d", got, opens)
}
}
// A live keypair whose last handshake is older than RejectAfterTime is
// provably dead (the keys are invalid): the nudge must rebind.
func TestNudgeExpiredHandshakeIsStale(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
peer.lastHandshakeNano.Store(time.Now().Add(-RejectAfterTime - time.Second).UnixNano())
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on an expired session must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
}
// A down device (how SPEC 020 idle-suspend leaves it) must be a no-op — the
// nudge never wakes sleepers.
func TestNudgeDownDeviceNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
if err := pair.devA.Down(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Down: %v", err)
}
if pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge on a down device must be a no-op")
}
}
// Pinned listen_port survives the nudge rebind.
func TestNudgePinnedPortPreserved(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
pair.devA.SetGiveUpRebind(true, false)
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("nudge must rebind a cold session")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
ports := pair.bindA.portsSnapshot()
if ports[1] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("nudge rebind requested port %d, want 1 (pinned)", ports[1])
}
}
// The debounce window is SHARED across triggers: an early/nudge rebind
// suppresses the give-up rebind of the same failed series, and a later series
// (window elapsed) heals again — sliding window, not a latch.
func TestSharedDebounceAcrossTriggers(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
// First trigger of the series: nudge.
if !pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale() {
t.Fatal("first nudge must rebind")
}
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 2)
// The give-up of the same series lands inside the window: suppressed.
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("give-up inside the shared window rebound: %d opens, want 2", got)
}
// Next series: age the window as wall clocks would — heals again.
pair.devA.giveUpRebind.last.Store(time.Now().Add(-RekeyAttemptTime - time.Second).Unix())
triggerGiveUp(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
waitOpens(t, pair.bindA, 3)
}
// The early trigger must NOT fire before enough initiations went unanswered,
// even against a provably dead session.
func TestEarlyRebindNeedsMinAttempts(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, true)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(0) // this expiry brings it to 1 (< min)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("early rebind fired below the attempt floor: %d opens, want 1", got)
}
}
// A fresh session (live keypair, recent handshake) must keep the retry branch
// byte-for-byte upstream even past the attempt floor: no rebind.
func TestEarlyRebindFreshSessionNoop(t *testing.T) {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
establishTunnel(t, pair)
peer := peerOf(t, pair.devA, pair.pkB)
opens := pair.bindA.openCount()
peer.handshake.mutex.Lock()
peer.handshake.lastSentHandshake = time.Now().Add(-2 * RekeyTimeout)
peer.handshake.mutex.Unlock()
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(earlyGiveUpMinAttempts)
expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer)
time.Sleep(300 * time.Millisecond)
if got := pair.bindA.openCount(); got != opens {
t.Fatalf("early rebind fired on a fresh session: %d opens, want %d", got, opens)
}
}
// Nudge racing Close: no panic, no deadlock, no race-detector report.
func TestNudgeRacesClose(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale()
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.Close()
}()
wg.Wait()
}
}
// Nudge racing Down/Up (the SPEC 020 suspend/resume shape): the device must
// end consistent — up, with a live bind.
func TestNudgeRacesSuspend(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
pair := newGiveUpPair(t, false)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
pair.devA.RebindIfSessionStale()
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
if err := pair.devA.Down(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Down: %v", err)
}
if err := pair.devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Up: %v", err)
}
}()
wg.Wait()
pair.devA.net.RLock()
bindAlive := pair.devA.net.bind != nil
pair.devA.net.RUnlock()
if !bindAlive || !pair.devA.isUp() {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: device inconsistent after nudge/suspend race (bind=%v up=%v)",
i, bindAlive, pair.devA.isUp())
}
pair.devA.Close()
pair.devB.Close()
}
}

65
device/magic-header.go
View file

@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
type magicHeader struct {
start uint32
end uint32
}
func newMagicHeader(spec string) (*magicHeader, error) {
parts := strings.Split(spec, "-")
if len(parts) < 1 || len(parts) > 2 {
return nil, errors.New("bad format")
}
start, err := strconv.ParseUint(parts[0], 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse %s: %w", parts[0], err)
}
var end uint64
if len(parts) > 1 {
end, err = strconv.ParseUint(parts[1], 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse %s: %w", parts[1], err)
}
} else {
end = start
}
if end < start {
return nil, errors.New("wrong range specified")
}
return &magicHeader{
start: uint32(start),
end: uint32(end),
}, nil
}
func (h *magicHeader) GenSpec() string {
if h.start == h.end {
return fmt.Sprintf("%d", h.start)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d", h.start, h.end)
}
func (h *magicHeader) Validate(val uint32) bool {
return h.start <= val && val <= h.end
}
func (h *magicHeader) Generate() uint32 {
// Widen before arithmetic: end-start+1 in uint32 wraps to 0 for the
// full 0..2^32-1 range, which would panic rand.Int (bound <= 0).
high := int64(h.end) - int64(h.start) + 1
r, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(high))
return h.start + uint32(r.Int64())
}

19
device/noise-protocol.go
View file

@ -54,11 +54,10 @@ const (
)
const (
MessageUnknownType uint32 = 0
MessageInitiationType uint32 = 1
MessageResponseType uint32 = 2
MessageCookieReplyType uint32 = 3
MessageTransportType uint32 = 4
MessageInitiationType = 1
MessageResponseType = 2
MessageCookieReplyType = 3
MessageTransportType = 4
)
const (
@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ const (
MessageResponseSize = 92 // size of response message
MessageCookieReplySize = 64 // size of cookie reply message
MessageTransportHeaderSize = 16 // size of data preceding content in transport message
MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize = 0 // lx: zeroed so AmneziaWG obfuscation composes without sagernet headroom (AWG path doesn't use the Bind.Send prepend)
MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize = 8 // size of optional, free (for use by conn.Bind.Send()) space preceding the transport header
MessageTransportSize = MessageTransportHeaderSize + poly1305.TagSize // size of empty transport
MessageKeepaliveSize = MessageTransportSize // size of keepalive
MessageHandshakeSize = MessageInitiationSize // size of largest handshake related message
@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ type Handshake struct {
localEphemeral NoisePrivateKey // ephemeral secret key
localIndex uint32 // used to clear hash-table
remoteIndex uint32 // index for sending
remoteStatic NoisePublicKey // long term key, never changes, can be accessed without mutex
remoteStatic NoisePublicKey // long term key
remoteEphemeral NoisePublicKey // ephemeral public key
precomputedStaticStatic [NoisePublicKeySize]byte // precomputed shared secret
lastTimestamp tai64n.Timestamp
@ -288,10 +287,8 @@ func (device *Device) CreateMessageInitiation(peer *Peer) (*MessageInitiation, e
handshake.mixHash(handshake.remoteStatic[:])
msgType := device.headers.init.Generate()
msg := MessageInitiation{
Type: msgType,
Type: MessageInitiationType,
Ephemeral: handshake.localEphemeral.publicKey(),
}
@ -474,7 +471,7 @@ func (device *Device) CreateMessageResponse(peer *Peer) (*MessageResponse, error
}
var msg MessageResponse
msg.Type = device.headers.response.Generate()
msg.Type = MessageResponseType
msg.Sender = handshake.localIndex
msg.Receiver = handshake.remoteIndex

155
device/obf.go
View file

@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
type obfBuilder func(val string) (obf, error)
// parseObfLen parses and bounds an obfuscator length argument: a negative
// value would panic slice bounds in obfChain.Obfuscate, a huge one would
// OOM in the handshake-time make (SendHandshakeInitiation).
func parseObfLen(val string) (int, error) {
length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if length < 0 || length > MaxMessageSize {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("obfuscator length %d out of range [0, %d]", length, MaxMessageSize)
}
return length, nil
}
var obfBuilders = map[string]obfBuilder{
"b": newBytesObf,
"t": newTimestampObf,
"r": newRandObf,
"rc": newRandCharObf,
"rd": newRandDigitsObf,
"d": newDataObf,
"ds": newDataStringObf,
"dz": newDataSizeObf,
}
type obf interface {
Obfuscate(dst, src []byte)
Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool
ObfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int
DeobfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int
}
type obfChain struct {
Spec string
obfs []obf
}
func newObfChain(spec string) (*obfChain, error) {
var (
obfs []obf
errs []error
)
remaining := spec[:]
for {
start := strings.IndexByte(remaining, '<')
if start == -1 {
break
}
end := strings.IndexByte(remaining[start:], '>')
if end == -1 {
return nil, errors.New("missing enclosing >")
}
end += start
tag := remaining[start+1 : end]
parts := strings.Fields(tag)
if len(parts) == 0 {
errs = append(errs, errors.New("empty tag"))
remaining = remaining[end+1:]
continue
}
key := parts[0]
builder, ok := obfBuilders[key]
if !ok {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("unknown tag <%s>", key))
remaining = remaining[end+1:]
continue
}
val := ""
if len(parts) > 1 {
val = parts[1]
}
o, err := builder(val)
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to build <%s>: %w", key, err))
remaining = remaining[end+1:]
continue
}
obfs = append(obfs, o)
remaining = remaining[end+1:]
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
return nil, errors.Join(errs...)
}
return &obfChain{
Spec: spec,
obfs: obfs,
}, nil
}
func (c *obfChain) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
written := 0
for _, o := range c.obfs {
obfLen := o.ObfuscatedLen(len(src))
o.Obfuscate(dst[written:written+obfLen], src)
written += obfLen
}
}
func (c *obfChain) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
dynamicLen := len(src) - c.ObfuscatedLen(0)
written, read := 0, 0
for _, o := range c.obfs {
deobfLen := o.DeobfuscatedLen(dynamicLen)
obfLen := o.ObfuscatedLen(deobfLen)
if !o.Deobfuscate(dst[written:written+deobfLen], src[read:read+obfLen]) {
return false
}
written += deobfLen
read += obfLen
}
return true
}
func (c *obfChain) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
total := 0
for _, o := range c.obfs {
total += o.ObfuscatedLen(n)
}
return total
}
func (c *obfChain) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
dynamicLen := n - c.ObfuscatedLen(0)
total := 0
for _, o := range c.obfs {
total += o.DeobfuscatedLen(dynamicLen)
}
return total
}

47
device/obf_bytes.go
View file

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"strings"
)
func newBytesObf(val string) (obf, error) {
val = strings.TrimPrefix(val, "0x")
if len(val) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("empty argument")
}
if len(val)%2 != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("odd amount of symbols")
}
bytes, err := hex.DecodeString(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &bytesObf{data: bytes}, nil
}
type bytesObf struct {
data []byte
}
func (o *bytesObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
copy(dst, o.data)
}
func (o *bytesObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
return bytes.Equal(o.data, src[:o.ObfuscatedLen(0)])
}
func (o *bytesObf) ObfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int {
return len(o.data)
}
func (o *bytesObf) DeobfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int {
return 0
}

25
device/obf_data.go
View file

@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
package device
func newDataObf(val string) (obf, error) {
return &dataObf{}, nil
}
type dataObf struct {
}
func (obf *dataObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
copy(dst, src)
}
func (obf *dataObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
copy(dst, src)
return true
}
func (o *dataObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return n
}
func (o *dataObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return n
}

36
device/obf_datasize.go
View file

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
package device
func newDataSizeObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &dataSizeObf{
length: length,
}, nil
}
type dataSizeObf struct {
length int
}
func (o *dataSizeObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
srcLen := len(src)
for i := o.length - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
dst[i] = byte(srcLen & 0xFF)
srcLen >>= 8
}
}
func (o *dataSizeObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
return true
}
func (o *dataSizeObf) ObfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int {
return o.length
}
func (o *dataSizeObf) DeobfuscatedLen(srcLen int) int {
return 0
}

29
device/obf_datastring.go
View file

@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"encoding/base64"
)
func newDataStringObf(val string) (obf, error) {
return &dataStringObf{}, nil
}
type dataStringObf struct {
}
func (o *dataStringObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
base64.RawStdEncoding.Encode(dst, src)
}
func (o *dataStringObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
base64.RawStdEncoding.Decode(dst, src)
return true
}
func (o *dataStringObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodedLen(n)
}
func (o *dataStringObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodedLen(n)
}

108
device/obf_guards_test.go
View file

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Guards around AWG obfuscation config values: these tests pin the
* crash-on-config-value fixes (swapped jmin/jmax, out-of-range obfuscator
* lengths, full-range magic headers).
*/
package device
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"testing"
)
func TestParseObfLen(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
val string
want int
wantErr bool
}{
{"0", 0, false},
{"100", 100, false},
{fmt.Sprintf("%d", MaxMessageSize), MaxMessageSize, false},
{"-1", 0, true}, // would panic slice bounds in Obfuscate
{fmt.Sprintf("%d", MaxMessageSize+1), 0, true}, // would OOM the handshake make
{"2000000000", 0, true},
{"abc", 0, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got, err := parseObfLen(c.val)
if c.wantErr != (err != nil) {
t.Errorf("parseObfLen(%q): err = %v, wantErr = %v", c.val, err, c.wantErr)
}
if err == nil && got != c.want {
t.Errorf("parseObfLen(%q) = %d, want %d", c.val, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestMagicHeaderGenerateFullRange(t *testing.T) {
// end-start+1 computed in uint32 wraps to 0 for the full range and
// panics rand.Int; the fix widens to int64 before the arithmetic.
h := &magicHeader{start: 0, end: ^uint32(0)}
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
v := h.Generate()
if !h.Validate(v) {
t.Fatalf("generated value %d outside range", v)
}
}
}
// TestJunkSwappedBounds brings up a device pair whose junk config has
// jmin > jmax (passes per-field UAPI validation); without the swap guard
// the first handshake panics rand.Int with a non-positive bound.
func TestJunkSwappedBounds(t *testing.T) {
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
bindA, bindB := newChanBindPair()
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, bindB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
// jmin deliberately greater than jmax: each field alone is valid.
junk := "jc=2\njmin=100\njmax=50\n"
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), junk, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\n%sreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), junk, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
// Drive a packet end-to-end: the handshake (junk packets included)
// must complete without panicking the process.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 28)
devA.InputPacket(testIPB.AsSlice(), [][]byte{pkt})
awaitPacket(t, tunB, pkt, func() {
devA.InputPacket(testIPB.AsSlice(), [][]byte{pkt})
})
}

38
device/obf_rand.go
View file

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
)
func newRandObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &randObf{
length: length,
}, nil
}
type randObf struct {
length int
}
func (o *randObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
rand.Read(dst[:o.length])
}
func (o *randObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
// there is no way to validate randomness :)
// assume that it is always true
return true
}
func (o *randObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return o.length
}
func (o *randObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return 0
}

47
device/obf_randchars.go
View file

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"unicode"
)
const chars52 = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
func newRandCharObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &randCharObf{
length: length,
}, nil
}
type randCharObf struct {
length int
}
func (o *randCharObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
rand.Read(dst[:o.length])
for i := range dst[:o.length] {
dst[i] = chars52[dst[i]%52]
}
}
func (o *randCharObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
for _, b := range src[:o.length] {
if !unicode.IsLetter(rune(b)) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (o *randCharObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return o.length
}
func (o *randCharObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return 0
}

47
device/obf_randdigits.go
View file

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"crypto/rand"
"unicode"
)
const digits10 = "0123456789"
func newRandDigitsObf(val string) (obf, error) {
length, err := parseObfLen(val)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &randDigitObf{
length: length,
}, nil
}
type randDigitObf struct {
length int
}
func (o *randDigitObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
rand.Read(dst[:o.length])
for i := range dst[:o.length] {
dst[i] = digits10[dst[i]%10]
}
}
func (o *randDigitObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
for _, b := range src[:o.length] {
if !unicode.IsDigit(rune(b)) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (o *randDigitObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return o.length
}
func (o *randDigitObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return 0
}

31
device/obf_timestamp.go
View file

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
package device
import (
"encoding/binary"
"time"
)
func newTimestampObf(_ string) (obf, error) {
return &timestampObf{}, nil
}
type timestampObf struct{}
func (o *timestampObf) Obfuscate(dst, src []byte) {
t := uint32(time.Now().Unix())
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(dst, t)
}
func (o *timestampObf) Deobfuscate(dst, src []byte) bool {
// replay attack check?
// requires time to be always synchronized
return true
}
func (o *timestampObf) ObfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return 4
}
func (o *timestampObf) DeobfuscatedLen(n int) int {
return 0
}

88
device/receive.go
View file

@ -76,10 +76,7 @@ func (peer *Peer) keepKeyFreshReceiving() {
* Every time the bind is updated a new routine is started for
* IPv4 and IPv6 (separately)
*/
func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(
maxBatchSize int,
recv conn.ReceiveFunc,
) {
func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(maxBatchSize int, recv conn.ReceiveFunc) {
recvName := recv.PrettyName()
defer func() {
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming %s - stopped", recvName)
@ -142,14 +139,9 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(
}
// check size of packet
packet := bufsArrs[i][:size]
// get message padding and type based on information from S1-S4 and H1-H4
msgType, padding := device.DeterminePacketTypeAndPadding(packet, MessageUnknownType)
if padding > 0 {
copy(packet, packet[padding:])
packet = packet[:len(packet)-padding]
}
packet := bufsArrs[i][:size]
msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[:4])
switch msgType {
@ -291,6 +283,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker %d - started", id)
for elem := range device.queue.handshake.c {
// handle cookie fields and ratelimiting
switch elem.msgType {
@ -317,14 +310,9 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
// consume reply
if peer := entry.peer; peer.isRunning.Load() {
device.log.Verbosef(
"Receiving cookie response from %s",
elem.endpoint.DstToString(),
)
device.log.Verbosef("Receiving cookie response from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString())
if !peer.cookieGenerator.ConsumeReply(&reply) {
device.log.Verbosef(
"Could not decrypt invalid cookie response",
)
device.log.Verbosef("Could not decrypt invalid cookie response")
}
}
@ -366,7 +354,9 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
switch elem.msgType {
case MessageInitiationType:
// unmarshal
var msg MessageInitiation
err := msg.unmarshal(elem.packet)
if err != nil {
@ -374,8 +364,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
goto skip
}
// have to reassign msgType for ranged msgType to work
msg.Type = elem.msgType
// consume initiation
peer := device.ConsumeMessageInitiation(&msg, elem.endpoint)
if peer == nil {
@ -407,9 +396,6 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
goto skip
}
// have to reassign msgType for ranged msgType to work
msg.Type = elem.msgType
// consume response
peer := device.ConsumeMessageResponse(&msg)
@ -439,7 +425,6 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake(id int) {
peer.timersSessionDerived()
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendPriorityMessage()
peer.SendKeepalive()
}
skip:
@ -508,7 +493,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) processInboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueInboundElementsCo
if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) {
peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint)
peer.timersHandshakeComplete()
peer.SendPriorityMessage()
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
if ep, ok := elem.endpoint.(conn.PeerAwareEndpoint); ok {
@ -587,57 +571,3 @@ func (peer *Peer) processInboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueInboundElementsCo
device.PutInboundElement(elem)
}
}
func (device *Device) DeterminePacketTypeAndPadding(packet []byte, expectedType uint32) (uint32, int) {
size := len(packet)
if expectedType == MessageUnknownType || expectedType == MessageInitiationType {
padding := device.paddings.init
header := device.headers.init
if size == padding+MessageInitiationSize {
data := packet[padding:]
if header.Validate(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data)) {
return MessageInitiationType, padding
}
}
}
if expectedType == MessageUnknownType || expectedType == MessageResponseType {
padding := device.paddings.response
header := device.headers.response
if size == padding+MessageResponseSize {
data := packet[padding:]
if header.Validate(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data)) {
return MessageResponseType, padding
}
}
}
if expectedType == MessageUnknownType || expectedType == MessageCookieReplyType {
padding := device.paddings.cookie
header := device.headers.cookie
if size == padding+MessageCookieReplySize {
data := packet[padding:]
if header.Validate(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data)) {
return MessageCookieReplyType, padding
}
}
}
if expectedType == MessageUnknownType || expectedType == MessageTransportType {
padding := device.paddings.transport
header := device.headers.transport
if size >= padding+MessageTransportHeaderSize {
data := packet[padding:]
if header.Validate(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data)) {
return MessageTransportType, padding
}
}
}
return MessageUnknownType, 0
}

234
device/send.go
View file

@ -6,12 +6,9 @@
package device
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
@ -110,70 +107,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendKeepalive() {
peer.SendStagedPackets()
}
// SendPriorityMessage invokes the [PeerPriorityMessageFunc] callback if one is
// set, and queues the returned message for encryption and transmission if the
// current keypair is valid.
func (peer *Peer) SendPriorityMessage() {
f := peer.device.priorityMsgFn.Load()
if f == nil {
return
}
keypair := peer.keypairs.Current()
if keypair == nil || keypair.sendNonce.Load() >= RejectAfterMessages || time.Since(keypair.created) >= RejectAfterTime {
// SendStagedPackets initializes a handshake when the keypair is invalid,
// but we explicitly avoid that here. A priority message is only intended
// to flow around symmetric session establishment, but it should never
// trigger a new session. Reaching this branch due to nonce exhaustion
// or keypair expiration is highly unlikely considering where
// SendPriorityMessage is called (at current keypair establishment).
return
}
// get plaintext message to send
msg := (*f)(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
if len(msg) == 0 {
return
}
if len(msg) > MaxPriorityMessageContentSize {
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%v - Failed to queue priority message due to size", peer)
return
}
// get pooled elements
elem := peer.device.NewOutboundElement()
elemsContainer := peer.device.GetOutboundElementsContainer()
elemsContainer.elems = append(elemsContainer.elems, elem)
packetQueued := false
defer func() {
if !packetQueued {
peer.device.PutOutboundBuffer(elem.buffer)
peer.device.PutOutboundElement(elem)
peer.device.PutOutboundElementsContainer(elemsContainer)
}
}()
// initialize outbound element
const offset = MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize
n := copy(elem.buffer[offset:], msg)
elem.packet = elem.buffer[offset : offset+n]
elem.peer = peer
elem.nonce = keypair.sendNonce.Add(1) - 1
if elem.nonce >= RejectAfterMessages {
keypair.sendNonce.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
return
}
elem.keypair = keypair
// add to parallel and sequential queue
if peer.isRunning.Load() {
elemsContainer.filling.Add(1)
peer.queuedOutboundPackets.Add(1)
peer.queue.outbound.c <- elemsContainer
peer.device.queue.encryption.c <- elemsContainer
packetQueued = true
}
}
func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeInitiation(isRetry bool) error {
if !isRetry {
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Store(0)
@ -202,53 +135,15 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeInitiation(isRetry bool) error {
return err
}
var sendBuffer [][]byte
for _, ipacket := range peer.device.ipackets {
if ipacket != nil {
buf := make([]byte, ipacket.ObfuscatedLen(0))
ipacket.Obfuscate(buf, nil)
sendBuffer = append(sendBuffer, buf)
}
}
jc := peer.device.junk.count
jmin := peer.device.junk.min
jmax := peer.device.junk.max
if jmax < jmin {
// UAPI validates jmin/jmax only individually; a swapped pair
// would panic rand.Int below with a non-positive bound.
jmin, jmax = jmax, jmin
}
for i := 0; i < jc; i++ {
nBig, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(jmax-jmin+1)))
n := int(nBig.Int64()) + jmin
buf := make([]byte, n)
rand.Read(buf)
sendBuffer = append(sendBuffer, buf)
}
var buf [MessageInitiationSize]byte
writer := bytes.NewBuffer(buf[:0])
binary.Write(writer, binary.LittleEndian, msg)
packet := writer.Bytes()
buf := make([]byte, MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageInitiationSize)
packet := buf[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize:]
_ = msg.marshal(packet)
peer.cookieGenerator.AddMacs(packet)
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketSent()
if padding := peer.device.paddings.init; padding > 0 {
buf := make([]byte, padding+len(packet))
rand.Read(buf[:padding])
copy(buf[padding:], packet)
packet = buf
}
sendBuffer = append(sendBuffer, packet)
err = peer.SendBuffers(sendBuffer)
err = peer.SendBuffers([][]byte{buf})
if err != nil {
peer.device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to send handshake initiation: %v", peer, err)
}
@ -270,11 +165,9 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeResponse() error {
return err
}
var buf [MessageResponseSize]byte
writer := bytes.NewBuffer(buf[:0])
binary.Write(writer, binary.LittleEndian, response)
packet := writer.Bytes()
buf := make([]byte, MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageResponseSize)
packet := buf[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize:]
_ = response.marshal(packet)
peer.cookieGenerator.AddMacs(packet)
err = peer.BeginSymmetricSession()
@ -287,15 +180,8 @@ func (peer *Peer) SendHandshakeResponse() error {
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal()
peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketSent()
if padding := peer.device.paddings.response; padding > 0 {
buf := make([]byte, padding+len(packet))
rand.Read(buf[:padding])
copy(buf[padding:], packet)
packet = buf
}
// TODO: allocation could be avoided
err = peer.SendBuffers([][]byte{packet})
err = peer.SendBuffers([][]byte{buf})
if err != nil {
peer.device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to send handshake response: %v", peer, err)
}
@ -306,33 +192,18 @@ func (device *Device) SendHandshakeCookie(initiatingElem *QueueHandshakeElement)
device.log.Verbosef("Sending cookie response for denied handshake message for %v", initiatingElem.endpoint.DstToString())
sender := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(initiatingElem.packet[4:8])
msgType := device.headers.cookie.Generate()
reply, err := device.cookieChecker.CreateReply(
initiatingElem.packet,
sender,
initiatingElem.endpoint.DstToBytes(),
msgType,
)
reply, err := device.cookieChecker.CreateReply(initiatingElem.packet, sender, initiatingElem.endpoint.DstToBytes())
if err != nil {
device.log.Errorf("Failed to create cookie reply: %v", err)
return err
}
var buf [MessageCookieReplySize]byte
writer := bytes.NewBuffer(buf[:0])
binary.Write(writer, binary.LittleEndian, reply)
packet := writer.Bytes()
if padding := device.paddings.cookie; padding > 0 {
buf := make([]byte, padding+len(packet))
rand.Read(buf[:padding])
copy(buf[padding:], packet)
packet = buf
}
buf := make([]byte, MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+MessageCookieReplySize)
packet := buf[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize:]
_ = reply.marshal(packet)
// TODO: allocation could be avoided
device.net.bind.Send([][]byte{packet}, initiatingElem.endpoint, 0)
device.net.bind.Send([][]byte{buf}, initiatingElem.endpoint, MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize)
return nil
}
@ -468,51 +339,8 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineReadFromTUN() {
// each), so without this cap a flood is buffered instead of dropped.
const maxQueuedInputPackets = 2048
func (device *Device) inputPacketPeer(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) *Peer {
var src, dst netip.Addr
switch len(destination) {
case net.IPv4len:
dst = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte(destination))
var srcBytes [net.IPv4len]byte
if !gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices, IPv4offsetSrc, srcBytes[:]) {
return nil
}
src = netip.AddrFrom4(srcBytes)
case net.IPv6len:
dst = netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte(destination))
var srcBytes [net.IPv6len]byte
if !gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices, IPv6offsetSrc, srcBytes[:]) {
return nil
}
src = netip.AddrFrom16(srcBytes)
default:
return nil
}
var ipPkt []byte
if len(packetSlices) == 1 {
ipPkt = packetSlices[0]
}
return device.allowedips.LookupFromPacket(src, dst, ipPkt)
}
func gatherPacketBytes(packetSlices [][]byte, offset int, destination []byte) bool {
for _, packetSlice := range packetSlices {
if offset >= len(packetSlice) {
offset -= len(packetSlice)
continue
}
n := copy(destination, packetSlice[offset:])
destination = destination[n:]
offset = 0
if len(destination) == 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (device *Device) InputPacket(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) {
peer := device.inputPacketPeer(destination, packetSlices)
peer := device.allowedips.Lookup(destination)
if peer == nil {
return
}
@ -523,9 +351,7 @@ func (device *Device) InputPacket(destination []byte, packetSlices [][]byte) {
for _, packetSlice := range packetSlices {
totalLength += len(packetSlice)
}
// paddings.transport (AWG s4) is prepended in-buffer by
// RoutineSequentialSender; reserve headroom for the shift.
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead + device.paddings.transport
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead
if allocLength > MaxMessageSize {
return
}
@ -559,7 +385,7 @@ func (device *Device) InputPackets(packets []*InputPacketRef) []*InputPacketRef
var unmatched []*InputPacketRef
elemsByPeer := make(map[*Peer][]*QueueOutboundElementsContainer, len(packets))
for _, packetRef := range packets {
peer := device.inputPacketPeer(packetRef.Destination, packetRef.PacketSlices)
peer := device.allowedips.Lookup(packetRef.Destination)
if peer == nil {
unmatched = append(unmatched, packetRef)
continue
@ -571,9 +397,7 @@ func (device *Device) InputPackets(packets []*InputPacketRef) []*InputPacketRef
for _, packetSlice := range packetRef.PacketSlices {
totalLength += len(packetSlice)
}
// paddings.transport (AWG s4) is prepended in-buffer by
// RoutineSequentialSender; reserve headroom for the shift.
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead + device.paddings.transport
allocLength := MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize + MessageTransportHeaderSize + totalLength + PaddingMultiple + chacha20poly1305.Overhead
if allocLength > MaxMessageSize {
continue
}
@ -756,9 +580,7 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineEncryption(id int) {
fieldReceiver := header[4:8]
fieldNonce := header[8:16]
msgType := device.headers.transport.Generate()
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(fieldType, msgType)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(fieldType, MessageTransportType)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(fieldReceiver, elem.keypair.remoteIndex)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(fieldNonce, elem.nonce)
@ -775,6 +597,9 @@ func (device *Device) RoutineEncryption(id int) {
elem.packet,
nil,
)
// re-slice packet to include encapsulating transport space
elem.packet = elem.buffer[:MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize+len(elem.packet)]
}
elemsContainer.filling.Done()
}
@ -788,7 +613,7 @@ func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialSender(maxBatchSize int) {
}()
device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential sender - started", peer)
bufs := make([][]byte, 0, max(maxBatchSize, conn.IdealBatchSize))
bufs := make([][]byte, 0, maxBatchSize)
for elemsContainer := range peer.queue.outbound.c {
if elemsContainer == nil {
@ -843,19 +668,6 @@ func (peer *Peer) processOutboundContainer(elemsContainer *QueueOutboundElements
if len(elem.packet[MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize:]) != MessageKeepaliveSize {
dataSent = true
}
// lx:begin awg (SPEC 025 — AmneziaWG transport padding, S4)
// Prepend `transport` random bytes ahead of the transport header. The AWG
// path zeroes MessageEncapsulatingTransportSize (see noise-protocol.go), so
// elem.packet starts at buffer offset 0 and this shift is what creates the
// prefix; the buffer is allocated with PaddingMultiple headroom.
if padding := device.paddings.transport; padding > 0 {
for i := len(elem.packet) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
elem.buffer[i+padding] = elem.buffer[i]
}
rand.Read(elem.buffer[:padding])
elem.packet = elem.buffer[:padding+len(elem.packet)]
}
// lx:end awg
scratch = append(scratch, elem.packet)
}

15
device/timers.go
View file

@ -99,25 +99,10 @@ func expiredRetransmitHandshake(peer *Peer) {
peer.timers.zeroKeyMaterial.Mod(RejectAfterTime * 3)
}
peer.noteSessionHandshakeStopped()
/* lx: SPEC 041 — the exhausted cycle just proved the current socket's
* 5-tuple dead (90s of initiations, zero replies). Rebind once and
* re-initiate, so a stale NAT mapping / poisoned DPI flow entry cannot
* pin this peer to a dead socket until a manual reconnect. Runs after
* the session-state notification so a consumer sees "handshake stopped"
* before the socket is recreated. */
peer.device.handleHandshakeGiveUp(peer)
} else {
peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Add(1)
peer.device.log.Verbosef("%s - Handshake did not complete after %d seconds, retrying (try %d)", peer, int(RekeyTimeout.Seconds()), peer.timers.handshakeAttempts.Load()+1)
/* lx: SPEC 041 v2 — early self-heal: >=3 unanswered initiations against
* a provably dead session (no live keypair, or last handshake older
* than RejectAfterTime) prove the 5-tuple dead without waiting out the
* full cycle. Rebind now (debounced with the give-up trigger below);
* the retry cycle itself continues untouched. */
peer.device.maybeEarlyGiveUpRebind(peer)
/* We clear the endpoint address src address, in case this is the cause of trouble. */
peer.markEndpointSrcForClearing()

361
device/transport_padding_test.go
View file

@ -1,361 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Regression test for the AWG transport-padding (uapi "s4") out-of-bounds
* crash: RoutineSequentialSender shifts elem.packet right by
* device.paddings.transport bytes inside elem.buffer to prepend a random
* padding prefix, but the injection paths (InputPacket/InputPackets)
* allocated elem.buffer tightly, without headroom for that shift:
*
* panic: runtime error: index out of range [123] with length 76
* device.(*Peer).RoutineSequentialSender
*
* (payload 28 bytes -> allocLength 76, sealed packet 64, s4=60 -> 63+60=123).
*
* The tests spin up two real Devices wired together through an in-memory
* conn.Bind (Go channels) and an in-memory tun.Device, configure s4=60 on
* both sides, and pass a small IPv4 packet end to end via both outbound
* paths: Device.InputPacket (the crashing path) and the regular tun read
* loop (in-place shift path).
*/
package device
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/conn"
"github.com/sagernet/wireguard-go/tun"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
const testTransportPadding = 60 // uapi s4, matches the on-device crash
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory conn.Bind over Go channels (minimal bindtest.ChannelBind clone).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type chanEndpoint uint16
func (e chanEndpoint) ClearSrc() {}
func (e chanEndpoint) SrcToString() string { return "" }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstToString() string { return fmt.Sprintf("127.0.0.1:%d", uint16(e)) }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstToBytes() []byte { return []byte{byte(e), byte(e >> 8)} }
func (e chanEndpoint) DstIP() netip.Addr { return netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{127, 0, 0, 1}) }
func (e chanEndpoint) SrcIP() netip.Addr { return netip.Addr{} }
type chanBind struct {
rx, tx chan []byte
source chanEndpoint // "port" this bind listens on
target chanEndpoint // endpoint of the opposite bind
mu sync.Mutex
closeSignal chan struct{} // recreated on every Open (BindUpdate closes+reopens)
}
// newChanBindPair returns two Binds whose Send/Receive are cross-wired.
func newChanBindPair() (*chanBind, *chanBind) {
aToB := make(chan []byte, 1024)
bToA := make(chan []byte, 1024)
a := &chanBind{rx: bToA, tx: aToB, source: 1, target: 2}
b := &chanBind{rx: aToB, tx: bToA, source: 2, target: 1}
return a, b
}
func (b *chanBind) currentCloseSignal() chan struct{} {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.closeSignal
}
func (b *chanBind) Open(port uint16) ([]conn.ReceiveFunc, uint16, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
b.closeSignal = make(chan struct{})
closeSignal := b.closeSignal
b.mu.Unlock()
fn := func(packets [][]byte, sizes []int, eps []conn.Endpoint) (int, error) {
select {
case <-closeSignal:
// Must be net.ErrClosed: RoutineReceiveIncoming treats anything
// else as a transient error and death-spirals before exiting.
return 0, net.ErrClosed
case pkt, ok := <-b.rx:
if !ok {
return 0, net.ErrClosed
}
sizes[0] = copy(packets[0], pkt)
eps[0] = b.target
return 1, nil
}
}
return []conn.ReceiveFunc{fn}, uint16(b.source), nil
}
func (b *chanBind) Close() error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.closeSignal != nil {
select {
case <-b.closeSignal:
default:
close(b.closeSignal)
}
}
return nil
}
func (b *chanBind) SetMark(mark uint32) error { return nil }
func (b *chanBind) Send(bufs [][]byte, ep conn.Endpoint, offset int) error {
closeSignal := b.currentCloseSignal()
if closeSignal == nil {
return net.ErrClosed
}
for _, buf := range bufs {
pkt := make([]byte, len(buf)-offset)
copy(pkt, buf[offset:])
select {
case <-closeSignal:
return net.ErrClosed
case b.tx <- pkt:
}
}
return nil
}
func (b *chanBind) ParseEndpoint(s string) (conn.Endpoint, error) { return b.target, nil }
func (b *chanBind) BatchSize() int { return 1 }
func (b *chanBind) SetReservedForEndpoint(destination netip.AddrPort, reserved [3]byte) {}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory tun.Device over Go channels (minimal tuntest.ChannelTUN clone).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type chanTun struct {
toDevice chan []byte // packets the device Reads (outbound plaintext)
fromDevice chan []byte // packets the device Writes (inbound plaintext)
events chan tun.Event
closed chan struct{}
closeOnce sync.Once
}
func newChanTun() *chanTun {
return &chanTun{
toDevice: make(chan []byte, 1024),
fromDevice: make(chan []byte, 1024),
events: make(chan tun.Event, 4),
closed: make(chan struct{}),
}
}
func (t *chanTun) File() *os.File { return nil }
func (t *chanTun) Read(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (int, error) {
select {
case <-t.closed:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
case pkt, ok := <-t.toDevice:
if !ok {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
sizes[0] = copy(bufs[0][offset:], pkt)
return 1, nil
}
}
func (t *chanTun) Write(bufs [][]byte, offset int) (int, error) {
for _, buf := range bufs {
pkt := make([]byte, len(buf)-offset)
copy(pkt, buf[offset:])
select {
case <-t.closed:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
case t.fromDevice <- pkt:
}
}
return len(bufs), nil
}
func (t *chanTun) MTU() (int, error) { return DefaultMTU, nil }
func (t *chanTun) Name() (string, error) { return "chantun", nil }
func (t *chanTun) Events() <-chan tun.Event { return t.events }
func (t *chanTun) BatchSize() int { return 1 }
func (t *chanTun) Close() error {
t.closeOnce.Do(func() {
close(t.closed)
close(t.events)
})
return nil
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test scaffolding.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
var (
testIPA = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
testIPB = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
)
// buildIPv4Packet builds a minimal, routable IPv4/UDP packet whose header
// fields satisfy the receive-side validation in RoutineSequentialReceiver
// (version, total-length field, allowed source address).
func buildIPv4Packet(src, dst netip.Addr, payloadLen int) []byte {
total := ipv4.HeaderLen + payloadLen
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[IPv4offsetTotalLength:IPv4offsetTotalLength+2], uint16(total))
pkt[8] = 64 // TTL
pkt[9] = 17 // protocol: UDP
copy(pkt[IPv4offsetSrc:], src.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[IPv4offsetDst:], dst.AsSlice())
for i := ipv4.HeaderLen; i < total; i++ {
pkt[i] = byte(i) // deterministic payload
}
return pkt
}
type paddedPair struct {
devA, devB *Device
tunA, tunB *chanTun
}
// newPaddedDevicePair builds two Up()'d devices peered with each other over
// the channel bind, both configured with s4 (transport padding) enabled.
func newPaddedDevicePair(t *testing.T) *paddedPair {
t.Helper()
skA, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey A: %v", err)
}
skB, err := newPrivateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newPrivateKey B: %v", err)
}
pkA := skA.publicKey()
pkB := skB.publicKey()
bindA, bindB := newChanBindPair()
tunA := newChanTun()
tunB := newChanTun()
devA := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunA, bindA, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devA: "), 1)
devB := NewDevice(context.Background(), tunB, bindB, NewLogger(LogLevelError, "devB: "), 1)
t.Cleanup(devA.Close)
t.Cleanup(devB.Close)
cfgA := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\ns4=%d\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:2\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skA[:]), testTransportPadding, hex.EncodeToString(pkB[:]), testIPB)
cfgB := fmt.Sprintf(
"private_key=%s\ns4=%d\nreplace_peers=true\npublic_key=%s\nendpoint=127.0.0.1:1\nallowed_ip=%s/32\n",
hex.EncodeToString(skB[:]), testTransportPadding, hex.EncodeToString(pkA[:]), testIPA)
if err := devA.IpcSet(cfgA); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.IpcSet(cfgB); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("IpcSet B: %v", err)
}
if devA.paddings.transport != testTransportPadding {
t.Fatalf("s4 not applied: paddings.transport = %d", devA.paddings.transport)
}
if err := devA.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up A: %v", err)
}
if err := devB.Up(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Up B: %v", err)
}
return &paddedPair{devA: devA, devB: devB, tunA: tunA, tunB: tunB}
}
// awaitPacket waits for want to arrive on the receiving tun, periodically
// re-sending via resend (injection has no delivery guarantee before the
// handshake completes).
func awaitPacket(t *testing.T, from *chanTun, want []byte, resend func()) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.After(20 * time.Second)
retry := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Second)
defer retry.Stop()
for {
select {
case got := <-from.fromDevice:
if bytes.Equal(got, want) {
return
}
t.Logf("ignoring unexpected packet, len=%d", len(got))
case <-retry.C:
resend()
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for packet on peer tun")
}
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestTransportPaddingInputPacket exercises the exact crash path: an injected
// packet (Device.InputPacket) whose buffer was allocated by payload size.
// With s4=60 and a 28-byte IPv4 packet the pre-fix buffer was 76 bytes and
// the padding shift indexed [123] -> index out of range.
func TestTransportPaddingInputPacket(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
// 20-byte header + 8-byte payload = 28 bytes, the on-device crash size.
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
dst := testIPB.AsSlice()
send := func() { pair.devA.InputPacket(dst, [][]byte{pkt}) }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// TestTransportPaddingInputPackets covers the batched injection path
// (Device.InputPackets), which had the same tight allocation.
func TestTransportPaddingInputPackets(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
refs := []*InputPacketRef{{
Destination: testIPB.AsSlice(),
PacketSlices: [][]byte{pkt[:12], pkt[12:]}, // multi-slice on purpose
}}
send := func() {
if unmatched := pair.devA.InputPackets(refs); len(unmatched) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("InputPackets returned %d unmatched refs", len(unmatched))
}
}
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}
// TestTransportPaddingTunPath covers the regular outbound path (tun read
// loop), whose MaxMessageSize buffers take the in-place shift branch.
func TestTransportPaddingTunPath(t *testing.T) {
pair := newPaddedDevicePair(t)
pkt := buildIPv4Packet(testIPA, testIPB, 8)
send := func() { pair.tunA.toDevice <- pkt }
send()
awaitPacket(t, pair.tunB, pkt, send)
}

291
device/uapi.go
View file

@ -97,56 +97,6 @@ func (device *Device) IpcGetOperation(w io.Writer) error {
sendf("fwmark=%d", device.net.fwmark)
}
if device.junk.count != 0 {
sendf("jc=%d", device.junk.count)
}
if device.junk.min != 0 {
sendf("jmin=%d", device.junk.min)
}
if device.junk.max != 0 {
sendf("jmax=%d", device.junk.max)
}
if device.paddings.init != 0 {
sendf("s1=%d", device.paddings.init)
}
if device.paddings.response != 0 {
sendf("s2=%d", device.paddings.response)
}
if device.paddings.cookie != 0 {
sendf("s3=%d", device.paddings.cookie)
}
if device.paddings.transport != 0 {
sendf("s4=%d", device.paddings.transport)
}
if device.headers.init != nil {
sendf("h1=%s", device.headers.init.GenSpec())
}
if device.headers.response != nil {
sendf("h2=%s", device.headers.response.GenSpec())
}
if device.headers.cookie != nil {
sendf("h3=%s", device.headers.cookie.GenSpec())
}
if device.headers.transport != nil {
sendf("h4=%s", device.headers.transport.GenSpec())
}
for i, ipacket := range device.ipackets {
if ipacket != nil {
sendf("i%d=%s", i+1, ipacket.Spec)
}
}
for _, peer := range device.peers.keyMap {
// Serialize peer state.
peer.handshake.mutex.RLock()
@ -197,7 +147,6 @@ func (device *Device) IpcSetOperation(r io.Reader) (err error) {
}
}()
ipcDev := new(ipcSetDevice)
peer := new(ipcSetPeer)
deviceConfig := true
@ -206,20 +155,12 @@ func (device *Device) IpcSetOperation(r io.Reader) (err error) {
line := scanner.Text()
if line == "" {
// Blank line means terminate operation.
err := ipcDev.mergeWithDevice(device)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to merge with device: %w", err)
}
peer.handlePostConfig()
return nil
}
key, value, ok := strings.Cut(line, "=")
if !ok {
return ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorProtocol,
"failed to parse line %q",
line,
)
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorProtocol, "failed to parse line %q", line)
}
if key == "public_key" {
@ -245,10 +186,6 @@ func (device *Device) IpcSetOperation(r io.Reader) (err error) {
return err
}
}
err = ipcDev.mergeWithDevice(device)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to merge with device: %w", err)
}
peer.handlePostConfig()
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
@ -298,155 +235,11 @@ func (device *Device) handleDeviceLine(key, value string) error {
case "replace_peers":
if value != "true" {
return ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorInvalid,
"failed to set replace_peers, invalid value: %v",
value,
)
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to set replace_peers, invalid value: %v", value)
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Removing all peers")
device.RemoveAllPeers()
case "jc":
jc, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse jc: %w", err)
}
if jc <= 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "jc must be a positive value")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating junk count")
device.junk.count = jc
case "jmin":
jmin, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse jmin: %w", err)
}
if jmin <= 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "jmin must be a positive value")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating junk min")
device.junk.min = jmin
case "jmax":
jmax, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse jmax: %w", err)
}
if jmax <= 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "jmax must be a positive value")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating junk max")
device.junk.max = jmax
case "s1":
padding, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse s1: %w", err)
}
if padding < 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "s1 must be non-negative")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating s1 padding")
device.paddings.init = padding
case "s2":
padding, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse s2: %w", err)
}
if padding < 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "s2 must be non-negative")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating s2 padding")
device.paddings.response = padding
case "s3":
padding, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse s3: %w", err)
}
if padding < 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "s3 must be non-negative")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating s3 padding")
device.paddings.cookie = padding
case "s4":
padding, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse s4: %w", err)
}
if padding < 0 {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "s4 must be non-negative")
}
device.log.Verbosef("UAPI: Updating s4 padding")
device.paddings.transport = padding
case "h1":
header, err := newMagicHeader(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse H1: %w", err)
}
device.headers.init = header
case "h2":
header, err := newMagicHeader(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse H2: %w", err)
}
device.headers.response = header
case "h3":
header, err := newMagicHeader(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse H3: %w", err)
}
device.headers.cookie = header
case "h4":
header, err := newMagicHeader(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse H4: %w", err)
}
device.headers.transport = header
case "i1":
chain, err := newObfChain(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse I1: %w", err)
}
device.ipackets[0] = chain
case "i2":
chain, err := newObfChain(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse I2: %w", err)
}
device.ipackets[1] = chain
case "i3":
chain, err := newObfChain(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse I3: %w", err)
}
device.ipackets[2] = chain
case "i4":
chain, err := newObfChain(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse I4: %w", err)
}
device.ipackets[3] = chain
case "i5":
chain, err := newObfChain(value)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to parse I5: %w", err)
}
device.ipackets[4] = chain
default:
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "invalid UAPI device key: %v", key)
}
@ -478,10 +271,7 @@ func (peer *ipcSetPeer) handlePostConfig() {
}
}
func (device *Device) handlePublicKeyLine(
peer *ipcSetPeer,
value string,
) error {
func (device *Device) handlePublicKeyLine(peer *ipcSetPeer, value string) error {
// Load/create the peer we are configuring.
var publicKey NoisePublicKey
err := publicKey.FromHex(value)
@ -511,19 +301,12 @@ func (device *Device) handlePublicKeyLine(
return nil
}
func (device *Device) handlePeerLine(
peer *ipcSetPeer,
key, value string,
) error {
func (device *Device) handlePeerLine(peer *ipcSetPeer, key, value string) error {
switch key {
case "update_only":
// allow disabling of creation
if value != "true" {
return ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorInvalid,
"failed to set update only, invalid value: %v",
value,
)
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to set update only, invalid value: %v", value)
}
if peer.created && !peer.dummy {
device.RemovePeer(peer.handshake.remoteStatic)
@ -569,11 +352,7 @@ func (device *Device) handlePeerLine(
secs, err := strconv.ParseUint(value, 10, 16)
if err != nil {
return ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorInvalid,
"failed to set persistent keepalive interval: %w",
err,
)
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to set persistent keepalive interval: %w", err)
}
old := peer.persistentKeepaliveInterval.Swap(uint32(secs))
@ -584,11 +363,7 @@ func (device *Device) handlePeerLine(
case "replace_allowed_ips":
device.log.Verbosef("%v - UAPI: Removing all allowedips", peer.Peer)
if value != "true" {
return ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorInvalid,
"failed to replace allowedips, invalid value: %v",
value,
)
return ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "failed to replace allowedips, invalid value: %v", value)
}
if peer.dummy {
return nil
@ -667,11 +442,7 @@ func (device *Device) IpcHandle(socket net.Conn) {
return
}
if nextByte != '\n' {
err = ipcErrorf(
ipc.IpcErrorInvalid,
"trailing character in UAPI get: %q",
nextByte,
)
err = ipcErrorf(ipc.IpcErrorInvalid, "trailing character in UAPI get: %q", nextByte)
break
}
err = device.IpcGetOperation(buffered.Writer)
@ -695,49 +466,3 @@ func (device *Device) IpcHandle(socket net.Conn) {
buffered.Flush()
}
}
type ipcSetDevice struct {
headers struct {
init *magicHeader
response *magicHeader
cookie *magicHeader
transport *magicHeader
}
}
func (d *ipcSetDevice) mergeWithDevice(device *Device) error {
if d.headers.init == nil {
d.headers.init = device.headers.init
}
if d.headers.response == nil {
d.headers.response = device.headers.response
}
if d.headers.cookie == nil {
d.headers.cookie = device.headers.cookie
}
if d.headers.transport == nil {
d.headers.transport = device.headers.transport
}
headers := []*magicHeader{d.headers.init, d.headers.response, d.headers.cookie, d.headers.transport}
for i := 0; i < len(headers); i++ {
for j := i + 1; j < len(headers); j++ {
left := headers[i]
right := headers[j]
if left.start <= right.end && right.start <= left.end {
return errors.New("headers must not overlap")
}
}
}
device.headers.init = d.headers.init
device.headers.response = d.headers.response
device.headers.cookie = d.headers.cookie
device.headers.transport = d.headers.transport
return nil
}