lx: fix transport padding buffer overrun + harden AWG config guards
Transport padding (s4) crashed the whole process with "index out of range" in RoutineSequentialSender on the first data packet: InputPacket/InputPackets sized elem.buffer without headroom for the in-buffer right-shift that prepends the random prefix. - send.go: reserve paddings.transport in both injection-path allocLength computations; replace the manual backward byte loop with an overlap-safe copy; defensively grow the buffer (pool-backed) if it still lacks headroom, dropping packets that cannot fit a single WG message instead of overrunning. - receive.go: drop the rxBytes/timers block duplicated by the AWG re-graft (rx accounting was doubled, keepKeyFreshReceiving fired twice per batch). - send.go: swap jmin/jmax when configured inverted (UAPI validates the fields only individually; a swapped pair panicked rand.Int with a non-positive bound on the first handshake). - obf*.go: bound obfuscator length args to [0, MaxMessageSize] (negative panicked slice bounds, huge ones OOMed the handshake). - magic-header.go: widen to int64 before end-start+1 so a full-range header cannot wrap to a zero rand.Int bound. Tests: transport_padding_test.go reproduces the on-device crash byte-for-byte (red on the previous commit, green now) across both injection paths and the tun path; obf_guards_test.go pins the config-value guards.
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9 changed files with 502 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
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package device
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import "strconv"
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func newDataSizeObf(val string) (obf, error) {
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length, err := strconv.Atoi(val)
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length, err := parseObfLen(val)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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